How Would Iran Respond to a U.S. Attack

Critical Questions by Benjamin Jensen

Published February 26, 2026

With the prospect of war in the Middle East again on the horizon, it is important to assess how Iran might respond to a U.S. attack. This installment of Critical Questions looks back to look ahead, using the history of how Iran has attacked the United States and its allies since 1980 as a baseline for predicting how Iran might retaliate and what it says about the potential for an escalation spiral that pulls the region, if not the world, into a broader war.

Both the history of Iran's attacks and core insights from international relations theory suggest near-term limits on a larger conflict. The underlying assumption is that any military response is part of a larger bargaining strategy. States talk and fight at the same time, using coercion alongside diplomacy to achieve their interests. This implies that both the United States and Iran will seek to initially keep violence to a minimum to preserve space for ongoing talks and avoid a larger spiral that leads to a protracted regional conflict. Iran is likely to prefer a proportional response that limits regional escalation. The more the regime can do to limit sustained U.S. strikes, especially while it is confronting a second round of protests, and ensure that aircraft from other Gulf states don't join, the better.

Yet, there is a tipping point. The gravity of escalation pulls harder the more missiles each side fires and the higher the number of lives lost, creating a real possibility, despite the preference for limited strikes and reciprocity, of a larger war. Fear and honor could devour interests to undermine even the most rational of plans.

Q1: Could Iran use cyberattacks to retaliate?

A1: Yes. Any response is almost certain to involve either a direct or indirect role for cyber operations. The regime has a documented history of substituting cyber operations for its traditional approach to proxy warfare in terrorism. Between 2012 and 2014, Iran targeted U.S. financial institutions (Operation Ababil), Saudi Aramco, and the Las Vegas Sands Corporation. More recently, there was a 700 percent increase in cyberattacks targeting Israel in the two days following Israel's military strikes in Iran in 2025. What the historical record suggests, and major studies confirm, is that Iran can use cyber retaliation to limit a larger escalation spiral.

Iran could opt for a range of cyber operations, ranging from simple website defacement and promoting bots spreading regime propaganda to more sophisticated attacks against critical infrastructure. This response would be low on the escalation ladder, effectively substituting a costly signal with an indirect attack in cyberspace.

Q2: Could Iran target U.S. unmanned systems in retaliation?

A2: They have in the past. In the summer of 2019, amidst high tensions in the Gulf, Iran responded to a U.S. military buildup by shooting down a RQ-4A Global Hawk High-Altitude, Long-Endurance surveillance drone in international waters near the Strait of Hormuz. At the time, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Major General Hossein Salami, stated that the action was a warning to the United States that the regime was ready for war, though it had no intention for it.

Of note, the United States responded to the attack with a cyber response. President Donald Trump opted to retaliate against Iranian surface-to-air missile systems with a cyberattack instead of a precision strike that would have killed members of the IRGC operating missile sites linked to the attack. In a subsequent interview, the president confirmed that he selected this option to avoid a larger war, demonstrating how leaders substitute cyber operations for other responses to avoid escalation.

The episode suggests the regime could target a mix of drones, from unmanned surface vehicles to aircraft, to signal to the United States the risks of escalation. Given the size of the U.S. military presence in the region, the attack would likely be larger than in 2019 and involve hitting multiple drones to send a stronger warning. It would also likely include electronic warfare and efforts to jam communication links on the drones to disrupt them, something China and Russia would likely assist with to gain valuable battlefield information.

Q3: Could Iran retaliate at sea?

A3: Iran could respond in a manner that seeks to keep the conflict in the maritime domain. During the tanker war in the late 1980s, Iran used a mix of naval mines and guided missile attacks to target U.S. ships. On October 16, 1987, an Iranian cruise missile hit the U.S. reflagged Kuwaiti tanker Sea Isle City. April 14, 1988, this led to the guided-missile frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) striking a mine. More recently, Iran targeted tankers flagged by U.S. allies, including Japan (drone attack) and the United Kingdom (armed boarding), and seized U.S. riverine craft and detained U.S. sailors for a short period of time. What the historical record suggests is that Iran has a range of options at sea that could signal resolve without trapping the regime into a dangerous escalation spiral.

Iran could opt to respond to a limited strike by the United States in the maritime domain. Firing one-way attack drones and laying mines provides a way to scale escalation without becoming locked into a major war. Iran could opt to lay mines short of closing the Strait of Hormuz and disrupting global oil markets or simply fire multiple drones at a U.S. target they know would be intercepted, but still likely to send a message. Waves of one-way attack drones in the air and sea also serve to deplete U.S. defense munitions, which are already at low levels. In the current standoff, the United States has already shot down a drone approaching a U.S. aircraft carrier. In the extreme, it could even combine fast attack boats, anti-ship cruise missiles, drones, and mines to try and sink a U.S. ship, but this would set the precedent for a larger second strike by the United States.

Q4: What unconventional response options does Iran have?

A4: Iran has a long history of using terrorism, proxies, and assassinations to advance state interests. In the early 1980s, Iran conducted multiple bombings of U.S. facilities across the Middle East, including the U.S. Marine barracks and embassy in Beirut, as well as the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait. The period also saw kidnappings of U.S. citizens and high-profile airline hijackings. This trend continued into the 1990s and included major attacks on U.S. military bases overseas, including the 1996 bombing attack on the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia.

Iran could alternatively explore horizontal escalation options and use covert operatives, proxy forces, and terrorist networks to target U.S. interests outside the region. This could range from assassinations to bombing campaigns and kidnappings, as well as providing proxy groups with drones to attack smaller U.S. military bases in the region. This could even include murder-for-hire efforts to assassinate high-profile individuals in the United States, something Iran has attempted in the past. While this historical record suggests a strong pull toward an unconventional response, Iran will likely be limited due to decades of investments in counterterrorism and counterintelligence specifically targeting the regime's overseas networks.

Q5: Could Iran launch large missile salvos at U.S. bases in the region?

A5: Iran has used limited missile strikes to retaliate against U.S. attacks in the past to demonstrate resolve while avoiding a larger conflict. In response to the U.S. drone strike that killed top Iranian commander Major General Qassem Soleimani, Iran fired 10 ballistic missiles at an airbase in Iraq hosting U.S. forces. In response to the June 2025 limited U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, Tehran launched 14 missiles at the U.S. airbase in Qatar. In 2019, Iranian-backed Houthi rebels fired a drone swarm and cruise missile salvos at major oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, specifically designed to avoid conventional Saudi radar systems.

The historical record suggests Iran seeks a delicate balance of signaling resolve to save face while avoiding a larger escalation spiral that would threaten regime interests, if not survival. If the initial U.S. attack is limited, Iran's response will be proportional and limited or seek to use a proxy to defuse the situation. Tehran will have to assume that the United States will have stealth aircraft and land-attack cruise missiles at the ready to retaliate against any missile launch site, creating a need to fire from multiple launch sites, integrate drones, and keep large stockpiles in secure underground caves. In the 12-day war with Israel in June 2025, Iran fired an estimated 550 ballistic missiles and over 1,000 one-way attack drones for an average of 45 missiles and 83 drones a day. That offers a sound planning assumption for the current crisis, and U.S. interception rates will likely be the same as Israel's (85-⁠90 percent). In all likelihood, Iran could combine this attack with jamming against U.S. drones and a cyber-enabled misinformation campaign to compound the effects without risking a broader spiral. Iran sees its ballistic missiles as a key bargaining chip and essential for deterrence, implying a need to preserve the force for future standoffs.

There are also regional dynamics limiting the size of Iranian salvos. Iran is unlikely to target U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia for fear of pulling the regional power into the conflict. The same logic likely extends to Jordan. That means retaliation would likely focus on Qatar or Bahrain. Iran doesn't want to fight a regional war alone, and Russia and China have shown no interest in direct involvement.

In the end, just like U.S. leaders, Iran will select its response from a menu of options that move from low-cost, weak signals of resolve to more high-risk gambles that risk escalation spirals. This is a rational process where leaders try to maximize benefit relative to perceived costs and live to bargain another day.

Intangibles that enter a calculation of an Iranian response to a U.S. attack arise from fear and honor. If the U.S. response is larger than press reports suggest out of fear of Iranian ballistic missile attacks or the need to limit naval attack options, including closing the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian leaders may confront a losses frame and adopt risk-acceptant behavior.

Benjamin Jensen is director of the Futures Lab and a senior fellow for the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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