Informal meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers (GYMNICH): Press conference by High Representative Kaja Kallas

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Dear Helen,

Thank you for hosting us for the second day here with EU Foreign Ministers. We had very open and substantive discussions.

First, on Ukraine. We had friends from Ukraine, Canada, Iceland, Norway, the United Kingdom and Switzerland joining us. What this presence shows is that it is important that the EU and close partners tackle the security challenges together.

Moscow has not changed its war aims. Russian strikes on Kyiv again killed dozens in recent days. This makes it abundantly clear that Moscow does not want peace. Our immediate focus continues to be giving Ukraine what it needs to defend itself.

Through the Ukraine Support Loan, we have disbursed the first €8.47 billion. Another €6.1 billion has been approved, including for air defence. But this is not enough. Bilateral support is also needed, and we were pleased to hear today announcements by Member States to provide air defence that we have been so long asking for.

Stopping Russian missiles is about providing interceptors, but it is also about cutting off the supply chains and funding that allow Russia to build those missiles in the first place. We have our largest package of listings, up to 1,600 in the pipeline targeting Russia's military-industrial complex.

In parallel, we must forcefully crack down sanctions circumvention. Ukraine has identified more than 5,500 Western and Asian components in Russian weapons. After four years of war, this is inexcusable. Those components should not be there. Together with the Commission, we are working on the new proposals to tighten sanctions enforcement.

Some Ministers also raised again the use of immobilised Russian assets. The discussion will continue. Russia must pay for destruction it has caused.

In the Black Sea, Russian strikes on grain ships could cause another worldwide food security shock. We support Ukraine's grain exports through alternative transit routes. We are also looking to support storage inside Ukraine to protect global food security. But there is no substitute for the volumes that can [be] moved by sea. I support the initiatives for a moratorium on Black Sea attacks.

Ministers further discussed Ukraine's winter resilience. Four years in a row, Russia has tried to freeze Ukrainians into submission, but it has failed. Ukraine has kept its cities running by defending, repairing, and replacing its energy infrastructure. We need to prepare Kyiv for another hard winter. I thank those who have already pledged new support for Ukraine Energy Support Fund as we work to replenish Ukraine's reserve of spare parts and generators.

And finally, there was broad support to move with an EU visa entry ban for Russian ex-combatants and tougher visa restrictions for Russian tourists.

We also see an escalation of attacks near our borders, violations of our airspace, and clear threats on our territory. Leipzig attacks had hallmarks of state-sponsored terrorism. What happened in Leipzig was not an isolated incident. Since 2022, we have seen systematic attacks across Europe. Sabotage, cyber-attacks, espionage are becoming more frequent and more brazen. The EU stands in full solidarity with Germany. We have summoned the Russian representative to the EU, and we are moving ahead with more sanctions. Attempts to intimidate Europe will fail.

Our second session was about Europe itself and whether our foreign policy machinery is fit for the world we now live in. Ministers had a good discussion about where EU foreign policy works, what it is too slow, and where our structures, our working methods, prevent us from exercising the influence that Europe should have.

Europe has influence. Trade, development aid, visas, enlargement, energy, and sanctions, all give us leverage, which we are not always able to use. We have many instruments of power. We need to start using them in a more coherent way. There was a broad support for current institutional setup, but all agreed that it has to be better implemented. It was clear that Member States want to keep steering European foreign policy.

As for how we work, we should look more seriously at constructive abstention and other tools that the treaties provide. We need to respect the principles of sincere cooperation and mutual solidarity, and we also need a stronger link between Foreign Ministers' work and the discussions of European leaders. My new External Action Service Secretary-General, Kajsa Ollongren, has already begun tour of capitals to move the conversation forward.

Ministers also discussed our work in multilateral fora, and we will issue a declaration by the EU and its Member States in support of effective multilateralism after this press conference.

And thirdly, on the Middle East, the battle for control of the Strait of Hormuz continues, making the case that freedom of navigation must be unimpeded and toll-free will be high on our agenda during the United Nations General Assembly.

Yemen is closer to renewed war than at any point since 2022 truce. With Bab-el Mandeb in the Red Sea, the Houthis are threatening another key oil shipping route in the region. Through Operations ASPIDES and ATALANTA, the EU is making vital contributions to protecting shipping in the region.

Ministers also discussed Gaza and West Bank, where the situation has deteriorated sharply. Settler violence against Palestinians continues to rise, and too often goes unchecked. The E1 settlements will further undermine the prospect of the two-state solution by driving a wedge through the West Bank. The EU will continue to support the Gaza Peace Plan and work with partners towards the two-state solution. This will also be a focus of our diplomatic outreach during UN General Assembly. Palestinian elections are important, and we are looking into ways how we can provide support in this regard.

And finally, on Lebanon, as I announced yesterday, Member States want to establish a new mission in October. Strengthening the Lebanese state, its armed forces and security institutions is essential.

I leave it here, and I am ready to take your questions.

Q&A

Q. You mentioned the reform of the EEAS. The discussion is taking place, and there are already some options with papers and non-papers flying around. One suggests consultation with the High Representative. So, my question is: Do you feel that you are consulted enough on this? And secondly, since you were on the other side of the fence as Premier of Estonia, what is your idea of a reform and effective EEAS?

The broader question is the effectiveness of EU foreign policy, and the first question we need to answer and deal with is the way we work. Because it is not entirely the issue of the institutions. It is because we are not reaching decisions with the Member States, so the working methods. That is why the treaties provide us possibilities, [and] we should really start using them. Constructive abstention, so that you do not veto, but let others move if you do not agree to this. There are other options, other tools. So that is the main stock.

Now the other question is the effectiveness of the [European] External Action Service. There, again from the start, the treaties foresee everybody's obligations, but after that, [there] has been a lot of duplication, and that duplication also comes afterwards. Now that we go to the discussion of MFF, then we know that all the Member States' budgets are under heavy strain. So, we should also look into the European Union on how we function.

If we do things well in the [European] External Action Service, there is no point in duplicating them in the Commission - let it be there. And what the Member States today were saying that there is broad support for the current institutional setup, so it should not be changed, but it should be better implemented. And by that, it is specifically the HR/VP role and the VP part of the HR/VP, High Representative, but also Vice-President of the Commission. The idea is to really fully coordinate the foreign policy that is coming from the European Commission. And there the problem is that with the Member States we are putting together the foreign policy, the instruments are very often with the Commission: trade, development aid, enlargement, migration, visas. That is something that the countries outside want from us. So, if we want to act as a geopolitical player, we should really put these things together, and that is why the treaties foresee the role of the Vice-President. Now, the problem is not the treaties, not the institutional setup. The problem is the implementation of that setup, that it would work in practice. And there was a broad support by the Member States to make it work. But of course, it does not entirely depend on the Member States.

Q. One of the suspects, who may be behind the drone attack in Leipzig, apparently entered the European Union on an Italian tourist visa. So, I would like to know if you also have this information and if you think that the EU visa policy should be tightened on this background.

If it is true, and it is of course up to German authorities to confirm or deny this. But if it is true, it shows very clearly that visas are a tool of these people who are meaning harm to the European Union, to get into the European Union. Actually, today, also on the Ukraine discussion, many raised that we really need to curb the visas. It is not okay that the country is bombing Ukraine, killing civilians in July and August more than ever during this war, and at the same time Russians are entering and enjoying the hospitality of European countries. It should not work this way, and many Member States have flagged this before that actually these kinds of tourist visas are used for the sabotage acts because these people need to get into the European Union. So, if it is true, I hope that this also convinces certain Member States who have been against moving on the visa restrictions that this is actually our security that is in concern as well as Ukraine's.

Q. On the air defence for Ukraine, High Representative, you mentioned that there was some movement. Could you specify how many interceptors were pledged and by which countries? And then on the sanctions on the 1,600, I just wonder: is this from before already more or less agreed and in the pipeline, or is there something new added since the Leipzig incident? On the reform, there was a proposal by France and Germany. If I understand correctly, they actually wanted to change the setup. They said there is no agreement, no support for a change of the setup. So, does it mean that Germany and France were more or less alone with this idea?

First, on the air defence, the Member States who made the announcements will make the announcements also publicly. So, let them do that, and that comes to the numbers and all details. But it was important there for Ukraine also to hear that we have actual movement on the air defence. Then on the listings, it is in the pipeline. We are aiming for FAC that is happening in October, and actually today there was at least one Member State who said that they have additional proposals to the listings. So let us see what comes in the end, because we have to check everything. But it is rather moving.

On the reform, as there are two sides of the equation. One is that if there is idea to concentrate the services of external action actually in the Commission, so the other side of the equation has to be that the High Representative/Vice-President, actually oversees those services. One side of the equation cannot happen without the other. So, everybody agreed that the Vice-President/High Representative is the connection between the Member States and the Commission, and like the treaties say, but it has to be implemented. So, there was no support of concentrating everything in the Commission without actually having this role practically implemented, which is another issue. So, everybody supported the current - not everybody, the majority - supported the current institutional setup.

Q. Ukraine looks like it will need a lot of money over the coming winter. You have had now meetings with Defence Ministers and Foreign Ministers. So, just simply, where will the money come from? And then, secondly, on sanctions, we have talked about listings. But when it comes more broadly to Russian companies important in the Russian supply chain, still operating in Europe, we have Rusal, who have a Swedish facility, and as you know, a facility in Ireland. And what should the EU do about that?

The ideal answer to your question, where should the money come from, is that it should come from Russia, because they are causing this damage. That is why some of the Member States were proposing to go back to the discussion of the frozen assets. And we will continue that discussion.

When it comes to the Russian companies, and in addition to the listings, then also some Member States were pointing out that there is actually so much more we can do. Really, companies that are operating access to services that the Russians have that also helps them, but in the end, it is always the question whether there is appetite to agree by all the Member States. So right now, we are working with these 1,600 listings that are very specifically targeting the Russian military complex, so that they could not produce the missiles that are killing Ukrainians every day.

Q. On the one hand, you say there is broad support for the current structure of the EEAS. Then you say, well, but actually, if you move parts of the staff and the competences of the EEAS to the Commission and give the High Representative a better coordinating role, I get the feeling you say I could live with this. Is this correct or not?

Right now, it is actually so that I am the High Representative/Vice-President. It is the link between the Member States and the Commission. On the paper, in theory. Because it is true that I have this role. But if we have had issues where there is somebody above me that is actually deciding, then it does not work that way. Let us be very frank. So, the issue or the problem that was mentioned by many Member States is that if we then move everything to the Commission, then especially the small Member States, lose the control of the foreign policy, because there is no Foreign Affairs Council every month where we coordinate with everybody, where I know where the Member States stand, where we push to have unified positions. And then this same is not happening always when it is, all the specific Commission policies. So, ideally, it should work like this. The treaties foresee this. That was the idea. If you read all the papers written about my role that this was the initial idea was - that you are overseeing both the Commissioners that are dealing with these external action tools that provide the power to the European foreign policy, and at the same time coordinate with Member States to have their view where they stand. So, there is this proposal, but the Member States were clear that they do not want to lose the steering feel of the foreign policy.