EU Statement at the IAEA Board of Governors on NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 September 2025

EU Statement at the IAEA Board of Governors on NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 September 2025

Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Republic of Moldova, San Marino, and Ukraine align themselves with this statement.

The European Union thanks the Director General for his update under this agenda item and commends the DG and the Secretariat for their professional, independent and impartial work in verifying Iran's safeguards obligations.

The EU is gravely concerned by Iran's purported suspension of its cooperation with the IAEA. On 2 July 2025, an Iranian law suspending IAEA inspector access was brought into force. Since 13 June 2025, the Agency has had no access to any of the safeguarded nuclear facilities in Iran, except for Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, nor has it received any of the legally required reports from Iran on its nuclear programme. The Director General has reported that the IAEA has now lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the current inventories of nuclear material in Iran, including highly enriched uranium. Iran must urgently allow the Agency to restart its safeguards activities in accordance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement. As the DG clearly states in his report, Iran's implementation of its Safeguards Agreement cannot be suspended under any circumstances. As the DG also stressed in his opening statement, while national law may create obligations domestically, it cannot do so for the IAEA.

The EU and its Member States have always strived for a lasting diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We are concerned over the potential implications of attacks against nuclear facilities. As our diplomatic efforts continue, we call on Iran to urgently return to the negotiating table and to refrain from any initiative that may hinder a negotiated solution. We also call on Iran to immediately return to the full implementation of its CSA obligations and full cooperation with the Agency.

We condemn threats against Director General Grossi and espionage charges against inspectors. The EU expresses our full support to the IAEA and the Director General in their critical work to uphold the implementation of safeguards, nuclear safety and security and to pursue clarity on Iran's nuclear programme Without the full implementation of safeguards in Iran being resumed, the Agency will not be in a position to provide any conclusion or assurance regarding Iran's nuclear programme.

We are seriously concerned that the inventory of HEU in Iran, the only NPT non-nuclear-weapon State to have produced such nuclear material, cannot be currently quantified nor located by the Agency. Therefore it is indispensable and urgent that Iran provides the IAEA with updated verifiable declarations about the quantity and whereabouts of nuclear material and allows inspections to resume in all its nuclear facilities. Iran must also take all necessary steps to ensure the safety and security of IAEA personnel. The longer the Agency is unable to verify the inventories of declared nuclear material in Iran, the more difficult it will be to reconstruct the continuity of knowledge and the greater the risk that the Agency is again unable to provide assurance that nuclear material required to be safeguarded under the CSA has not been diverted.

We remain deeply concerned that there has been no engagement between Iran and the Agency on the unresolved safeguards issues. In June, this Board adopted a resolution on Iran's implementation of safeguards, which demonstrated our collective commitment to a negotiated solution. Iran's implementation of its safeguards obligations stems from the NPT and is non-negotiable. We expect Iran to remedy its non-compliance by taking all steps deemed necessary by the Agency and the Board, to refrain from any further unilateral move that might aggravate the situation and to re-engage in serious discussions on a reasonable basis and in good faith.

We call upon Iran to fully implement the legally binding CSA and modified Code 3.1 and to return to the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol and to ratify it, in order to address in a credible manner our serious doubts about the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

The EU reiterates its unequivocal support to upholding and strengthening the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with its Article VI, and an important element in the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes.

With this, the EU takes note of the report, looks forward to further regular reporting from the Director General and requests that this report be made public.