11/19/2024 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 11/19/2024 16:11
Photo: Parilov/Adobe Stock
Commentary by Kateryna Bondar
Published November 19, 2024
The war in Ukraine has shown that unmanned systems are now indispensable to modern war tactics. These systems-both platforms and software-are evolving at an extremely rapid pace, as new updates and technological advancements emerge sometimes within one or two days. Yet, the technology itself is only part of the story. Achieving success on the battlefield requires more than just advanced unmanned systems, it also demands their effective integration into military operations, proper deployment, personnel training, and support throughout their use.
This urgent need has pushed the Ukrainian military to institutionalize these support functions by creating a new branch of the Armed Forces of Ukraine-the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF). In addition, specialized teams started to form within frontline forces as bottom-up initiatives. These teams work to integrate unmanned systems into operations, providing support to warfighters by delivering the latest technological developments to the battlefield and training how to operate them. According to a report from CSIS, these changes significantly alter the institutional landscape within the Ukrainian military, enabling it to adapt to rapid innovations development and making it more resilient to the technological advancements of the enemy.
This article analyzes the Ukrainian experience by examining three examples of these newly formed structural units. Identifying commonalities across these three cases will draw lessons that should be learned and potentially implemented when expanding the arsenal of unmanned systems in the U.S. Army.
The first and most notable example is the establishment of the Unmanned Systems Forces as an independent branch within the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In February 2024, President Volodymyr Zelensky announced its formation, and in September 2024, the USF was officially established through the enactment of a law. The USF is tasked with managing the deployment and strategic use of unmanned systems across the military.
The second example is the formation of the unit "Typhoon" under the National Guard of Ukraine in August 2024. This specialized unit operates only unmanned systems, providing crucial operational support to combat brigades of the National Guard.
The third case comes from the Da Vinci Wolves Battalion, which has established a dedicated unit focused on unmanned ground systems (UGSs). This unit not only advances the battalion's operational use of these systems but also shares knowledge across the Ukrainian Army with the main focus on infantry units.
Several key insights can be derived from these three cases, each of which represents a practical aspect of successful unmanned systems deployment.
Innovation deployment and collaboration with defense companies. All units work directly with unmanned systems' manufacturers. The latter get direct feedback from the battlefield, allowing them to iterate quickly and adjust the systems to combat needs. The military units get improved systems tailored to their current requirements, also allowing them to be a step ahead of the enemy in the technological race.
One noteworthy example of such collaboration is the development of the remotely operated turret "ShaBlia." It was first deployed in 2014 and has since undergone substantial upgrades during the battle for Bakhmut based on direct feedback from warfighters of the Da Vinci Wolves Battalion. In response to their need for the turret to advance toward enemy positions under fire without endangering the battalion's personnel, the turret's manufacturer partnered with the producer of the wheeled platform "Rys" to create an unmanned ground system that combines a robotic platform with the turret. The following improvement included the innovative use of a Steam Deck gaming console to control ShaBlia, which is yet another example of the creative application of commercial technology into weapon systems.
Meanwhile, USF focuses heavily on collaborating with domestic drone manufacturers, maintaining contact with 90 percent of local unmanned systems manufacturers. Their mission includes deploying new systems, sharing feedback on their performance with developers, and training warfighters on how to operate them. The USF has integrated more than 170 unmanned systems into frontline operations, underscoring its role as a key enabler for adopting unmanned technologies.
Readiness to test foreign unmanned systems on the battlefield. The Department of Defense has acknowledged the strategic importance of leveraging commercial technology in unmanned systems to stay competitive in the innovation race. However, commercial drones sent to Ukraine by the U.S. have faced significant challenges, proving the need for systems to be tested in real combat environments.
The specialized unmanned systems units in Ukraine represent a unique opportunity for foreign manufacturers to test their technologies in real battlefield conditions. Ukrainian units, with their established testing processes, streamlined feedback loops, and forward-deployed engineers, offer an ideal setting for foreign manufacturers to refine their systems. By leveraging Ukraine's experience, manufacturers can achieve rapid iteration cycles, adapt quickly to adversary tactics, and ensure their technologies meet real battlefield needs.
Knowledge sharing. The USF has positioned its mission around gathering experience, disseminating knowledge, and formalizing these insights into statutes and tactical and operational guidelines. To advance this objective, the USF has developed a doctrine and a statute for unmanned systems use for all levels-from squads to battalions. It outlines standardized tactics and practices for unmanned systems as well as represents a significant effort in formalizing the use of these technologies. Oleksandr Yabchanka, meanwhile, imparts his experience both vertically-with the USF to document these practices into guidelines-and horizontally, whenever other brigades seek to learn from his expertise.
While the USF can assist in operations planning, training military personnel, and providing guidelines, they generally do not maintain their own battalions, except for small groups of forces experienced in specific operations. The Typhoon unit, on the contrary, is designed to rapidly deploy and provide operational support during combat, so unmanned systems are used effectively according to mission objectives.
Foreign militaries can draw valuable lessons from Ukrainian unmanned systems units by adopting practices that enhance adaptability and operational efficiency. For effective deployment of new systems, establishing direct communication and hands-on training with the manufacturer is essential, as developers possess the most in-depth operational knowledge of their products and can train pilots and operators. Designating personnel to compile best practices and codify strategies into accessible guidelines across services ensures that all users benefit from accumulated expertise. Involving veterans experienced in unmanned systems as leaders of these initiatives can facilitate experience sharing. Unmanned systems units can also help to streamline bureaucratic processes, and respond to real-time needs, such as accelerating acquisition timelines and enabling direct dialogue between warfighters and developers. All these practices can significantly contribute to the U.S. military's adaptability to real-battlefield challenges and the effectiveness of its weapon systems deployment.
Kateryna Bondar is a fellow with the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
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