Unpacking Ukraine’s Future Cyber and Space Forces

Critical Questions by Lauryn Williams, Taylar Rajic, and Kuhu Badgi

Published October 20, 2025

In 2024, Ukraine saw a nearly 70 percent surge in cyberattacks targeting civilian and defense critical infrastructure; yet, the number of serious attacks declined dramatically, reflecting both Russia's persistence and Ukraine's determined cyber resilience. Early in the conflict, Russia notably sabotaged U.S. company Viasat's satellite network to disrupt Ukrainian security communications ahead of a ground invasion. Confronted with escalating cyber and space threats, Kyiv is now working to create centralized structures dedicated to defending Ukraine from future multi-domain attacks.

On October 9, 2025, Ukraine's parliament approved a bill to establish a Cyber Force, which would unite its offensive and defensive military cyber capabilities under a single command. This legislation comes alongside Ukraine's parallel effort to create a Space Force by the end of 2025, as announced last month. This move signals a big shift in the strategic approach to cyberspace as a warfighting domain as it will formalize Kyiv's existing cyber defensive and offensive capabilities into an independent service focusing on manning, training, and equipping the force to combat relentless cyber threats.

Q1: What are the proposed Ukrainian Cyber and Space Forces, and how will they be organized?

A1: The proposed Ukrainian Cyber Force will create an independent command focused on offensive and defensive cyber operations, under the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi. The Cyber Force proposal also details the creation of a cyber reserve, which would feature civilian technology security experts to assist with cyber incident responses and address the growing personnel shortage amidst the ongoing war. The current figure allocated to forming the Cyber Force is approximately $336,000.

Similarly, according to Ukraine's 2025 program of activities-submitted to the Verkhovna Rada, the unicameral parliament of Ukraine-the new Space Force will become an independent entity within Ukraine's existing defense and security force structure. The force will focus on on-orbit threats, provide early-warning of missile and airborne threats, and equip Ukraine with its own space-based intelligence capabilities.

Q2: Why is Ukraine creating the Cyber Force now?

A2: The proposed bill for a new cyber service was drafted by a military working group, and submitted to parliament in December 2024, to bolster Ukraine's warfighting capabilities in cyberspace and align with NATO standards. The bill will establish a Cyber Force as an independent military body responsible for orchestrating Ukraine's cyber offensive and defensive capabilities. With the support of the Ukrainian Parliament, this move underscores the importance of cyber as a warfighting domain and the crucial role it has played in the war in Ukraine.

Cyberspace has been a critical domain in the war in Ukraine, with Russia targeting key communications systems, critical infrastructure and utilizing cyberattacks in support of its kinetic campaign. Conversely, Ukraine has also embedded cyber into its operations against Russia through both formal and informal campaigns. Shortly after the invasion in February of 2022, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence established the IT Army of Ukraine, a volunteer group of international cyber warfare operators who conduct cyberattacks against Russia. Although largely unsophisticated in its approach, the group was responsible for the largest coordinated distributed denial-of-service attack in history against Russian financial institutions. These attacks require little to no technical knowledge and simply flood a server with so much traffic the target will shut down. While noteworthy, these amateur-style attacks have at best inconvenienced Russia by disrupting internet services and impacting the stock market.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine took a more organized approach to cyber warfighting even before the full-scale invasion in 2022. It focused on hunt forward operations, conducted in partnership with U.S. Cyber Command, that successfully defended the country's most critical networks. These joint operations demonstrate the significance of active cyber defenses in conflict and the central role cyber plays in the war in Ukraine. Consolidating these dispersed efforts into an independent military service will provide a streamlined opportunity for training, recruitment, and funding for Ukraine's vast cyber operations landscape. Alongside the successful defensive cyber capabilities Ukraine has so far demonstrated, the Cyber Force will also usher in a shift away from the "hacktivist" model of the IT Army and toward more formal offensive capabilities. The move also reflects Ukraine's broader shift toward a more hybrid defense landscape focused on integrating emerging technologies into legacy defense systems that reflect the evolving nature of warfighting.

Q3: What challenges could Ukraine face in standing up these forces?

A3: Ukraine is moving to establish its own Cyber and Space Forces, but it still faces bureaucratic and implementation barriers, especially amid active conflict. The Cyber Force bill passed its "first reading" by Ukrainian legislators, but must survive a second vote and then be signed by President Volodymyr Zelensky. While there is current momentum for a Cyber Force, the idea has circulated in Ukraine for years. Even among key cyber players, not all agree on the need for a new service, echoing similar U.S. debates. Some argue assigning the same personnel to cyber defense and offensive operations will be difficult, given the different skills and legal authorities needed.

Even if President Zelensky eventually signs the bill, the devil will still be in the implementation details. Building an effective Cyber Force requires integrating fragmented Ukrainian cyber elements into one cohesive structure. Early indications suggest the Cyber Force will report directly to the commander-in-chief and the president, and will be tasked to organize, train, and equip cyber forces, including a reserve element. Given Ukraine's personnel shortage, would-be cyber servicemembers might temporarily fill a specific military function. In this environment, developing a cohesive culture will be a major challenge, all during wartime in a nation constantly bombarded by cyberattacks.

Standing up a Space Force will also be a huge undertaking, but the effort appears further along. Ukraine intends to create this new Force by December 31, 2025, setting in motion an overhaul of its armed forces that could come to include the Cyber Force. Ukraine's plans are ambitious and the government hopes to reach 60 percent operational readiness by 2026. Earlier this year, Ukraine also followed in the United States' footsteps by creating a Space Policy Department-an apparent parallel to the Pentagon's space policy office responsible for U.S. defense space policy and strategy. Today, the United States Space Force is the global benchmark for an independent space military service, a model Ukraine looks to emulate with far less resources.

Q4: How might Russia respond?

A4: Ukraine's efforts to build these new Forces are directly tied to Russia's aggressive track record in space and cyberspace; as such, Ukraine's planned military modernization will raise eyebrows in Russian military and political circles and could motivate yet more attacks. Since 2022, the Russo-Ukraine War has played out publicly in both domains. Before the ground invasion began, a Russia-linked cyberattack on U.S. space company Viasat disrupted Ukrainian official communications and spilled over into neighboring countries.

Russia has since taken an extremely aggressive posture toward U.S. commercial satellites it believes support Ukraine. Just a few months ago, Russia argued nations supporting Ukraine had no right to protest jamming of GPS satellites when called out for threatening civilian and military flight safety. Back in October 2022, a Russian diplomat used the UN stage to announce Russia would target U.S. and allied commercial satellites as "legitimate targets" in wartime.

On the terrestrial cyber front, Russian cyberattacks are an even more pressing daily threat. Ukraine's cyber defense agency tracked over one thousand attacks in 2024 alone targeting government, military and civilian infrastructure. Google's threat intelligence team reported that Russian-aligned hackers are frequently targeting even platforms known for their security like Signal Messenger to support intelligence operations. With cyberattacks in Ukraine rising exponentially in recent years, Moscow's efforts will likely intensify as Kyiv strengthens its own defensive and offensive capabilities in these domains.

Q5: What does this mean for the future of Ukraine's national security posture?

A5: Kyiv's proactive stance on cyber defensive and offensive operations is poised to bolster its multi-domain national security posture, especially in a world of increasingly tenuous international alliances. Ukraine's cyber efforts since the onset of the Russia conflict have been internationally celebrated as a model for how effective, modest investments in an agile coalition of cyber forces can counter a determined, nation-state aggressor. Since 2022, Ukraine has turned heads for its digital-forward approach to combatting Russian aggression. The Ministry of Digital Transformation and the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, the national cyber defense agency, have been front and center. Volunteer units like the IT Army of Ukraine have also demonstrated the value of civilians in effectively supporting national efforts. By necessity, Ukraine has proven that constant innovation and effectively leveraging civilian expertise can go a long way. A new Cyber Service should further streamline Ukraine's cyber successes.

In the space domain, Ukraine has long been forward-leaning in recognizing the importance of space-based services to national warfighting efforts. Former Digital Minister Mykhailo Fedorov famously reached out to SpaceX CEO Elon Musk in 2022 for Starlink terminals, which have ever since kept Ukrainian civilians and soldiers connected where terrestrial communications are inaccessible. A new Space Force would form a key element of a revamped Ukrainian Armed Forces designed to strategically tackle twenty-first-century space challenges.

Q6: If Ukraine establishes these forces, how would their structure compare to the U.S. model of force design?

A6: Ukraine's fast-moving plans to establish a Space Force track closely with the U.S. decision to create its own space Service in December 2019 during the first Trump administration. U.S. officials at the time acknowledged the space domain held national security, not just scientific significance, and believed this required a separate force structure, as opposed to dispersed space professionals across the then-five existing services. The Space Force has significantly benefitted the United States, including by helping the U.S. military build more intentional international and commercial partnerships; a Ukrainian Space Force would be the natural U.S. counterpart, and Kyiv aims to build its own partnerships, starting with the European Union. Ukraine has already established additional defense coordination mechanisms via the Space Policy Department. For its part, the United States reestablished U.S. Space Command in 2018 and later expanded the Pentagon space policy office in an overhaul of military space bureaucracy.

An established Ukrainian Cyber Force would outpace the United States, though the two countries have found ways to collaborate closely on cyber issues throughout the war. Within the United States, discussions are heating up among experts about the need for a U.S. Cyber Force to own force generation for offensive, defensive and cyber intelligence personnel. Advocates argue only a new service can solve challenges today in recruiting, retaining, and training skilled cyber personnel. While not refuting the challenges, some skeptics doubt whether a new structure would resolve them, and others believe cyberspace operations are unique to each Service and should remain integrated. Today, the CSIS U.S. Commission on Cyber Force Generation is actively discussing how a dedicated service could be structured, resourced and trained in the current threat environment and will release its recommendations in 2026.

Lauryn Williams is the deputy director and senior fellow in the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Taylar Rajic is an associate fellow for the Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS. Kuhu Badgi is the program coordinator and research assistant for the Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS.

Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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