Aid Sanctions and Hybrid Regimes

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Aid Sanctions and Hybrid Regimes

Working Paper Series no. 1056. Recent advances combining sanctions scholarship and the study of authoritarianism relate sanctions effectiveness to regime type. These studies generally conclude that economic sanctions tend to be more effective on democracies than on autocracies, but also on weakly institutionalised autocracies rather than on other authoritarian types. This literature at the intersection between international relations and comparative politics focuses on the democracy-autocracy dichotomy, or the categorization of autocratic types, to the detriment of the exploration of 'hybrid' regime types. Equally importantly, it has neglected examining the impact of aid suspensions as a subcategory of sanctions. We address these deficits by investigating whether (i) the autocratic type or the level of democratic openness of the target better predicts sanctions effectiveness, (ii) whether hybrid regimes behave like closed autocracies or like democracies under sanctions, and (iii) whether aid suspensions perform similarly than other sanctions in terms of effectiveness. The hypotheses are tested on an original dataset rich in aid sanctions.

Frequencies of hybrid regimes and dictatorships among target countries

Non-Technical Summary

Research on sanctions has traditionally found that sanctions are less likely to succeed against dictatorships than against democracies. More recent research on authoritarian regimes allows us to move beyond the simple distinction between democracy and dictatorship. Some forms of dictatorship appear particularly resilient to sanctions pressure. But what about "hybrid" regimes, which combine characteristics of democracies and dictatorships? There are nearly twice as many hybrid regimes in the world as dictatorships.

This paper examines whether hybrid regimes respond differently to sanctions. Dictatorships typically maintain power through a combination of repression and rewards granted to loyal elites. Because sanctions reduce government resources, they may weaken both mechanisms. We assume that hybrid regimes operate in a similar way. However, because they also contain some democratic features that may facilitate political change, we expect them to be more vulnerable to sanctions than fully authoritarian regimes.

We also examine whether suspensions of foreign aid affect hybrid regimes differently from economic sanctions. Foreign aid can strengthen governments by providing resources that may be used to support security forces or reinforce political control. When donors suspend aid or redirect it towards civil society organisations, governments may find it harder to remain in power. We therefore expect aid suspensions to be as effective as economic sanctions in increasing pressure on hybrid regimes.

A further question is whether sanctions effectiveness is better explained by the type of dictatorship or by the degree of political openness of the regime. Hybrid regimes are usually defined according to their position on a continuum between democracy and authoritarianism. We therefore assess whether political openness provides a better predictor of sanctions vulnerability than traditional classifications of authoritarian regimes.

Finally, we investigate whether economic development protects hybrid regimes from the impact of sanctions and aid suspensions. Previous research has shown that wealthier countries are often better able to withstand sanctions. However, foreign aid may be more difficult to replace than trade or financial flows. We therefore expect economic development to reduce the impact of economic sanctions more strongly than the impact of aid suspensions.

Using an original dataset covering 309 sanctions episodes between 1990 and 2018, we test these expectations. The dataset includes sanctions imposed by major sending countries and international organisations, including the European Union.

Our findings show that hybrid regimes are significantly more vulnerable to sanctions than fully authoritarian regimes. We also find that aid suspensions are at least as effective as conventional economic sanctions in generating pressure on hybrid regimes. In addition, vulnerability to sanctions tends to increase with political openness. Finally, while higher levels of wealth reduce the effectiveness of economic sanctions, they do not appear to weaken the impact of aid suspensions.

Overall, the results suggest that hybrid regimes should not be analysed in the same way as closed autocracies. The degree of political openness helps explain their vulnerability to external pressure, and aid suspensions emerge as a particularly effective policy tool. These findings highlight the importance of taking regime hybridity into account when assessing the effectiveness of sanctions.

Keywords: Foreign Aid; Aid Suspensions; Hybrid Regimes; Regime Types; Sanctions Economic; Autocracy
Codes JEL : F51, O19, F53, Z18, O55, F13

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