01/27/2026 | News release | Distributed by Public on 01/28/2026 16:09
Additional Actions Could Improve the Department's Pilot Vetting Process Within the Office of International Affairs
January 27, 2026January 23, 2026
Additional Actions Could Improve the Department's Pilot Vetting Process Within the Office of International Affairs
In January 2021, the White House issued Presidential Memorandum on United States Government-Supported Research and Development National Security Policy - National Security Presidential Memorandum-33 to direct a series of actions for Federal research agencies to strengthen protections of U.S. Government-supported research and development against foreign government interference and exploitation. In November 2021, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act was signed into law, followed by the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act in August 2022.
As the Department of Energy continues to heavily invest in research, development, and demonstration projects, we initiated this audit to determine whether the Department's Office of Research, Technology and Economic Security (RTES Office) had sufficient resources and authority to help protect the Department's financial assistance from foreign influence, ownership, and control.
We found that the RTES Office had sufficient resources and authority to perform its role in helping protect the Department's financial assistance from foreign influence, ownership, and control. However, we found that it had not formally documented a limited number of controls. Specifically, the RTES Office had documented its internal due diligence review processes and procedures but migration of these procedures into a centralized electronic system was incomplete. In addition, the RTES Office had not formally documented: (1) coordination with its due diligence review partners and (2) training requirements for staff.
The RTES Office has progressed in formalizing its policies and procedures since its inception; however, opportunities for improvement remain for strengthening its internal controls and formalizing its processes and coordination with key partners. Without a robust and formally documented set of internal controls, the RTES Office may be limited in its ability to help protect the Department from foreign influence, ownership, and control.
To address the concerns identified in this report, we made two recommendations that, if fully implemented, should help ensure that the Department's RTES Office has formal policies and procedures in place, and consistent execution of its due diligence reviews.