What’s Next for AGOA

Even more striking, Africa's U.S.-bound goods exports covered by AGOA specifically have decreased nearly 6 percent from 2002 to 2024. Africa's share of total U.S. trade has fallen from 2 percent in 2000 to 1.4 percent in 2024, underscoring a lack of progress in absolute trade value.

While AGOA boasted early successes in African export growth from 2002 to 2008-representing nearly 70 percent of total U.S.-Africa trade at its peak in 2011-this growth was highly concentrated in natural resources, namely oil. From 2002 to 2022, oil accounted for an average of 73 percent of total exports under AGOA. Looking at which AGOA participants have benefited most from the deal further emphasizes the centrality of raw energy exports. Nigeria and Angola, large oil producers, dominated AGOA exports until their share began declining in 2011.

The 2008 financial crisis marked a turning point in the short-lived boom in trade under AGOA. That year, AGOA oil exports plunged by over 50 percent amid an 80-percent drop in in oil prices and a 6.1 percent contraction in U.S. domestic consumption. Exports somewhat rebounded from 2009 to 2011, only to fall further after 2011 as the United States ﷟ramped up domestic production of petroleum during the American Shale Boom. The value of AGOA exports has not returned to its former highs since.

In 2024, aggregate exports hit the lowest volume in AGOA's history ($8 billion) outside of the pandemic period (2020-2021) and total exports from Africa to the United States fell to pre-2004 levels. Energy products' share of AGOA exports declined to just 25 percent in 2024, but this shift is more attributable to deeper declines in energy exports rather than meaningful diversification. Indeed, exports in other relevant sectors-transportation equipment, apparel, and food and agricultural products-have only experienced modest growth. With oil exports no longer heading to the United States, total AGOA exports have languished.

Falling Behind

AGOA has also fallen short in the later addition to its mandate: competing with China. While AGOA sought to position the United States as Africa's preferred partner, China has resoundingly bypassed the United States in Africa in terms of trade relations. Since 2000, African exports to China have risen more than twenty-fold, and China has been the continent's largest trading partner for 16 consecutive years. In 2024, U.S.-Africa trade totaled $104.9 billion compared to $295 billion in trade between China and Africa. China's lead is poised to increase further after Beijing's recent offer of tariff-free access to the Chinese market for all 53 African countries that have diplomatic ties with China.

Beijing's approach toward engaging with African countries fundamentally differs from the United States'. China offers African countries trade engagement with no strings attached, where deals are made without expectation of political reforms. In contrast, AGOA's benefits are conditional on governance standards, rigorous eligibility reviews, and compliance with U.S. policy priorities. The United States has suspended several African countries from AGOA for their human rights records in hopes of holding governments accountable-though the efficacy of this practice has been called into question.

In the past decade, China has also shown greater appetite to pair its trade engagement with commercial investment. This has allowed China to import a larger share of capital-intensive products from Africa, such as critical minerals. From 2000 to 2022, metals and minerals rose from 10 percent of China's imports from Africa to 45 percent. The United States, meanwhile, has not kept pace with China's investments in Africa over much of the past decade, and its minerals and metals trade with Africa is equivalent to just 6 percent of China's.

China has aligned its engagement with Africa's export profile to advance its strategic and economic security priorities. Whereas AGOA's relevance has waned with the decline in U.S. demand for oil, China has cultivated a robust trade relationship that reinforces its economic and geopolitical goals while being responsive to the needs of its African trade partners. Without a revitalized value proposition, AGOA remains uncompetitive against China's model; simply renewing it in its current form would fail to address this imbalance.

A Way Forward

Despite the challenges outlined above, AGOA remains a crucial piece of legislation, and it holds important symbolic value for signaling U.S. commitment to engaging with the African continent. Specific country examples, like the Kingdom of Lesotho, demonstrate how AGOA can have a meaningful impact on economic development and poverty reduction. With the support of AGOA, the small kingdom of 2.3 million people has risen to become one of Africa's largest apparel exporters to the United States, supplying inputs for leading U.S. brands.

AGOA matters even more as the United States looks to the future. Africa will be home to the world's largest working-age population by 2050 and sits at the intersection of major sea lanes, critical mineral reserves, and key voting blocs in multilateral institutions. As U.S.-China competition intensifies and the international system fragments, the United States' ability to build durable, mutually beneficial trade relationships through AGOA will open opportunities for growth and strategic influence.

If the United States is to offer a revamped version of AGOA, it must be developed with an eye to the future and tailored to the needs of its African partners.

1. Improve policy predictability.

   AGOA's effectiveness has been limited by the unpredictability around its annual renewal process-as the current lapse demonstrates-and around country eligibility status, which can change abruptly. A more stable policy environment is needed to incentivize businesses to invest in capital-intensive sectors such as manufacturing and critical minerals. By encouraging these kinds of long-term investments, AGOA reform can help the United States meet its strategic priorities around supply chain diversification while helping African economies move toward higher value-add industries.

   The first challenge can be addressed by lengthening the period between renewal, potentially mirroring the 16-year renewal period of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). This longer renewal cycle avoids exposing African trading partners to the economic volatility induced by the U.S. political cycle. From a geopolitical perspective, extending the renewal cycle also signals the United States does not feel the need to run a referendum on U.S.-Africa relations every few years-or every year, if Congress follows the Trump administration's recommendation-a helpful gesture of goodwill.

   The second challenge can be alleviated by shifting country eligibility reviews from yearly to once every three years, as is standard in other trade preference programs. In addition, rather than immediately expelling countries that become "high income" as defined by GDP per capita, countries should lose eligibility after achieving high-income status for five consecutive years, which avoids unexpected trade shocks and gives time for key stakeholders to adapt. Last, policymakers should avoid weaponizing AGOA eligibility as a form of sanctions against human rights offenses-which has been shown to be minimally successful and tends to punish everyday workers rather than the offending parties-in favor of other tools that can more effectively protect human rights.