04/01/2026 | Press release | Archived content
One of the most dangerous assumptions among newer entrants to U.S. private markets is also one of the most common: if a deal looks sophisticated, is oversubscribed, includes recognizable names, and feels well-packaged, then it must be safe.
As more GCC-based family offices, private investors, and institutional allocators pursue direct investments, co-investments, and syndicated exposure into U.S. private markets, the key differentiator is no longer access. Access has become increasingly democratized through platforms, syndicates, special purpose vehicles, feeder structures, and relationship-driven intermediaries. What remains scarce is disciplined underwriting.
Many LPs are still asking surface-level questions about prestige, momentum, and optionality, when they should be interrogating structure, incentives, entry price, liquidity, governance, and the actual mechanics of risk transfer.
At SPLY Capital, we spend significant time evaluating and underwriting each deal. We don't believe that the process and insights should be reserved for our internal diligence. By sharing our approach, we aim to empower investors with the tools and perspective needed to evaluate opportunities independently and protect their capital.
This is the framework we believe LPs should be applying before committing capital.
The first failure in private market underwriting often happens before the numbers are even reviewed: investors confuse market enthusiasm with investment quality.
A polished founder, top-tier branding, glowing press, a waitlisted allocation, big-name angels, institutional logos, or a fast-moving round can all create the impression of quality. None of these, on their own, are tangible underwriting variables.
A deal can be well marketed and still be structurally weak, overvalued, poorly governed, or misaligned with the investor's return threshold.
A disciplined allocator should start with basic but non-negotiable underwriting questions:
Where many allocators get into trouble is because they are thinking to themselves, "Could this become huge?" The right question is "At this entry price, under realistic market assumptions, is the expected return attractive?"
This is where a brief scenario analysis should come into play. A robust underwriting process should model at least three cases:
The allocator should then ask:
If the answer depends on heroic assumptions, it is not disciplined underwriting.
One of the biggest blind spots among international investors entering U.S. private markets is structural misunderstanding.
Many investors think they are underwriting a company when in reality they are first underwriting a vehicle. And the vehicle may have a greater impact on realized returns than the underlying company itself.
This is particularly relevant in SPVs, feeder funds, nominee structures, Series LLCs, offshore blockers, layered syndicates, and other pass-through arrangements frequently used to facilitate access.
Two investors can gain exposure to the same company and end up with very different economics, rights, reporting access, and liquidity outcomes depending on the structure through which they invested.
Before evaluating the company, LPs should ask:
This matters because investors often assume "I own shares in Company X," when in practice they own an interest in an SPV whose manager owns an interest in another vehicle that has economic exposure to Company X.
This distinction could impact all of the following:
We suggest conducting a technical review of vehicle mechanics covering:
Vehicle mechanics often matter more than the asset thesis because they determine whether your exposure is actually investable on terms you can defend.
In public markets, transparency is partially embedded into the system. In private markets however, transparency must be deliberately demanded.
LPs should not view reporting discipline as a nice-to-have. It is a crucial underwriting factor.
A manager, syndicate lead, or SPV sponsor who cannot explain the full structure, economics, and information flow clearly is not merely disorganized. They are increasing the probability of misalignment, monitoring failure, and negative surprises later.
Before wiring capital, investors should require clarity on the following:
A strong manager should be able to explain, within the first 30 minutes of a call:
If the explanation remains vague after repeated questioning, that ambiguity is itself a red flag.
Opacity compounds risk because it weakens the investor's ability to monitor drift, assess changes, and respond intelligently.
A common mistake in private markets is focusing entirely on the company while failing to diligence the person or institution bringing the deal. But in many private market structures, the sponsor, GP, or syndicate lead is not a neutral access point, which means you are not just investing in an asset.
You are investing in someone else's judgment, incentives, and process.
That means the allocator must ask:
A sponsor with no real downside, limited capital at risk, and economics that reward transaction velocity over investment quality may be structurally incentivized to maximize deal flow, not investor outcomes.
Underwriting the manager should include:
While much of the underwriting process is standard across structures, there are certain things you should be considering depending on whether you are evaluating a blind-pool fund, a single-asset SPV, or a syndicate-led deal as each structure distributes risk, control, and information differently.
In a fund structure, you are underwriting the GP's ability to source, select, construct, and manage a portfolio over time.
Core diligence areas:
Key questions:
In an SPV, you are underwriting a specific asset and the mechanics of the wrapper.
Core diligence areas:
Key questions:
In a syndicate model, you are underwriting both the deal and the sponsor's ability to filter, negotiate, and monitor it.
Core diligence areas:
Key questions:
A "good deal" is not defined by prestige, scarcity theatre, or whether well-known names are in the round.
From a technical underwriting perspective, higher-quality opportunities tend to share several characteristics.
Not just charismatic founders, but operators who have navigated scaling constraints, capital formation, and prior exits. A repeat founder with scar tissue tends to make better decisions around hiring, burn, timing, and capital allocation than a first-time founder optimizing for optics.
A company that has created meaningful progress per dollar of capital is generally more resilient than one that has relied on abundant funding to manufacture growth optics. Efficiency is especially important in environments where capital is no longer free.
Questions to ask:
A company's hiring quality often reveals more than the pitch deck. Great founders can recruit disproportionate talent before the market fully understands the opportunity.
Questions to ask:
A moat can be technological, regulatory, operational, distribution-driven, data-driven, or ecosystem-based. But it must be difficult to replicate and relevant to margins or market power.
Questions to ask:
The strongest companies often sit where capability meets inevitability: compute, energy, logistics, defense, AI infrastructure, industrial automation, supply chain resilience, applied software in regulated sectors, and other areas shaped by deep structural demand rather than transient excitement.
Questions to ask:
A strong deal is one where business quality, entry terms, structure, sponsor quality, and timing all work together.
Many family offices entering direct private markets from a relationship-driven or opportunistic angle have strong instincts but limited formal underwriting infrastructure. While this is understandable, once capital starts moving into concentrated, illiquid, privately negotiated transactions, informal intuition is not enough. A robust underwriting process should be consistent across every investment.
Each opportunity should be reduced to a written investment memo-covering the business model, market dynamics, competitive positioning, valuation, structure, governance, dilution, exit pathways, and, critically, the reasons not to invest.
Before committing capital, investors should be able to clearly articulate:
At SPLY Capital, we believe that better outcomes come from better-informed investors. That's why we are intentional about sharing how we underwrite opportunities bringing transparency to structure, incentives, and risk, so that every investor we work with is equipped to evaluate deals independently and allocate capital with clarity and confidence.
Published by SPLY Capital · April 2026