05/16/2026 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 05/16/2026 00:14
Mr Wadephul, what is conservative foreign policy?
It's good foreign policy. I'm guided by what serves our German and European security and prosperity interests and reflects our concept of freedom. I feel a sense of duty to this.
What are you doing differently to your predecessors from the Greens and the Social Democrats?
I'm putting a far greater emphasis in our relations on our security and economic interests. Look at what we achieved as regards the free trade agreements. The EU's negotiations with Australia, India and the MERCOSUR countries had been deadlocked for years. And I'm afraid that this standstill would have gone on forever if Germany hadn't worked resolutely to ensure that agreement was reached. This serves our prosperity, and that is my priority. And that's why I don't point the finger at others on my official trips, but instead take a trade delegation with me.
The Chancellor spoke of a "normative surplus" in German foreign policy in the past. When the German Government now criticises the United States in the Iran war, isn't that exactly the same thing?
I don't see any "normative surplus" there. On the contrary - we state what is in our interests and what isn't.
The Chancellor has said that "This is not our war", that the United States doesn't have a strategy and that Germany would have advised against the war - is that praise?
No, but fundamentally we are still saying that we share numerous interests with the United States. As regards Iran, these interests are very clear, namely to prevent the country from becoming a nuclear power, expanding its missile programme and continuing its destabilising conduct in the region. This endangers Israel, but it also poses a threat to us in Europe and our economic relations, for example, as regards commercial shipping through the Red Sea.
At the same time, the Chancellor has taken a tougher stance towards Donald Trump. And there have been consequences: the announced reduction in US troop numbers in Germany and no stationing of US Tomahawk cruise missiles, which would have significantly enhanced our deterrence vis-à-vis Russia.
My interlocutor is Secretary of State Marco Rubio, with whom I work constructively and amicably. The United States remains an essential partner for both trade and security. For years now, it has been a NATO strategy that Europe must take on greater responsibility for its security. With defence spending of five percent of GDP, which I firmly supported, we are now finally putting this goal into practice. We are discussing the measures you mentioned with Washington. I am certain that NATO's deterrence capability will be preserved.
Do you still see a chance to procure Tomahawks?
This German Government is working every day to increase Germany's defence capability in the best possible way. We are also continuing to discuss this intensively with our allies in the United States.
A year after taking office, how are German foreign policy's instruments of power doing? In order to possibly deploy two minehunters to the Strait of Hormuz, other naval missions need to be reduced.
It's no secret that we did too little for our defence for decades. This Government has finally put our country's security where it needs to be on the agenda. However, we cannot play a leadership role in every sector. We need to prioritise. Supporting Ukraine is crucial for us - this is the most important question for Europe's security. And at the same time, we are counting on strong diplomatic networks with countries worldwide with which we share interests. That is why we are very active at the diplomatic level in the Middle East and that is why I visited the Gulf states shortly after the start of the war. That was greatly appreciated there and further enhanced our ties in the region.
Nevertheless, the German Government is proposing support for mine clearance in the Strait of Hormuz, ideally with a UN mandate. What if this mandate doesn't happen?
A mandate from the UN Security Council would be ideal, but there are alternatives, for example via the EU. One could expand current missions such as ASPIDES in the Red Sea or set up new mandates. Europe has a huge economic and security interest in free maritime routes.
If the mission only starts when the war is over, why do we even need a mandate for a naval mission?
We will look at exactly what is needed once we know all the circumstances - we also owe this due diligence to the German Bundestag. At any rate, this type of clearance isn't a weekend project. It's a process that will take many weeks in order to truly ensure safety in this strait.
So was the sentence "This is not our war" wrong from the outset?
What is definitely correct is that it is clearly in our interests to contain Iran and prevent Teheran from developing a nuclear weapon.
The German Government has urged the United States to take part in a possible naval mission. How much sense does it make to include a party to the war?
It always makes sense to include the United States. A military operation in the region without close cooperation with US forces and their expertise would hardly be responsible.
A moratorium on uranium enrichment in Iran, as is apparently on the cards as the basis for a deal, is less than a complete renouncement. Does this mean that the West has come up short in the contest with Iran?
No. The war has already ensured that Iran will not be able to develop a nuclear weapon in the near future and has weakened it militarily in the region - this means that it can no longer threaten its neighbours and Europe with long-range missiles for now. This creates a basis for a new legal agreement with Iran - ideally one that goes further than the earlier Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA). Interim steps such as a moratorium are normal on this path.
The United States originally wanted a complete renouncement.
None of us know the exact state of play in the negotiations. What matters is that Iran did not keep earlier promises either. That's why we need mechanisms in the future that reliably prevent nuclear enrichment which could lead in any way at all towards military use.
Should inspections also include undeclared nuclear facilities?
Let me reiterate that it is vital that this regime does not acquire nuclear weapons. In order to ensure this, we need an effective monitoring system. Trust alone is certainly not enough, as this regime has shown that it is always willing to use violence, either itself or through proxy militias such as the Houthis, Hezbollah or Hamas. The situation in the Red Sea shows us just how badly this can hurt Europe, too. The Suez Canal - or ultimately the entire route through the Red Sea - has been pretty much unusable for European ships for several years. We simply accept this, although it implies a huge rise in costs. That is totally against our interests, and we should not continue standing idly by.
In the negotiations between the United States and Iran, the latter's missiles and support for militias in the region no longer seem to be playing a major role - contrary to what you and many countries in the region have demanded. The focus is on the nuclear dossier. How much is this kind of deal worth?
Any deal that curtails nuclear capabilities makes sense. However, missile programmes and proxies need to be addressed at some stage.
Will a deal stabilise the regime in Teheran?
The regime is still under pressure, with the main threat coming from the completely unsustainable economic situation in Iran and the resulting feeling among the population that the country cannot have a good future with this regime in power. It is almost impossible to imagine that a deal would fundamentally change anything in that regard.
Human rights are hardly mentioned at all any more.
Any curtailment of the regime's scope for action indirectly helps to defend human rights - those of the people of Iran and those of the people across the entire region. Sanctions such as the EU designating Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation also send a clear message. I was able to bring about this listing in the EU, something the previous German Governments didn't manage. This is a real step forward. At the same time, we are supporting some individuals, but this remains a balancing act because we cannot leave ourselves open to blackmail.
Are you providing any concrete support to the Nobel laureate Narges Mohammadi, the human rights activist who had a heart attack in prison in Iran and who is apparently not receiving the treatment she needs? Shouldn't the German Government issue a statement on this?
We have been following this case and the overall human rights situation in Iran for a long time. Among other things, an investigative mechanism was set up in the UN Human Rights Council at our instigation following the murderous suppression of the protests at the start of the year. Furthermore, we have provided refuge to numerous human rights defenders from Iran. At the same time, we always have to weigh up what we can achieve with public statements.
If no agreement is reached, would it be right for the US airstrikes to continue?
Iran needs to realise how serious the situation is. It has not yet done so to the necessary extent - that is the sobering finding here. The United States is not currently seeking military escalation. Operation Epic Fury has ended, as my counterpart Marco Rubio stated. However, the military option remains. It is crucial that substantial results are achieved.
So it's right to leave the military card on the table?
Everyone will want to avoid further escalation. But let me reiterate that the outcome must be that Iran's access to nuclear weapons is blocked and its missile and proxy capabilities are significantly reduced.
You presented reform proposals for the EU this week, including enhanced cooperation between groups of states. This is basically the two-speed Europe suggested by Wolfgang Schäuble as far back as 1994. Why do you think the idea will be more likely to succeed this time round?
Out of sheer necessity. Problems seek solutions and solutions seek formats. I would like the EU to be a format that plays a role in finding solutions. This does not happen enough under the current set-up, as Brussels too often paralyses itself because of the principle of unanimity and because too often the slowest member state sets the pace. This won't work in the future. And that is why we need to discuss these types of model.
Majority voting could lead to anti-Israel decisions in the EU that contradict Germany's position.
Qualified majorities can be prevented. One needs to seek political support, including together with Israel. And perhaps Israel needs to correct its policies in some areas. However, the principle of unanimity has led us into extremely dangerous situations in the case of Ukraine, for example. Just imagine that the elections in Hungary had not taken place now, but only in a year's time. This would have meant that we could hardly have implemented the 90-billion-euro loan to Ukraine this year, although it is a matter of life and death. We cannot risk getting into that kind of situation again.
The United States is currently focused on Iran. Is this Europe's hour in Ukraine diplomacy?
We are willing to take on more responsibility and are discussing this with the United States and Ukraine. We are now making a new attempt in the E3 format with France and the UK to re-enter the negotiations, with a greater role for Europe in the coming weeks and months.
You have spoken about deeper security cooperation with Israel. What does this mean in concrete terms?
We already work closely together, for example in air-defence systems such as Israel's Arrow system for Germany or German submarines for Israel. We want to expand this cooperation in foreign, defence, economic and arms policy. Israel is a technological leader in many areas, particularly as regards companies in the digital sector. In view of how Europe lags behind the US and China, we need partners like Israel. We want to exploit this potential together.
Interview: Daniel-Dylan Böhmer, Thorsten Jungholt