A New Rift in the Gulf, and Only the Gulf Can Solve It

Commentary by Michael Ratney

Published January 16, 2026

For two countries now at each other's throats, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have an awful lot in common. They share the ambition and resources to remake the Middle East as an engine of economic opportunity and to serve as global hubs for artificial intelligence, shipping and aviation, tourism, finance, and much more. They both long to turn the page on the region's history of extremism and instability, and focus instead on commerce, social development, and economic diversification. They are both working to wean their economies away from dependence on oil, investing in renewable energy and their own human capital. They both want a strong security partnership with the United States to help defend against their ultimate threats, namely Iran and jihadi terrorists including al Qaida and ISIS. And they both think Israel should ultimately be an integral part of their region, even while their timelines and conditions for advancing that relationship differ sharply.

With all that the two countries share, there should be great opportunities for cooperation-with each other and with the United States. But those commonalities also set the stage for the bitter antagonism they are now living, which exploded into public view when an Emirati-supported political movement, the Southern Transitional Council (STC), took over two large provinces in Yemen, including one right along Saudi Arabia's southern border. Following sharp words and air strikes, the STC withdrew and most of its leadership, accepted a Saudi offer to come to Riyadh and talk, and has now reportedly disbanded completely. The UAE has meanwhile reportedly withdrawn its own forces from Yemen. The immediate crisis is perhaps behind us, but the antagonism will likely endure for some time.

Some of that antagonism is not about Yemen, but is more deeply rooted in longstanding economic competition. Both countries seek to attract investment and headquarters of multinational companies, build global airlines, draw tourists, and maximize revenues from the oil exports on which both countries still depend. For years the UAE was the unquestioned economic powerhouse of the Gulf, and many observers will say it is still 20 years ahead of Saudi Arabia in economic development. But Riyadh is trying to catch up fast.

Some of the antagonism is no doubt personal-the 64-year-old Emirati president, Mohammad bin Zayed (MBZ), was once a mentor of sorts for the younger Saudi Crown Prince, the 40-year-old Mohammad bin Salman (MBS). Because both countries are ruled by monarchs, national relations inevitably become personal, and that relationship has degenerated in recent years into something more like a rivalry. The Saudis believe the UAE does not accept the dominant role Saudi Arabia has historically played-indeed, always will play-in anchoring a stable system of Arabian monarchies. They see the UAE stoking the very instability they should all be seeking to contain. The UAE, on the other hand, believes Saudi Arabia misjudges, even dismisses, the Emiratis' economic influence, and their expanding regional role and identity, which has grown rapidly in recent years independently of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) construct that has long defined the region and its pecking order.

And some of the antagonism simply comes down to policy goals and differing approaches to the region. Saudi Arabia, dubious that the region's worst conflicts can be satisfyingly resolved, has sought principally to de-escalate them and distance the most pernicious effects of those conflicts from Saudi borders. The UAE, meanwhile, has sought to deal with that instability by projecting influence, developing relationships and access throughout the region, often through local proxies in places such as Yemen, Sudan, and Libya, which harbor separatist ambitions or rival governments. The Saudis have no love for Islamist political movements-indeed they are a threat to the Saudi monarchy and outlawed in the kingdom-but the Saudis have historically been willing to work with them where there is no viable alternative, such as in Syria. The UAE, on the other hand, has sought to extirpate Islamist political movements in the region, even if it involves working with other unsavory local partners.

Whether rooted in commercial competition, personal rivalry, or ideology, this Saudi-UAE tension has been growing since MBS became Saudi crown prince in 2017. It may have reached a crisis point over Yemen, but the intense vitriol in social media right now suggests that this is far worse than a temporary disagreement over one country, and perhaps more profound than the GCC rupture with Qatar in 2017. That rupture was not fixed with outside mediation, though the United States tried. It was ultimately Kuwait, with help from Oman, that helped bring it to a close, and it was not a speedy process. Though never really freighted with the economic and personal rivalry of the Saudi-UAE relationship, it still took over three years. If the current split is ultimately resolvable, it could easily take longer, and like the 2017 break with Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their Gulf neighbors will need to repair this in their own way and on their own timetable.

At the same time, the United States and its partners can reinforce with GCC leaders-quietly, patiently-that they are better off working together for the collective good. Divisions, bleeding into conflict, become own-goals-opportunities for Iran to exploit. Better would be a common regional strategy that keeps the United States and all its Gulf partners arrayed against the real adversaries, and helps maintain momentum toward what both countries want: a region where their vast ambitions in technology, energy, infrastructure, transportation, tourism, and many other sectors can truly make the Arabian Peninsula an island of stability and prosperity.

Michael Ratney served for over three decades as a U.S. diplomat, most recently as ambassador to Saudi Arabia. He is currently a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC.

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