Not a Time for Arms Control With North Korea

Newsletter by Ho-Young Ahn

Published March 18, 2026

In March 1993, Pyongyang announced that it would withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) within three months. For more than 30 years since then, the international community has made exhaustive efforts to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons development. However, these efforts have not met with much notable success. To the contrary, things have aggravated since Kim Jong-un assumed power in 2011. More recently, North Korea even ingratiated itself with Russia by sending weapons, workers, and more than 10,000 soldiers to Ukraine, and is suspected to get Russia's support to develop nuclear weapons and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) satellites. Most ominously, North Korea changed its nuclear doctrine in 2022, and now openly declares that it will use nuclear weapons against South Korea for pre-emptive purposes.

Given such developments over the past 30 years, calls began to emerge in Washington to give up the current policy of denuclearizing North Korea and begin the process of arms control to limit the size and range of Pyongyang's arsenal. I am afraid that such a suggestion can only backfire very badly. It will undermine the ROK-U.S. alliance, further heighten North Korea's security threat against South Korea and beyond, and embolden China and Russia in their strategic challenge to the U.S.

First and foremost, I am concerned about such a suggestion's impact on the alliance between Korea and the U.S. In early 2025, some leaders of the new Trump administration began to call North Korea "a nuclear state." This sent shock waves through Seoul, because the appellation was perceived as a signal that the new U.S. government might give up the denuclearization of North Korea and pivot to arms control. The scenario is an anathema for Seoul, because it would perpetuate the nuclear asymmetry between South and North Korea, and leave South Korea vulnerable to North Korea's nuclear threats and coercion. The White House tried to assuage Seoul's concern by reaffirming its commitment to the denuclearization of North Korea. Even then, the fear often resurfaces in Seoul, especially when President Trump expresses his interest in meeting with Kim Jong-un.

A recent opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in July 2025 showed that 89% of South Koreans considered the U.S. as the most important ally, the highest percentage among U.S. treaty allies. However, the apparent stability of this bilateral relationship should not lead to complacency.

It is because recent U.S. actions, including the arbitrary tariffs imposed even on its closest allies and the threats to annex Greenland, made some Korean observers lose trust in the alliance, and think about developing a "Plan B" for Korea's security and economy. As a former Korean Ambassador to the U.S., I take every opportunity to explain to my compatriots why a Plan B cannot work for Korea. Were the U.S. to give up the goal of North Korea's denuclearization and thus expose South Korea to North Korea's nuclear coercion and blackmail, it would undermine and devastate the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Second, the arms control negotiations with North Korea will significantly heighten North Korea's security threat against South Korea and beyond. Currently, North Korea's nuclear threat is deterred through U.S. extended deterrence and sanctions.

The U.S. proposal of arms control, were it to happen, will undo the current structure of deterrence against North Korea's nuclear threats. It will convince North Korea that its nuclear ambitions have been vindicated as the right course of action and lead it to demand a heavy price. North Korea will demand that the U.S. remove economic sanctions and significantly weaken the security alliance between South Korea and the U.S. These are a package of demands North Korea has made consistently as a precondition for any nuclear concessions.

Were these demands to be met, North Korea would emerge as a far bigger threat. At present, the economic sanctions work as effective headlocks on North Korea. As a group of South Korean economists showed through a rigorous equilibrium model, the sanctions have reduced the country's manufacturing output by 12.9% and real income by 15.3%.

The economic impact of sanctions has a parallel impact on North Korea's conventional weapons capabilities. Since coming to power in 2011, Kim Jong-un has allocated more resources to nuclear weapons. Furthermore, beginning with the 8th Party Congress in 2021, North Korea has also increased investment in conventional weapons, including naval and armored capabilities, which have been hampered by economic sanctions.

Were arms control negotiations with North Korea to proceed, it would demand the removal of economic sanctions, which would lead to economic recovery and increased resource allocation to both conventional and nuclear military capabilities. Combined with the weakening of the alliance between South Korea and the U.S., this would significantly aggravate the security environment on the Korean peninsula and beyond.

Third, treating North Korea as a nuclear state will further embolden China and Russia in their strategic challenge to the United States. There is growing concern in the U.S. about an unprecedented challenge, with the country now facing two, not one, strategic competitors - Russia and China - while China rapidly increases the number of deployed nuclear weapons to close the gap with the U.S. As Brad Roberts has suggested, China is doing so because it believes that its nuclear weapons "underwrite its great power status."

The challenge would become even more serious, should North Korea be recognized as a nuclear power. Vipin Narang, who served as acting U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense under the Biden Administration, expanded the traditional nuclear threat framework beyond Russia and China to include North Korea, dubbing the challenge as a "multiple nuclear challenger problem." He also noted that the "growing collaboration and evidence of collusion" between the adversaries is "unprecedented," urging the U.S. to think in new and careful ways about these challenges.

In fact, there indeed have been worrisome signs of "growing collaboration and evidence of collusion" between Russia and North Korea. In March 2024, Russia exercised its veto power at the UN Security Council to cripple the Security Council's sanctions panel against North Korea. Since then, Putin also commented that North Korea has its own nuclear umbrella, a statement widely interpreted by South Korea's policy community as Russia's acknowledgement of North Korea as a "nuclear state." Russia is also suspected of having significantly expanded the supply of sensitive WMD technologies to North Korea, as well as cash, fuel, and food.

China has also been significantly increasing its economic and political support for North Korea in recent years. China observes with apprehension the rapidly expanding relationship between North Korea and Russia since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This has fueled Beijing to do more to shore up its influence over Pyongyang.

China's position on North Korea's denuclearization also changed significantly. When the leaders of South Korea, Japan, and China met in Chengdu, China in December 2019, the three leaders agreed through a joint statement that the three countries are "committed to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." When the leaders of the three countries met again in Seoul in May 2024, China's changed position on the North Korean nuclear issue was unmistakable. In the joint press conference held after the trilateral summit, President Yoon and Prime Minister Kishida called for the denuclearization of North Korea and emphasized that peace and stability on the Korean peninsula are in the common interest of the three countries. However, Prime Minister Li Qiang of China did not make any comments on North Korea or its denuclearization. Since then, any reference to the denuclearization of North Korea has completely disappeared from China's statements.

Given these developments, should the U.S. give up on North Korea's denuclearization and treat it as a nuclear state, Russia and China would view this as a long-awaited victory in their strategic challenge to the U.S. Russia will feel unrestrained in providing further assistance to North Korea's WMD programs as "a nuclear power." As Professor Narang warned, this will lead to a "growing collaboration and evidence of collusion" between North Korea and Russia, further complicating the unprecedented challenges for the U.S.

In his recent speech at the Reagan National Defense Forum, U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth praised South Korea as a model ally. Elbridge Colby, U.S. Under Secretary of War for Policy, also recently introduced South Korea as an exemplary ally at the Munich Security Conference, while calling on NATO members to expand their role. General Xavier Brunson, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, recently introduced an "east-up" map - rotated 90 degrees counter-clockwise - highlighting how South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, all U.S. treaty allies, could gain strategic depth through cooperation at a time when Washington has been encouraging closer coordination in response to challenges from China, North Korea, and Russia.

I am encouraged that the highest military leadership in the Trump administration understands the key role South Korea plays in the security of the Korean peninsula and the broader Indo-Pacific region. For this mutually beneficial relationship to endure, it is crucial to maintain the trust that treaty allies such as South Korea and Japan place in their alliance with the United States. Pivoting to arms control with North Korea will shatter that trust. This is not a time for arms control with North Korea.

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