Digital Echoes: Countering adversarial narratives in Georgia and Armenia

Metadata

From Tbilisi to Yerevan, adversarial narratives are gaining ground in the digital sphere, increasingly targeting the European Union. While the EU maintains a solid digital footprint in Georgia and Armenia⁽¹⁾, an innovative approach to digital diplomacy, based on AI-enhancedsocial listening, can help it navigate and shape these increasingly contested information spaces.

EU Delegation accounts post multiple times a day, indicating a strong commitment to digital communication. Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions also engage in online outreach, albeit less regularly and with more limited scope. This pattern mirrors broader trends among international organisations and governments. In both Georgia and Armenia, the EU primarily uses Facebook to communicate with the general public, in line with local preferences, while relying on X for elite-to-elitecommunication, facilitating exchanges among political-diplomaticactors and policyexperts⁽²⁾.

This Brief outlines how the EU can better leverage digital diplomacy (public diplomacy conducted via digital means)⁽³⁾in strategically important regions to pre-emptand counter adversarial information campaigns in its Eastern neighbourhood. First, it maps the contested information environments in Georgia and Armenia, where both foreign (FIMI) and domestic (DIMI) information manipulation and interference efforts targeting the EU are on the rise. Building on AI-enhancedcontent analysis, the Brief goes on to recommend how the EU can improve outreach and counter adversarial narratives by better 'listening to the digital echoes' of its onlinepresence.

Adversarial narratives

The South Caucasus presents a contested information landscape, shaped by ongoing geopolitical rivalries and unresolved internal conflicts. In both Armenia and Georgia, distinct patterns of adversarial narratives targeting the EU's presence can be identified⁽⁴⁾.

In Armenia, one dominant disinformation narrative presents the EU as conducting a geopolitical offensive aimed at altering the security status quo in the region by driving out Russia and Iran. In parallel, Russia is depicted as a benign power under existential threat from encirclement and destabilisation efforts. This narrative constructs starkly opposing identities for Russia and the EU, while framing the EU as a hostile actor waging a 'hybrid war' using covert tactics and disinformation campaigns⁽⁵⁾. According to the disinformation narratives, the EU orchestrates destabilisation by supporting local revolutionary elites and propping up Pashinyan's 'puppet regime'. It is portrayed as acting against popular interests by pressuring legitimate governments in the region and fomenting conflict through military assistance and efforts to expel Russia from Armenia, including by removing its military presence at the Gyumri base.

Since its deployment in 2023, the EU civilian mission in Armenia, EUMA, has become a prominent target of adversarial narratives. The Kremlin portrays EUMA as both powerless and ineffective, yet at the same time secretly armed and posing an obstacle to peace. It is also accused of exceeding its mandate by engaging in espionage activities against local actors, Russia and Iran, or acting as a front for creeping NATO expansion in the region. Simultaneously, EUMA is targeted in Azerbaijani media narratives (often echoing themes spread by Russian outlets⁽⁶⁾) and even domestically produced disinformation. In the latter, the mission is depicted as orchestrating the return of Azerbaijanis to areas in Armenia where itoperates.

In Georgia, adversarial narratives also portray the EU as a destabilising force. Unlike in Armenia, however, this is framed through the lens of a shadowy global 'party of war' that seeks to draw Georgia into a confrontation with Russia by opening a 'second front'. Echoing Trumpian rhetoric, recent narratives have increasingly focused on an allegedly EU-backed'deep state' that supports opposition parties - revolutionaries who sow chaos and sedition, and undermine Georgia's sovereignty, while also promoting ultraliberal values alien to Georgian society. In comparison to Armenia, a larger share of the conspiratorial and adversarial narratives are domestically generated and reflect the interests of the ruling elite. These narratives implicate the EU in the domestic political struggles while largely exempting the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), as it is perceived by the regime as serving its interests. While the Kremlin amplifies key disinformation narratives, such as claims that the EU funds protests against the Georgian Dream government, the rise of homegrown disinformation has reduced Russia's need to invest in FIMI, especially as Georgian Dream has adopted policies that distance the country from the EU⁽⁷⁾.

AI-driven analysis

This section shows how widely available, AI-enhancedsocial listening tools can be used to better understand, and potentially shape, the information environment in which the EU operates. Analysing Facebook comments on EU-affiliatedpages in Georgia and Armenia, we combined AI-poweredsocial listening with human insight to compare public engagement across EU Delegations and CSDP missions⁽⁸⁾.

Data: Caucasus Barometer Survey, Georgia and Armenia, 2024

Starting from the premise that the EU's social media communications serve both to convey core messages - such as promoting EU values, raising awareness and sharing information - and to foster engagement with target audiences, this analysis highlights the value of these digital spaces. They provide actionable insights that can support prebunking efforts and facilitate more effective public outreach. Our AI-enhancedsentiment and content analysis of EU Delegation and CSDP mission accounts in Georgia and Armenia captured local perceptions of the EU, views on Russia's geopolitical presence in the region and domestic politicaldynamics.

The analysis revealed many positive comments expressing gratitude for the EU's presence in Georgia and Armenia. These included expressions of support for a successful integration process or praise for CSDP patrol deployments. It also showed that the local population uses social media platforms to channel concerns about domestic governance and economic conditions, the extent of Moscow's political influence, as well as to express nationalistic or anti-Russiansentiments. Still, despite representing a minority of interactions, the most negative comments revealed clear traces of adversarial FIMI and DIMI narratives⁽⁹⁾. These included accusations of hidden corruption and claims of EU or broader Western interference in domestic politics. Underpinning many of these messages were concerns over loss of sovereignty, fears of being drawn into war or destabilisation via externally orchestrated 'colour revolutions', and claims that the EU seeks to impose an 'ultraliberal' agenda at odds with local traditional values.

NB: Analysis based on user comments posted under Facebook content from the official accounts of the EU delegations and missions in Georgia and Armenia.

From echoes to impact

The EU should further leverage its digital presence in Georgia and Armenia to counter adversarial narratives- foreign or domestic - and take greater control of how its image is shaped. This requires a communication strategy that is both proactive and data-driven: in a post-factualera, facts still matter. Communication should also better reflect local languages and cultural sensitivities as well as media consumption patterns. Adopting new formats such as vlogging and Instagram reels, or engaging local influencers, can help the EU connect with wider and younger audiences. Steady engagement, both digital and offline, is essential - although strategic silence may at times prove more effective than futile attempts to debunk every piece of disinformation. The key is to decide based on empirical evidence andcontext⁽¹⁰⁾.

Delegations and missions need more funding and trained personnel - such as specialised STRATCOM officers speaking the local language. The EU could achieve much in terms of countering FIMI and improving its image in the global information environment at a cost equivalent to that of a single F-35or a few Leopard 2 tanks. However, with a fierce battle over the next EU Multiannual Financial Framework now underway, it is also important to recognise that efficiency can be achieved through measures requiring little or no additional funding.

These measures include clear strategic guidance from headquarters and systematic assessment of critical adversarial narratives, enhanced by AI and big data analysis. Intensified horizontal exchanges, both internally and with likeminded partners, are equally important. Many of the disinformation tactics deployed by Russia follow familiar patterns, from the Black Sea to the Arctic. Moreover, coordination between Delegations and missions on the ground often remains ad hocand overly reliant on personal networks, while standard operating procedures (SOPs) are not sufficiently harmonised. While the Delegation is in charge of political communications, the CSDP missions can play a more integrated analytical role if clear mechanisms and effective coordinating structures (such as a dedicated inter-institutionalworking group) arein place.

Calls for a more proactive EU communication strategy, and the need to maintain a presence in the information space,⁽¹¹⁾are not new. When the EU remains silent, others fill the communication space. Streamlined use of digital tools and AI-enhancedmedia analysis, externally sourced on the EU market or custom-built, can save valuable time and create new opportunities for engagement. Effective use of social listening tools can help the EU identify what kind of engagement is effective and why, fostering more interactive two-waycommunication⁽¹²⁾both online and offline, while also enabling the monitoring of how key narratives spread and evolve over time. Lastly, the EU should step up support for civil society actors who counter FIMI independently and often have closer ties to target audiences - particularly in light of recent USAID funding cuts in the region. To maintain the edge in the increasingly competitive information environment, the EU must actively project its image, ideas and priorities - committing the necessary resources while also leveraging cost-effectivetools to enhance efficiency.

References

*The authors would like to thank Carole-Louise Ashby, EUISS trainee, for her invaluable research assistance.

• 1As of 19 June 2025 EU accounts feature these followers: EUDEL GE: 126K (FB); 18.1K (X); 8K (IG). EUMM: 45K (FB); 4.7K (X). EUDEL AR: 111K (FB); 19K (X); 10K (IG). EUMA: 1.6K (FB); 4.8K (X).
• 2Bjola, C. and Manor, I., 'The rise of hybrid diplomacy: from digital adaptation to digital adoption', International Affairs, Vol. 98, No 2, 2022, pp. 471-91.
• 3Currently, there is no common definition of digital diplomacy in the EU. See Sottilotta, C.E., 'A "battle for hearts and minds"? EU digital diplomacy toward the Global South', Global Policy, Vol. 15, No 5, 2024, pp. 915-27; Zabala Roldán, P., La diplomacia digital de la Unión Europea, Reus, Madrid, 2022.
• 4The overview in this section draws on: EUvsDisinfo (2024, 2025); Myth Detector (2024, 2025); Media Development Foundation (2024); GFSIS (2024); Friedrich Naumann Foundation (2024); IWPR (2025).
• 5Kovalčíková, N., 'Hybrid warfare: dismantling the hypocrisy of Russia's rhetoric', in Ditrych, O. and Everts, S. (eds.), 'Unpowering Russia: How the EU can counter and undermine the Kremlin', Chaillot Paper No.186, EUISS, May 2025.
• 6See Simonyan, O., 'Coinciding agendas: Russian and Azerbaijani media narratives target EU mission', Media.am, 2 June 2025.
• 7The authors compiled a database of the most frequently recurring narratives in Georgia and Armenia, which informed the analysis. The data was taken from the 'EUvsDisinfo' archive, with entries between February 2022 and May 2025.
• 8Facebook comments were scraped using Apify and translated into English via Google Translate. Up to 1300 recent comments per page were collected (as of May 2025). The data was split into four datasets (EUDEL Georgia, EUDEL Armenia, EUMM Georgia, EUMA Armenia) and analysed in MAXQDA. A consistent process was used for sentiment and content analysis, including autocoding, sentiment tagging, with inbuilt AI-generated thematic summaries. Results were reviewed and interpreted by the authors.
• 9See note 7.
• 10The authors conducted 11 semi-structured interviews with EU officials, from both HQ and the region.
• 11Remarks made by Christophe Lemoine, Porte-Parole et Directeur de la Communication et de la Presse, MEAE, during a conference titled 'La diplomatie numérique et l'audience nationale', 11 April 2025, CERI-Science Po, Paris.
• 12'A "battle for hearts and minds"?', op. cit.

Links

• Download the brief

Metadata Bottom

• Russia and Eastern Neighbours
• Countering Foreign Interference