Warren Calls For Trump Administration To Act As New START Expires, Warns Of Nuclear Arms Race

Warren Calls For Trump Administration To Act As New START Expires, Warns Of Nuclear Arms Race

The U.S.-Russia arms control treaty is set to expire in two days.

Former New START negotiator confirmed that walking away from arms control negotiations on Russia's nuclear arsenal would make China less likely to engage in limiting its nuclear arsenal.

Warren: "It is a mistake to let New START expire and to walk away from an agreement that gives us valuable intelligence information. We need to do better."

Video of Exchange (YouTube)

Washington, D.C. - At a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) raised concerns about the imminent expiration of the last bilateral arms control agreement with Russia. New START, which limits the number of deployed nuclear warheads and has provided insight into the Russian arsenal, reducing guesswork for U.S. military planning, is set to expire this week.

After the height of the Cold War, the U.S. worked to prevent a nuclear arms race through arms control agreements, including negotiating New START with Russia. The New START agreement facilitated data exchanges between the U.S. and Russia and allowed American inspectors to be on the ground at Russian nuclear facilities to verify compliance with the treaty's limitations. On February 5, the U.S.-Russian agreement is set to expire. While Russia proposed an option of mutually observing New START limits for an additional year, the Trump administration has not responded or pushed for a stronger extension that includes vital verification tools to prevent Russia from cheating.

Senator Warren slammed the potential expiration of the agreement, saying, "The Trump administration has been unwilling to use U.S. economic, diplomatic, and military leverage to advance an agreement that would restore verification and help keep Americans safe."

When questioned if New START strengthens transparency and predictability with Russia, Admiral (ret.) Charles A. Richard, the former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, confirmed the vital importance of arms control agreements for national security and strategic deterrence.

Before the suspension of verification by Russia during its war of aggression with Ukraine, New START enabled over 25,000 notification exchanges on the status of both countries' nuclear weapons and over 300 on-site inspections of nuclear facilities. While the State Department's annual compliance report indicates that Russia says it is complying with New START limits, it also says it cannot confirm compliance without verification tools. Ms. Rose E. Gottemoeller, former chief negotiator for New START, agreed that verification should be included in a new arms control deal, testifying that "on-site inspection is vital."

Senator Warren also questioned Ms. Gottemoeller on whether the U.S. ending restraints on Russia's nuclear arsenal would make China more likely to engage in arms control negotiations.

Ms. Gottemoeller said, "[T]he Chinese will only come to the table if the United States is engaging with Russia."

Senator Warren stressed the importance of negotiating a new and strong arms treaty: "The United States should be using its position now and using all of its economic and diplomatic powers to try to get Russia to the table, ultimately, to try to get China to the table. I think it is a mistake to let New START expire and to walk away from an agreement that gives us valuable intelligence information. We need to do better."

Transcript: Hearings to examine strategic competition in an unconstrained, post-New START Treaty environment.
Senate Armed Services Committee
February 3, 2026

Senator Elizabeth Warren: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is hard to imagine the destruction that nuclear war would bring, and that's why the U.S. has worked to prevent a nuclear arms race through arms control agreements, including negotiating New START with Russia. But this week's expiration of New START pushes the world closer to the edge.

These are agreements that facilitate data exchanges and put American inspectors on the ground at Russian nuclear facilities. That verification has provided years of insight into things like the number of warheads on each Russian missile, reducing guesswork on our military planning. And I think we can all agree, nobody wants to be guessing with nukes.

Russia suspended verification during its war of aggression against Ukraine but recently has expressed interest in extending the tenets of New START. However, the Trump administration has been unwilling to use U.S. economic, diplomatic, and military leverage to advance an agreement that would restore verification and help keep Americans safe.

Admiral Richard, you were the commander of U.S. Strategic Command. Do arms control agreements like New START strengthen transparency and predictability with Russia?

Admiral (ret.) Charles A. Richard: Senator, as I testified back when I was on active duty, arms control agreements that involve all parties, which in this case would include China, Russia and the United States, include all weapons, all types of weapons, and have verification mechanisms like you just described, with consequences for failing to uphold the agreement, do enhance strategic deterrence and national security.

Senator Warren: Thank you. The State Department knows why these verification regimes are important. It said in its annual report that it cannot confirm Russian compliance without on-site inspections, and that this kind of verification permits. Inspectors can conduct short-notice surprise visits, look at things like how many warheads are on a missile.

Without that visit, we might get lucky-we might be able to spot one from a satellite, but we wouldn't know if it could hit one target or multiple targets, and that means we're guessing. We usually have to assume the worst, and our enemies do the same. And before you know it, we are in a more dangerous arms race.

Ms. Gottemoeller, you were the chief negotiator for New START and then responsible for doing the annual compliance reports. If we lose verification due to New START's lapse, can current intelligence capabilities fully plug that hole?

Honorable Rose E. Gottemoeller: Ma'am, the New START monitoring regime, verification regime, has not been implemented since February of 2023. You mentioned that in your remarks. And so we have been dependent on our national technical means of verification. I couple that-I marry that-with a compliance report that is now coming out of the Department of State, where they say that, essentially, they see that the New START limits continue to be maintained by the Russian Federation. Now they have raised a concern about whether the Russians might be going over the operationally deployed warhead limit. But that is a concern. They haven't been able to confirm that. And I'll be frank with you, I do think that it may be associated with the so-called deployed and undeployed launcher limit. We have an undeployed launcher, a possibility where, if they were notifying us, they could tell us that they were removing certain platforms, SSBMs, for example, from deployment. And therefore, that would account for if there is some kind of differential in the number of deployed warheads.

So, I just use this as an example to say that these negotiated verification measures are really important. Its on-site inspection is vital. But with our ability to notify each other of exactly what we're doing, and we did that under New START, there were 25,000 notifications of the movements of our strategic forces exchanged on a regular basis.

Senator Warren: Thank you. I appreciate that. And I want to slip in one more question quickly, if I can, and that is, if the U.S. gives up on restraining Russia's nuclear arsenal through a new deal, does that make China more or less likely to come to the table?

Ms. Gottemoeller: I think the Chinese will only come to the table if the United States is engaging with Russia, in my opinion.

Senator Warren: Okay, that's very helpful. Thank you. You know, the United States should be using its position now and using all of its economic and diplomatic powers to try to get Russia to the table, ultimately, to try to get China to the table. I think it is a mistake to let New START expire and to walk away from an agreement that gives us valuable intelligence information. We need to do better.

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