How Does Saudi Arabia See the War with Iran

Commentary by Michael Ratney

Published March 18, 2026

For Saudi Arabia, the Iran war in its scale, intensity, and potential impact is as unsettling as it is unprecedented. The Saudi leadership finds itself simultaneously trying to protect and prioritize its own economic and societal transformation, to navigate its relationship with an impulsive and unpredictable U.S. president, and to manage the geographic reality of living a drone's flight away from a country that is likely to remain its principal antagonist for the foreseeable future. Not surprisingly, Saudi views of this war are complicated.

The question of how Saudi Arabia views this war has drawn considerable speculation, misunderstanding, and wishful thinking. The Saudi government communicates principally through official statements, and to the frustration of international journalists, unauthorized leaks are rare. Media reports citing unnamed and ambiguously defined sources with claims about Saudi intentions or their communications with President Donald Trump should be read cautiously. And so, to understand actual Saudi thinking, the best place to start is with what their government is saying publicly.

The Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued its most comprehensive statement on the war on March 9. That statement, angry but measured, condemned Iranian attacks against the kingdom and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, and affirmed Saudi Arabia's "full right to take all necessary measures to safeguard its security, sovereignty, and the safety of its citizens and residents, and to deter aggression." It complained that Iranian attacks continued despite the Iranian president's assurances that they would stop unless Iran is attacked from Saudi territory. And the statement warned that further Iranian attacks would have "significant implications for bilateral relations both now and in the future."

Although the language about taking "all necessary measures" comes close, there is no explicit threat to attack Iran. That said, Saudi Arabia has not ruled out greater involvement in the war, and its calculus may well shift if the war grinds on and if Iranian attacks on the kingdom escalate. Iran crossed a major line with its attacks on civilian and energy infrastructure, which are clear violations of Saudi sovereignty. Saudis are understandably furious; their military has the capacity to take the fight to the Iranians, and the country's leadership would have little trouble mustering the support of their public. What is more, with the rocket attacks continuing and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the perception has emerged among some Gulf states that Iran has taken the region hostage and has the ability to do so again at any time. This has the potential to change the calculus of Gulf governments, making them more inclined to support a continued war, if not bring their own militaries into the conflict directly.

Still, Saudi Arabia previously invested considerable diplomatic efforts in reaching a modus vivendi with Iran that, if not amicable, was at least not explicitly hostile. It did that for a reason: Saudi Arabia entering a military conflict would invite far greater Iranian retaliation, potentially causing long-lasting damage to the Saudi economy and its reputation as a safe destination for investors and tourists. Recall-as Saudis do-that its conflict with the Houthis in Yemen became a grinding war of attrition featuring missile attacks on Saudi territory. It eventually led the Saudi leadership to pursue de-escalation through diplomacy. In fact, its approach to the region in recent years has been to de-escalate rather than fuel conflicts and to distance the impact of regional conflicts from Saudi Arabia.

Does Saudi Arabia Tacitly Support This War?

While Saudi Arabia may be reluctant to join the fight against Iran, there is a widespread narrative that they are privately gleeful at the damage being done by the United States and Israel to the Iranian regime. That narrative is stoked by both Iran, which wields it as a political slur, and Israel, which focuses on Saudi Arabia and Israel's shared distrust of Iran and the Islamic Republic of Iran's historical enmity toward both Zionism and the Al Saud monarchy. The reality is more complicated.

It is fair to say that Saudi Arabia and most other Gulf states do share with Israel a desire to weaken Iran's regional influence, end its regional subversion, and destroy its ability to sponsor militant proxies. The kingdom will not rue the demise of the Iranian supreme leader, the destruction of the Iranian military, or the damage seemingly now being done to Iran's ballistic missile program and perhaps its nuclear ambitions, too. But at the same time, Saudis have little confidence that this war will decisively eliminate the Iranian threat, or that the United States, which bears responsibility for starting the current conflict, will protect the Saudis from Iranian attacks. That is especially true if Saudi Arabia were to become more directly involved.

In a perfect world, Saudi Arabia-like the United States and much of the Middle East-would like to see a different sort of Iranian regime, stable and predictable, but lacking the belligerence toward Israel and its Arab neighbors, devoid of its messianic ideology, and disinclined to sponsor and arm violent proxies. But Saudis likely view a change of that magnitude as improbable, at least in the near term. When the dust settles from the current conflict, their best-case scenario is an Iran run by a weakened version of the same Islamic Republic that has ruled the country since 1979, hopefully with the capacity and inclination to export revolution much diminished. In the worst case, Iran will degenerate into chaos, producing refugees and radicalized youth. The Saudis, like others in the Gulf, have been investing heavily in a transformed society and economy, which depend on attracting investors and tourists and maintaining a reputation for safety and stability. The kingdom now weighs the damage to the Iranian regime against the potential regional volatility and economic damage being wrought, and the absence of a clear endgame. For Saudi Arabia, the stakes are high, and unsurprisingly, it prefers predictability to chaos.

Will Saudi Arabia Join the Fight?

There are currently criticisms from some quarters that Saudi Arabia is being brazenly attacked by their archenemy, and so should launch their own air strikes against Iranian targets or at least allow the U.S. military to launch strikes from Saudi bases. The Iranians certainly seem to be goading the Gulf states, perhaps in an effort to pressure President Trump to end the war. And Saudi Arabia may find itself unable to justify staying out of the fight-triggered, for example, by an attack on a major civilian population center. The Saudi leadership could also find itself under pressure from President Trump to either participate in the war directly or to permit U.S. offensive operations to be launched from Saudi territory. If other GCC countries launch offensive operations, Saudi Arabia may also feel obliged to do so. And, of course, if the Houthis resume attacks on Saudi territory, Saudi Arabia would likely respond forcefully.

All that said, this war is a vivid display of just how vulnerable Gulf economies are to attacks by Iranian ballistic missiles, rockets, and drones. Military bases, civilian airports, and, of course, the energy infrastructure on which Saudi Arabia's efforts to transform its economy and society still largely depend have all been targeted. Water desalination plants are highly exposed. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf states are keenly aware that entering the fight would draw an even stronger Iranian reprisal against precisely those targets, using cheap yet accurate weapons that are both difficult and expensive to counter. Given the relative ease with which Iran could expand its attacks on the Saudi economy, the Iranians clearly have escalation dominance. And just as the United States initiated the conflict without consulting Saudi Arabia or its other Gulf partners, it could also declare victory and go home, leaving Saudi Arabia and others to deal with the fallout from Iran after having joined in offensive action.

None of this is to say that Saudi anger with Iran is not reaching epic levels. But given the vulnerability of their economies to just this sort of conflict, their risk tolerance is extraordinarily low.

Will Saudi Arabia's Perception of the United States Change?

An important question is whether this war changes Saudi perceptions of the United States, with some analysts suggesting that Saudi Arabia no longer trusts the United States to protect it from its principal enemy, causing the kingdom to look elsewhere for security partners. That view ignores the depth of the U.S.-Saudi security relationship that has developed over many decades. The country's military is built principally on armaments sourced in the United States. Its military has trained with U.S. counterparts for decades, participates in exercises, and hosts U.S. forces. Saudi Arabia's entire security paradigm is deeply anchored in its partnership with the United States.

A long-standing conundrum for the Saudis is that, despite the intimacy of its security partnership with the United States, the U.S. military has no obligation to defend the kingdom. Saudi Arabia had been working on a deal to normalize relations with Israel, largely because it would have gotten them a mutual defense treaty with the United States, and with it the obligation they hoped would be in place for just the sort of situation they now find themselves in. The kingdom may seek to diversify its defense relationships to some extent, though it is difficult to imagine a partnership with China or Pakistan would provide greater protection against Saudi Arabia's principal adversary, Iran. And a serious defense relationship with China would be viewed by Washington as incompatible with the much stronger defense relationship Saudi Arabia already has with the United States. So, rather than discard the decades-old relationship with the United States, what Saudi Arabia is likely to seek is greater clarity.

Does This War Advance Israel-Saudi Normalization?

Given the Saudi desire for a mutual defense treaty with the United States, some say this war pushes them to normalize relations with Israel, which theoretically remains the price of that treaty. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu himself has confidently offered this prediction. While Saudi Arabia has certainly not ruled out normalization, it is far from clear that the Iran war facilitates it. The Israeli view ignores the political damage the war in Gaza, and now this conflict, is doing to the perception of Israel in Arab Gulf states, and Saudi Arabia in particular. While Israel was once thought of as a potential security partner against common threats, it is increasingly viewed as the principal belligerent in the region after Iran, stoking instability and driving resentment among Arab publics. This war also does nothing to address the status of Palestinians or move Israel closer to supporting the creation of a Palestinian state, which is still a central Saudi requirement for normalization with Israel.

How Will Saudi Arabia Address Iran Postwar?

Just as the United States launched this war without asking Saudi Arabia or other Gulf partners, President Trump is likely to declare it over without telling them. Saudi Arabia will be left to manage a relationship with a broken Iran. Both countries will be deeply distrustful of each other, with the Iranians potentially still able to sponsor mayhem in the region. This is another reason Saudi Arabia may be reluctant to undertake offensive military operations against Iran now: Unlike the United States, Saudi Arabia will have to live in the region and with its neighbors, long after President Trump has declared "mission accomplished."

Michael Ratney served for over three decades as a U.S. diplomat, most recently as ambassador to Saudi Arabia. He is currently a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.

Programs & Projects

Commentary by Mona Yacoubian - March 16, 2026

Critical Questions by Mona Yacoubian - March 1, 2026