China’s Third Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean: Expanding Influence and Ambitions

Critical Questions by Ryan C. Berg, Henrietta Levin, and Bonny Lin

Published December 18, 2025

China's Foreign Ministry recently released its third policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). The paper is wide-ranging, encompassing topics from diplomacy to security cooperation and cultural exchange. The document reflects China's growing engagement with the Western Hemisphere and its increasingly comprehensive approach.

Q1: On December 10, 2025, China released its third policy paper on LAC. What does it indicate about China's strategy toward the region?

A1: In its 2025 policy paper on LAC, China puts forward a largely affirmative agenda for an institutionalized, expanded, and elevated relationship with LAC countries. This agenda hinges on "Five Programs for Building a China-LAC Community with a Shared Future," including a Solidarity Program, Development Program, Civilization Program, Peace Program, and People-to-People Connectivity Program. The "community with a shared future" concept is a central component of Xi Jinping thought, and while China has only vaguely defined this term, it now appears in nearly all Chinese foreign policy documents and can be understood as an affirmation of China's intent to continue building an alternative world order that is more friendly to China's authoritarian system of government, that guarantees deference to Beijing on its interests (for example, with respect to Taiwan), and that marginalizes U.S. influence.

The sequencing of the policy paper is significant. It begins with the Solidarity Program, which combines prior policy papers' sections on political cooperation and international collaboration into one combined agenda, while adding important new topics such as respect for core interests, including the one-China principle (see Q4), and implementation of China's Global Governance Initiative. This suggests China's primary objectives in the LAC region are fundamentally political; China hopes LAC will play an important role in legitimizing its aggressive posture toward Taiwan and supporting the alternative world order Beijing is working to build.

Next, the paper turns to the Development Program. This is the paper's longest section, illustrating the continued importance of economic and commercial cooperation in China-LAC ties. The Development Program begins with the implementation of the Global Development Initiative, through which China will "share development opportunities of Chinese modernization" with the region, as well as the implementation of China's Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing then puts forward an expansive agenda for continued cooperation on financial issues, energy, infrastructure, manufacturing, agriculture, food security, and science and technology. The Development Program also addresses maritime and environmental issues, perhaps in acknowledgment of regional concerns regarding Chinese illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in LAC waters and the environmental impacts of certain Chinese mining and infrastructure projects. Notably, the Development Program includes a new section on "development assistance"-a term that does not appear in either of China's prior papers-standing in contrast to the United States' slashing of foreign assistance to the region.

The Development Program illustrates China's plans to expand dual-use infrastructure in the region. The paper prioritizes high-tech cooperation in "information technology, Artificial Intelligence (AI), aviation and aerospace, new energy, new materials, [and] biomedicine and integrated circuits." China encourages regional countries to use its Beidou Navigation Satellite System and proposes joint construction of a cooperation and development center toward that end. Already, China has more space infrastructure in LAC than anywhere else in the world outside of mainland China. Tucked into the maritime cooperation section, China also explicitly notes that it wants to "build logistical supply base(s) for China's Antarctic expedition."

The paper also features an expanded section on security and law enforcement cooperation, ambitiously titled the Peace Program. This section is framed by the Global Security Initiative, a Chinese effort to recast global norms for international and domestic security and assert leadership on security matters at the expense of the United States and its alliances. Whereas the 2016 paper's security section included only two efforts-military cooperation and judicial and police cooperation-the 2025 Peace Program also features cybersecurity, nonproliferation export controls, and anticorruption and fugitive repatriation. The latter item reflects the continued internationalization of President Xi's anticorruption drive, but may also implicitly acknowledge LAC concerns regarding corruption in Chinese development projects.

Overall, the 2025 policy paper demonstrates continuity with previous documents, released in 2008 and 2016. Political cooperation is consistently presented as the foundation of China-LAC ties. Cooperation on economic development and Beijing's value proposition as a trade and commercial partner are always emphasized. The 2016 and 2025 papers are both couched in Xi Jinping Thought and Xi's vision of a community of shared future.

But the 2025 policy paper also illustrates ways in which China's strategy for the LAC region has evolved. Beijing's approach has clearly grown more comprehensive and institutionalized. The 2025 paper covers a wider range of issues and is much longer than its predecessors, clocking in at 9,332 characters in contrast to 7,439 and 4,891 characters in 2016 and 2008, respectively. Some of this additional length can be attributed to an expanded agenda, including military and law enforcement cooperation; in the 2025 paper, Beijing demonstrates new confidence in bringing a security agenda to its LAC partnerships. Additionally, Xi's four global initiatives-the Global Governance Initiative, Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilizational Initiative-serve as organizing principles for the strategy. This demonstrates the degree to which China's approach to the LAC region has been integrated into a coherent global strategy.

Q2: The Trump administration recently released its National Security Strategy (NSS), with a large focus on the Western Hemisphere. Is China's policy paper a response to the Trump administration's NSS, or should it be read in a different light?

A2: The timing of China's third policy paper on LAC is intriguing. Beijing published its first paper on the region in early November 2008, before then Chinese President Hu Jintao's late November tour of the region, and issued its second paper in November 2016, immediately after President Xi Jinping wrapped up a three-country tour of Latin America. This time, Xi did not travel to Latin America in December 2025 and there are no known plans for him to be in the region in January 2026.

The paper's release comes on the heels of the Trump administration's NSS, which featured four pages on the U.S. reprioritization of the Western Hemisphere, placed first in the regional section of the NSS. The NSS also led with the development of a "Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine," which states the United States will seek to "deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere." The mention of strategic vital assets is a clear reference to China's ownership and operation of important infrastructure, such as ports and energy generation and distribution, in LAC. The Trump administration's NSS also promises to "restore American preeminence" in the Western Hemisphere and expresses a desire to "enlist and expand" the United States' regional allies, partly to slow and curtail China's advance in the region.

But China was likely most worried by the NSS position on Taiwan, which notes the importance of the island and that the United States will "build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain," including denying "any attempt to seize Taiwan." Chinese officials have been cautious in responding to the document, but China's Ministry of National Defense responded to a question about the NSS by reaffirming China's long-standing concerns regarding the United States' position on Taiwan. Chinese media and netizens have gone much further, claiming the new policy paper on LAC aims to extend Chinese influence within the United States' immediate neighborhood in response to the U.S. focus on Taiwan. They argue that by increasing Chinese activities in LAC, Beijing is showcasing its willingness to push back against the United States globally, drawing a comparison between the United States' focus on Taiwan-the most important core Chinese interest-and China's plans to expand its influence in the region, which the United States has identified as core to its national security interests.

Indeed, China's third policy paper reiterates points made in the roadmap paper Beijing released earlier this year following the China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit in May 2025. China regularly publishes roadmap papers in its summit gatherings with CELAC as well, which occur roughly every three years. Specifically, in the most recent roadmap paper, China seeks to take advantage of what it characterizes as the United States' "bloc politics," "hegemonism" as espoused in the positive U.S. references to the Monroe Doctrine, lack of support for Global South causes, such as the reform of multilateral institutions, and the current state of the global order. This can foster "grievance-based unity" that appeals to some countries in the region.

Q3: The Trump administration has evinced an intense focus on the Western Hemisphere, some of which is driven by a desire to compete with China in the region. Does the document indicate China will recalibrate its strategy toward LAC?

A3: In many ways, foreign policy begins closer to home for the second Trump administration, which has been described as a "Latin America-first administration." Just about every cabinet official who has visited the Western Hemisphere-and there have been many-has mentioned China during their stops. Meanwhile, China's third policy paper on LAC makes clear that China intends to continue expanding its engagement in the Western Hemisphere. In other words, great power competition in the region has only just begun.

Strategically, China's approach in LAC appears to stay the course, aiming to position China as the preferred partner in a number of priority areas, ensuring the region's support on international standard setting, reforms to multilateral institutions, and development initiatives. Likewise, Beijing hopes to secure the region's "non-alignment" on issues of import, such as United Nations resolutions regarding its human rights practices or statements condemning its support for Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine. Similarly, China mentions the region's absorption of its manufacturing output, including electric vehicle and green industry manufacturing, as well as continued support for space cooperation.

China's 2025 policy paper does not explicitly reference the United States, but it notes that China will oppose decoupling, hegemony, and subjugation by any third party. It also states that China advocates for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and opposes the "willful threat or use of force." The paper casts China as a benign partner, while positioning it to contest U.S. influence across a wide range of issues and implicitly warning LAC countries against adopting measures that could impinge on Chinese interests at the behest of the United States.

Q4: LAC still counts seven countries that recognize Taiwan diplomatically. The document places the issue of Taiwan first in the section on "mutual support of each others' core interests and major concerns." How does China pursue the concept of the one-China principle in LAC?

A4: China's third policy paper on LAC is structured differently than the prior two papers to more clearly highlight the importance of Taiwan as not only the political foundation but the "premise" for how Beijing conducts diplomatic relations with countries in the region. Beijing insists that countries abide by its one-China principle. Specifically, countries should:

Abide by the one-China principle, recognize that there is but one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory, and the government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China, oppose "Taiwan independence" in any form, and support the Chinese government in safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity and realizing national reunification.

This list of demands is far more extensive than what was included in the 2016 paper, where China merely noted that countries need to "abide by the one China principle and support China's great cause of reunification." The 2016 paper did not even mention the word Taiwan. The 2008 paper did mention Taiwan, but did not ask countries to do more than avoid relations or contact with Taiwan, support China's unification, and support the one-China principle.

Prioritized as the second item within the 2025 paper's Solidarity Program, Taiwan is discussed in a new section titled "Mutual Support of Each Others' Core Interests and Major Concerns." Importantly, this integrates the one-China principle into China's action plan for the region. In China's action plan for the region, the only activity that precedes support for Taiwan in China's list of activities is high-level visits. This stands in stark contrast to the two prior papers, which discussed the one-China principle in the context of general principles and values-such as equality, mutual trust, and mutual respect-that guide China's engagement with the region. This identification of mutual support as an activity means that China now expects more from regional countries aside from not having contact with Taipei.

Indeed, China has long rewarded regional countries that publicly back Beijing's claims and pressured countries to curtail engagement with Taiwan. Moving forward, China is likely to increase its scrutiny of how regional countries deal with Taiwan and use more carrots and sticks to influence regional policies. For example, earlier this month, after a delegation of Colombian parliamentarians visited Taipei, Colombian President Gustavo Petro had to cancel a planned trip to China in December and reschedule it for early 2026. Likely in response to Beijing's anger, Colombia's foreign ministry also publicly reaffirmed its support of China's position on Taiwan.

China is likely to also accelerate efforts to "flip" Taiwan's remaining diplomatic allies in the region. As a region, LAC has the largest number of countries-Belize, Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines-that still recognize Taipei instead of Beijing. Since 2016, Beijing has successfully convinced nine countries to sever ties with Taipei, often promising significant diplomatic and economic incentives. Currently, China is particularly focused on winning over Paraguay and Guatemala, two of Taiwan's largest partners with the most power and influence regionally. Additionally, recent elections in the region, such as in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, have broken the hold of long-dominant establishment parties, giving Beijing new opportunities to encourage a diplomatic flip.

Ryan C. Berg is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Henrietta Levin is a senior fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS. Bonny Lin is director of the China Power Project and senior adviser at CSIS.

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