Minister of Finance Riikka Purra's speech at the Annual Meeting of Heads of Mission

Minister of Finance Riikka Purra's speech at the Annual Meeting of Heads of Mission

"Finland will continue to play a constructive role in promoting a stable and peaceful international order", said Minister of Finance Riikka Purra in her speech at the Annual Meeting of Heads of Mission .

Distinguished Ambassadors, Ladies and Gentlemen,

After a two-year break, it is a real pleasure for me to be speaking at the Annual Meeting of Heads of Mission again.

Over the past two years, world politics has, in many respects, undergone a significant realignment. Russia's war of aggression and destruction against Ukraine is still ongoing with undiminished brutality. The Russian government is showing no interest in reaching a balanced negotiated solution. Instead, it relentlessly pursues its maximalist objectives through military force. Finland's objective is durable peace that secures Ukraine's sovereignty and self-defence capacity and denies Russia any gains that could make future aggression more attractive.

During President Donald Trump's second term, the United States has adopted a major shift in foreign and security policy in relation to Europe. This has shocked many across Europe and, in some quarters, has led to the perception of the United States as a political opponent rather than a partner of Europe. The current United States vision for Europe is set out in greater detail in the 2025 United States National Security Strategy. The document depicts Europe as a region at risk of cultural erosion and economic decline unless swift and decisive political action is taken across the continent. In particular, the strategy portrays immigration as a major security threat to Europe, arguing that it is not only a civilian and societal crisis but also undermines the ability of European NATO allies to uphold their commitments to the Alliance.

While the US administration's views on the threat Russia poses to Europe have at times been regrettably ambivalent, recent months have seen encouraging convergence within the Euro-Atlantic community on this matter. This is of particular importance to a country such as Finland, for which Russia's threat is an existential concern.

Alongside all the legitimate criticism of the current US administration, it is not sensible to create unnecessary divisions between Americans and Europeans on matters of values. The fact that the current US administration has criticised Europe's immigration policy in its National Security Strategy and other declarations does not constitute a threat to democracy in Europe. The United States remains a free society and democracy, linked to Europe by many centuries of shared cultural roots. Furthermore, given the sometimes rapid fluctuations of political cycles in the United States, it makes little sense to draw permanent conclusions about the policies the country will pursue over the longer term. I am referring especially to the US congressional elections in November, where both the Senate and the House of Representatives may see significant shifts in political power.

In response to the current US administration's policies, Europe has strengthened the idea of creating alternative alliances among countries that still trust in the so-called old rules of the liberal world order. This policy also seeks to reduce certain European dependencies on the United States in the fields of defence and technology. In many European speeches, particular emphasis has been placed on strengthening cooperation between the EU and Canada, and even between the EU and China.

Closer cooperation between the EU and Canada must be viewed in light of the fact that Canada's GDP is around thirteen times smaller than that of the United States and that the country is not a military superpower, notwithstanding its considerable increase in defence spending. Canada is therefore not in a position to provide Europe with the kind of strategic defence package that the United States offers, including global military logistics, strategic air transport capabilities, intelligence and satellite capabilities, extensive missile defence, substantial defence-industrial capacity and, above all, US nuclear deterrence.

In developing its relations with China, Europe must proceed with the utmost caution and remain mindful of the many risks involved. The reality is that China is not a peaceful and predictable actor seeking to uphold the traditional rules of the international community. On the contrary, China seeks to reshape the interpretation of international norms and the activities of international organisations in ways that support its foreign policy objectives. In the United Nations, for example, China has been able to rally support among countries of the Global South in efforts to silence criticism of its human rights violations. Within key positions in UN bodies, China has also succeeded in appointing individuals who have advanced China's strategic interests around the world.

Industrial policy in China has always been closely linked to the country's broader geopolitical objectives. Regrettably, it took Europe a long time to recognise this reality. China was once a low-cost producer of bulk goods, but today it is an undisputed market leader in many key technological sectors. However, China would not have attained market leadership in areas such as battery production, electric vehicles and solar panels in such a short period of time without extensive state-led industrial policy, substantial subsidies and low-cost financing that distort competition, together with an asymmetrical opening of the domestic market to Western companies. Western countries themselves have contributed significantly to this development by transferring production, technology and capital to China, driven for many years by the mistaken belief that economic integration would automatically lead to political liberalisation and to a more responsible approach to great-power policy. Through its own policies, the West has actively helped to create a strategic competitor.

China is committed to retaining critical value chains under its own control in order to prevent Chinese know-how from falling into the hands of Western competitors. China also seeks to promote the wider adoption around the world of Chinese standards in areas such as technical standards, software and charging infrastructure.

China has not used its influence over Russia to bring the war in Ukraine to an end. While China has not sought to become a direct party to Russia's war, it is clear that China is a key external enabler of Russia's war economy and defence industry. Chinese microelectronics, machine tools, components and other dual-use technologies meet critical needs within Russia's military-industrial sector and help to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. The fact that the war-industrial capacity of Europe's principal military threat is sustained to a significant extent by China weighs heavily against any Sinophile shift in European foreign policy at the present time. Instead, Europe should deepen its military, technological and economic partnerships with Japan and South Korea, countries that share our values and our understanding of society.

A concise conclusion on the future development needs of US politics is that Europe must be able to defend itself considerably more than at present in order for the transatlantic alliance to be more balanced, but not in order to build an artificial substitute for the United States. As Robert Gilpin's book War and Change in World Politics demonstrated in the 1980s, the stability of the international system depends on the extent to which the structure of alliances and institutions reflects underlying power realities. When the balance of relative power shifts, responsibilities must also be adjusted. Otherwise, an imbalance will emerge that weakens the entire system.

This also provides a far more secure foundation for Finland than the notion of replacing transatlantic ties with Canada or other partnerships. It should also be remembered that, for example, ten medium-sized partnerships do not automatically equate to one United States. The importance of the United States rests not only on the sheer scale of its economy and military capabilities, but also on a number of unique strategic capabilities, the development of which in Europe could, in the worst case, take decades.

Since the migration crisis of 2015, support for Europe's traditional mainstream parties has steadily, albeit gradually, eroded. This phenomenon is no longer confined to countries where protest parties have historically enjoyed strong support, such as Austria, France and Italy. The rise of immigration-critical and EU-sceptic parties as significant political forces has also occurred in countries that, owing to their historical experience, were long regarded as largely immune to hard-line nationalism, including Germany, Spain and Portugal. Without exaggeration, Germany in particular is experiencing its most significant political turbulence since the Second World War, with numerous surveys indicating a sharp decline in public confidence in politicians and social institutions. The political crisis in Germany reflects a profound nosedive in the country's economic model, energy policy and immigration policy. For decades, Germany has served as a stabilising force in Europe, owing to the strength of its economy and the moderation of its policies. The fact that a party which, in certain respects, seeks to overturn elements of the social order established in Germany after the Second World War, and advocates a 180-degree reorientation of the country's policy towards Russia, now leads opinion polls by a significant margin and is viewed as a potential governing party at federal level is not merely a matter for Germany. It also has direct implications for Europe as a whole, including Finland.

Many commentators have rightly pointed out that the foreign and security policies of some migration-critical parties in Western Europe favour a re-engagement with Russia and would leave Ukraine to Russia's aggression and coercion. However, voters in continental Europe do not make their electoral choices primarily on the basis of protest parties' views on Russia. While Russia pursues aggressive influence operations through social media, its efforts are not powerful enough to account for the political choices of millions of European voters. The fact that Western Europe has experienced large-scale immigration from developing countries for more than half a century, with the pace accelerating in recent years, is undeniably one of the main factors, if not the principal factor, behind the erosion of the traditional party system. An increasing number of Europeans simply no longer believe the explanations, advanced by the media and traditional parties, that the eroding effects of migration on national culture, social cohesion and the welfare system represent either a moral obligation, a source of competitive advantage, or a development that enriches people's daily lives. People do not believe in this anymore.
As security scholars Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver have argued through the concept of societal security developed by the Copenhagen School in the 1990s, a state's ability to act effectively in the external sphere ultimately rests on internal cohesion and a shared sense of identity. When that cohesion is weakened by rapid demographic and cultural change, society's willingness to shoulder common burdens, including national defence, is also diminished.
In addition to establishing far more effective control over immigration, Western Europe must also be able to renew the social contract with its citizens. This is equally essential if these countries are to achieve the substantial strengthening of their defence capabilities that the current security environment demands, which is also of importance to Finland. Indeed, the results of German surveys measuring the willingness of citizens and residents to defend their country are strikingly troubling.

For the rest of Europe, Finland and the other Nordic countries provide a compelling example of how parties that challenge established political consensus and oppose open-border policies can become constructive and effective participants in parliamentary decision-making. In the Nordic countries, sovereigntist parties have contributed to responsible economic policymaking, the reform of societal structures and, of course, rationalising immigration policy. There remains a relatively strong national consensus on foreign and security policy, particularly in Finland and Sweden. In both Finland and among our Western neighbours, public support for the agendas advanced by China, Russia and other authoritarian powers remains limited. Indeed, the Nordic countries can be regarded as a democratic anchor in Europe, owing to the adaptability of their party systems and their strong resilience in the face of anti-Western authoritarian influence.

The occasional political, or media-driven, surface noise in our country has not diminished Finland's excellent international standing, and Finnish expertise continues to command widespread respect abroad. Especially in this era of renewed geopolitics, Finnish technology and innovation have considerable potential as Europe seeks to strengthen its strategic autonomy. In fact, over the coming decades, Finland will have no choice but to achieve even greater success in international trade if we are to strengthen the financial foundations of our welfare society and meet the growing demands of national defence. While substantial fiscal adjustment measures will remain necessary during the next parliamentary term, growth in the competitive private sector must also be encouraged through tax, labour-market and innovation policies.

In the years ahead, Finland must seek to harness the opportunities offered by artificial intelligence across all sectors of the economy. In Finland, the most significant contribution of artificial intelligence to addressing the challenges of an ageing population will come through higher productivity. Artificial intelligence can be applied across a wide range of industries, including manufacturing, the forest industry, the chemical sector and electronics, to optimise production, enable predictive maintenance, strengthen quality control, optimise energy efficiency, and enhance planning and supply chain management. In addition, artificial intelligence has the potential to provide Finnish companies with a genuine competitive advantage in software development by reducing development costs. Finland already enjoys a strong starting position in software exports, as Finnish IT and information services have demonstrated an exceptionally high degree of export orientation compared with those of the other Nordic countries.

Turning to EU policy, I would like to mention the negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework, which will present a significant challenge for Finland. Europe's new security environment will also reshape the European Union's budgetary priorities, and Finland must ensure that this shift recognises the particular responsibilities borne by Member States on the Union's eastern border. Finland serves as Europe's frontline safeguard against Russia, and we will increase our defence expenditure in the years ahead despite challenging fiscal circumstances. Finland must insist that the next Multiannual Financial Framework takes account not only of the external security challenges posed by Russia, but also of the long-term vitality of regions along the EU's border with Russia. It is equally important to ensure that changes to the structure of the Multiannual Financial Framework do not alter the balance of competences between Brussels and Finland.

I would like to extend my warmest thanks to the entire Finnish Foreign Service and our diplomatic corps for their excellent cooperation throughout this parliamentary term. In particular, I wish to thank you, the heads of Finland's missions abroad. In your work, you provide continuity and predictability while demonstrating a clear-eyed and realistic ability to operate effectively in a rapidly changing international environment. This is of paramount importance at a time when many of the established rules and conventions of international diplomacy are under considerable strain.

I remain confident that the turbulence we are witnessing around the world will, in time, give way to a new balance in international politics, one in which the democratic West and its allies, the Global South, and authoritarian states can coexist in stability. Finland will continue to play a constructive role in promoting a stable and peaceful international order.
Thank you.