Support Civil Society, Counter Autocracy

Commentary by Andrew Friedman

Published April 28, 2025

Autocrats desire a more autocratic world. A lack of transparency opens the door for greater corruption and kleptocracy and normalizes human rights violations. It also creates new international norms, such as transnational repression, including international assassinations. In addition to wanting to avoid these blights on society, polling data consistently demonstrates that people want to live in countries where they have real input on decisions that impact their lives. Supporting democracy and pushing back on autocracy is the responsibility of all who prefer democracy and aim to live in a freer world.

Speaking for the Trump administration, Pete Marocco, former acting deputy administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), declared in a recent court filing that "USAID intends to terminate instruments that the . . . Administrator determines are inconsistent with the national interests or USAID's mission." By implication, this includes listed categories of canceled contracts including "Regime Change, 'Civic Society' or 'Democracy Promotion'."

Besides parroting an authoritarian talking point-likening civil society and democracy promotion with regime change, cited by Serbian law enforcement in a raid on civil society organizations (CSOs)-this approach amounts to unilateral disarmament in the ongoing battle between democracy and authoritarianism. Authoritarian governments provide support to actors around the globe aiming to make the world more authoritarian; democratic governments should, in turn, provide support to civil society aiming to make the world more democratic.

Spreading Authoritarianism

Take, for example, the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School in Tanzania, a leadership academy supported by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), along with six ruling revolutionary movements of Southern Africa that make up the Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa (FLMSA). There is nothing inherently troubling about a leadership school receiving financial support from Beijing; however, the CCP is not just a funder or supporter, but an active participant in training the school's students, with involvement from CCP instructors, other CCP officials, and the Chinese embassy. This has led to instruction and training on the structure and implementation of a one-party state, or "the CCP's founding principle of 'absolute party control of government,' or the 'one post two responsibilities system'."

These types of relationships are not limited to Southern Africa. Chinese National Academies of Governance, international extensions of the CCP party school, conduct year-round programming in Algeria, Ethiopia, and Kenya. An Atlantic Council report found a massive expansion of CCP training offerings since 2013. While 36 percent of these trainings were either "clearly authoritarian" or "potentially authoritarian" in nature, the report notes that there has been a clear effort to ensure that "authoritarian governance choices are being promoted even in the most niche of subject areas." Such seemingly apolitical trainings include things like "beekeeping, bamboo forestry, meteorology, or low-carbon development."

This type of engagement is only set to increase. As Beijing moves to focus on smaller projects rather than the grand infrastructure of the early Belt and Road Initiative, this year's Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) saw multiple governance-related pledges in the Beijing Action Plan for 2025-2027. This includes "a platform for governance experience-sharing between China and Africa" and a "China-Africa network of knowledge for development and 25 China-Africa research centers" supported by China. Finally, "[t]he African Leadership Academy will be leveraged to train governance talent and 1000 African political party personages invited to China for exchanges."

Russia's approach to making the world safer for autocrats is less subtle than Beijing's. Through military operators, including the Wagner Group and its follow-on organizations such as the Africa Corps, Moscow has worked diligently and opportunistically to prop up dictators, assisting them in combatting any threats to their power with all of the tools in its toolbox. In the Central African Republic, Russia has served both as a praetorian guard for President Touadera as he postures toward a potential third term and as a violent enforcer. Reports have included complex disinformation campaigns, often targeting and co-opting civil society; violent intimidation of dissenting voices, including journalists; and violence against civilian populations. The same is true across the 20-some countries in which Wagner and its follow-on organizations operate, where the group has cultivated ties and worked to co-opt civil society, student organizations, and activists.

These efforts go far beyond technical and political support. They aim to both deepen authoritarianism in authoritarian states, such as Zimbabwe and Algeria, and move the needle toward authoritarianism in democracies such as Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa-all democratic members of FLMSA. They also aim to consolidate authoritarianism in ostensibly transitional countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso, where international support for military juntas could prove influential in future democratic trajectories.

People Want Democracy; Civil Society Helps Provide It

It would be easy for proponents of an isolationist foreign policy to dismiss authoritarian governments spreading authoritarianism as outside the manageable interest of the United States. In this framing, yes, Beijing and Moscow are attempting to ensure that more states are authoritarian and consolidate power in current authoritarian states. However, that does not mean the United States and other pro-democracy actors need to engage in a push and pull, with one side aiming for its preferred system while the other does the same. This ignores one simple fact: People want democracy.

In a geographically expansive survey of 24 nations, Gallup saw 77 percent support for representative democracy, in comparison to 26 percent support for rule by a strong leader and 15 percent support for military rule. Afrobarometer data shows a strong preference and demand for democracy, with 66 percent of respondents demonstrating support for democracy. This number is down from its 2011 peak, but still well in the positive. Arab Barometer and Americas Barometer are also similarly in the positive, with a clear preference for democratic rule.

Improving democratic outcomes is the irreplaceable role of civil society. The U.S. Department of State, in a fact sheet released January 20, 2025, stated that a robust civil society ". . . is essential for democracy to thrive." The Council of Europe has gone further, stating that CSOs make an "essential contribution . . . to the development and realisation of democracy and human rights, in particular through the promotion of public awareness, participation in public life and securing the transparency and accountability of public authorities."

The active contribution civil society makes to the development of democracy is only eclipsed by how deeply CSOs push back against authoritarianism. When Stanford political sociologist Larry Diamond spoke in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, he told gathered representatives that "Civil society actors should watch how state officials use their powers. They should raise public concern about any abuse of power. They should lobby for access to information, including freedom of information laws, and rules and institutions to control corruption." In fact, Diamond insisted, "The first and most basic role of civil society is to limit and control the power of the state."

This is why autocrats attack civil society.

Recommendations

As the United States considers next steps for foreign assistance, global civil society should take center stage.

USAID was the world's largest funder of civil society organizations. The sudden and unexpected freeze of funding has wreaked havoc on CSOs the world over. In one poll, 44 percent of CSOs stated they had three months or more of operating expenses, with 14 percent saying they have less than one month. In another survey, only 13.7 percent of CSOs stated they have more than six months of operating budget. This is part of a broader trend, with major cuts already announced in donor nations such as Belgium and the Netherlands alongside the European Union, and with cuts presumed given defense spending increases in Germany.

There is little doubt, however, that such support can be more impactful and more efficient. For this reason, the United States, as it thinks through the future of foreign assistance, should center civil society in the discussion. Voices from organizations that have received funding from USAID and other institutions should be included to discuss how assistance can be provided in ways that promote U.S. interests while ensuring CSOs' ultimate survival.

As part of its foreign assistance review process, the State Department has already hosted multiple "listening sessions," aiming to hear concerns and receive input from invited individuals about the road forward. While these efforts have reportedly included specialists in multiple subject matters, they have not led to concrete action or a public strategic plan. At least one participant referred to them as mere "tick the box" exercises.

These sessions, and such gatherings in the future, have the opportunity to provide real insight that is missed in the current policy conversation. They could also be expanded geographically, with gatherings held at embassies where civil society representatives from countries that traditionally have received substantial foreign assistance could explain to policymakers how decisions have impacted those most affected on the ground.

Gathering the collective insight of civil society on how to improve foreign assistance and using it to chart a real tangible path forward is in the interest of both the United States and global civil society.

The United States should loudly speak up against closing civic space.

According to Civicus, which monitors civic space, 7 of 10 people worldwide live in a country where civil society is either closed or repressed. This contrasts with a mere 3.6 percent of people worldwide who live in countries where civic space is open. This level of repression is an existential threat to civil society as a whole. In addition to foreign assistance, diplomacy should play a significant role in countering the trend toward repression.

In addition to the Serbia example mentioned above, the words of the Trump administration have led to action against civil society in several countries in the former Soviet Bloc. U.S. leadership on civil society partnerships and the importance of CSOs has impact. It is crucial that this impact be leveraged in a positive direction, such as by urging states to accommodate and work with civil society to improve the lives of individuals rather than sanctioning crackdowns. This starts at the country level, where ambassadors should quickly decry any actions to break civil society. It should also include broad statements from Washington about the importance of civil society partners and the role they play in improving individuals' lives the world over.

The United States should foster long-term partnerships with civil society.

Robust relationships with civil society actors create lasting goodwill for future leaders and for those called on in the event of political upheaval, when diplomacy can be difficult due to unclear lines of communication and murky context. Alternatively, if geopolitical rivals such as Moscow and Beijing are ceded the playing field, future leaders will not forget their friends. Take South Africa, for example, where the United States siding with the repressive apartheid government over organizations fighting for political freedom and human rights today reverberates in warm feelings toward Russia, which supported the revolutionary groups.

Investing in long-term relationships with civil society, both through foreign assistance and diplomacy, serves to improve long-term alliances and position the United States for future success in a way short-term repression of civil society actors never could. However, given recent vitriol against CSOs from the Trump administration, there is much repairing to be done. This means reinstating funding and ensuring stable funding sources, standing shoulder to shoulder with CSOs through diplomacy and, importantly, giving civil society a seat at the table.

The bilateral engagements preferred by the Trump administration make the logistics of such consultations relatively simple, where traveling policymakers could engage with civil society in country and discussions with civil society could be held, either in Washington or virtually, in advance of delegation visits to Washington.

Civil society participation in such engagements is mutually beneficial. CSOs would have inroads to inform and influence the conversation. The local ownership and influence on such efforts would make the deals the Trump administration seeks far more sustainable and long term. Take, for example, peace agreements currently being brokered by the Trump administration in Ukraine, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Israel/Gaza: A lack of civil society participation "can prove fatal" in implementation, thus negating any deals or their legacy.

Beyond high-level administration engagement, USAID has traditionally been a focus point of executive branch relationships with global civil society, so the Trump administration will have to empower other elements of the U.S. government to maintain those relationships on a day-to-day basis. The State Department's Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) is a logical central point of contact, where technical experts on these issues can provide both technical and financial support to global civil society. A proposed reorganization is set to change the name of the bureau, but not its ability to work with civil society long term provided there are not significant staffing cuts. Other areas that have similarly seen budgetary cuts, such as the Department of Labor's Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB), should also be empowered to maintain robust and multifaceted relationships with civil society organizations in their subject areas.

This focus on high-level engagement alongside deep and sturdy day-to-day relationship maintenance has long-term value to the United States, helping to foster generational alliances. If the United States shortsightedly ignores civil society, over the long run, as civil society actors rise to positions of power given their trust with local communities, the United States will have diplomatic bridges to rebuild rather than utilize.

Conclusion

Civil society provides support for democracy while pushing back on authoritarianism and state overreach. It also provides a training ground for a future crop of leaders who know how to rally people and advocate for their community. These types of alternative power bases and intentional groupings around issues promote democratic structures and counter authoritarian governance.

Ultimately, providing support to civil society and democracy promotion is not a nebulous attempt at regime change; rather, it equips individuals with skills to play a greater role in the affairs that most impact their lives, including human rights, health, economic development, and security. Authoritarian actors are working diligently to provide similar tools to would-be authoritarians and budding repressive governments. By ceding the space and abandoning civil society partners, the United States and other democratic governments are not avoiding regime change; they are just ensuring the change will be toward greater repression, authoritarianism, and corruption.

Andrew Friedman is a senior fellow with the Human Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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