The EU must now respond politically to Trump

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This opinion piece by Steven Everts was originally published in Dutch in NRC on 1 April 2025 under the title 'De EU moet nu politiek op Trump reageren'. It is reproduced here in English with the permission of NRC.

The genius of European integration was its 'depoliticisation': political problems were transformed into technical issues. This made it possible for countries to work together despite major differences of opinion. By keeping issues small and framed as technical matters, and by entrusting independent institutions with safeguarding the common interest. This explains why we have EU directives instead of laws, why there is a 'High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy' and no EU foreign minister, and why the euro notes show bridges that do not exist - on a continent with such a rich historical heritage.

That depoliticisation held things together. There were never really any outright political winners or clear losers. Maybe not much pathos and passion, but progress. And, importantly, it allowed European countries to weather each crisis.

But now that Trump is attacking Europe politically, this technocratic reflex will not be enough. Trump wants not just specific concessions on trade, defence or tech regulations, but to transform the EU itself. His aim is to weaken core EU institutions and strengthen the populist right. This is a fight for power and politics, not policy.

In November 2024, the European Commission had playbooks ready for increased trade tariffs, less support for Ukraine, to mounting pressure for greater European defence spending. The strategy was clear: keep emphasising that Europe wanted to negotiate, offer 'sweeteners' such as additional LNG purchases, make promises about more defence spending, and step up support for Ukraine. In the meantime, Europe would quietly work on building its own resilience in case the situation escalated. Policymakers also hoped for counterpressure from the American business community and moderate Republicans, as happened during Trump's first term.

This is a fight for power and politics, not policy

Ten weeks into the new administration, we are in a completely different dynamic. Trump has described the EU as an organisation that is 'screwing' the US - not as election rhetoric, but officially from the White House. Vice President JD Vance gave a speech in Munich in February that attacked Europe's centrist parties and openly supported the populist right, just before the German elections.

Last week, he targeted Denmark, calling it a 'bad ally' and falsely claiming that the people of Greenland would rather be part of the US. Meanwhile, Ukraine is being blackmailed and Russia is getting one strategic concession after another. And from 'Signalgate' we have learned once again how deep the contempt for Europe is within the Trump administration.

Amid so many political fireworks, it is striking that there are hardly any real negotiations between Trump and Europe. A possible ceasefire in Ukraine is being discussed with Russia and sometimes Ukraine, but Europe is absent. Within NATO, people are trying to interpret American signals, but serious talks about a new division of tasks within the alliance are lacking. On trade, EU Commissioner Maros Sefcovic visited Washington, but despite European pressure, negotiations never materialised. Decisions on trade tariffs are made unilaterally in the US.

Moreover, there is a clear division of roles between Brussels and the capitals. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen usually speaks in soothing yet general tones. In line with the depoliticising tradition, she mostly refrains from rousing rhetoric. But national leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron, Germany's incoming Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk frame the situation in political terms. Macron stated in January: 'If we choose to be weak and defeatist, Trump will never respect us.' Merz declared after his election victory: 'Europe must become independent of the US; it is clear that the Americans do not care about the fate of Europe.' And Donald Tusk summed up the situation well: 'How is it possible that 450 million Europeans ask 300 million Americans to protect them from 140 million Russians, who cannot win against 45 million Ukrainians?'

The EU was set up to abolish power politics among its Member States; now it must practise power politics in a hyper competitive world

These European leaders rightly emphasise the need for European unity and strength. In a similar way, Brussels must also transcend its technocratic reflex and show that it understands what is historically at stake. A good example is EU High Representative Kaja Kallas. After Zelensky's humiliation in the White House, she declared that Europe must now take over the role of leader of the free world. This earned her criticism, but her political message was the right one.

Trump's attack is not just a collection of specific policy preferences. It is about the essence of the political order in Europe and the preservation of our self-determination. Europe must see this clearly. It must speak, think and act in political terms and not remain stuck in the belief in technocratic solutions and compromises. In a way, the EU was set up to abolish power politics among its Member States; now it must practise power politics in a hyper competitive world.

There is a sense of anxiety among European citizens: who will protect me against the Trump tornado and Putin's aggression? There must be a political answer to this - and Europe is well-positioned to deliver it. Because those same citizens have never shown so much support in various polls for the EU to do exactly that.

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