Trump Discovers Multilateralism

Commentary by William Alan Reinsch

Published February 17, 2026

Council on Foreign Relations President Michael Froman made an important point in his February 6 column regarding multilateralism. In short, it may be coming back. While administration officials have frequently said that "America First" does not mean "America Alone," until now, there has been very little evidence that they mean it. Trump himself clearly prefers bilateral negotiations, apparently on the theory that in most of them-China being the obvious exception-the United States is the bigger party and in a good position to push the other country around. Multilateral talks, in contrast, provide an opportunity for the other guys to gang up on him.

For the most part, that has not happened. There has been remarkably little retaliation against his tariffs, except for China and Canada, which acted separately. So, no ganging up-until Trump's moves to acquire Greenland several weeks ago; European nations, both in the European Union and outside it (Norway and the United Kingdom), rediscovered their spines and stood up-with some success. It is tempting to say that was an inflection point, and the world is likely to see more of it; indeed, I said that after it happened. In truth, it's too early to reach that conclusion.

Instead, we have seen the United States, in a bit of a U-turn, rediscover multilateralism in the form of its proposed Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE) initiative, in Froman's words, "a coalition of countries aimed at quickly scaling up public and private investment in critical minerals supply chains." He also quotes Vice President JD Vance, who described it as a "preferential trade zone for critical minerals protected from external disruptions through enforceable price floors." Details remain to be revealed, but it appears to be similar to a customs union with (relatively) free trade among its members for the covered minerals, and a common external tariff on imports of the same items from nonmembers, primarily China.

The purpose, however, is not identical to customs unions. Instead of focusing entirely on promoting trade within the membership, FORGE appears designed to set a price floor on imports from nonmembers that will prevent them from dumping their production into the group and thus undermining the ability of companies within the membership to compete. The rationale for that is national security. The minerals in question-there does not seem to be a public list yet-are all critical to the United States' ability to produce sophisticated technologies that are essential to U.S. security.

The obvious question is who will end up joining. Multilateralism only works when it is actually multilateral-when the group constitutes a critical mass. So far, it appears that nobody has said no, but few have said yes. It's a good idea and a necessary counter to China's tactics, but countries may be rightly concerned about Trump's increasingly erratic record of policy pronouncements, a growing number of which are never implemented. They may also be worried about a structure that appears to be more focused on U.S. security than their own. A successful multilateral regime will ensure that all members are treated equally and participate equally in the benefits.

Whether FORGE is a good idea or not, however, is not the point of this column. The point is that FORGE is significant because it is a multilateral approach coming from an administration that has largely eschewed such a policy. Of course, it is also recognition of the obvious-the United States cannot solve its dependency on China for critical minerals by itself. It does not have all the resources it needs, and reestablishing an indigenous processing capability will take more time than we have.

In addition to whether it will work, the other big question is whether it is a one-off endeavor or a sign of change in the administration's thinking about how to deal with other countries. I am inclined to say it is the former. Trump is a confirmed unilateralist and believer in the use of leverage to get his way, a worldview that is fundamentally different from the idea of building cooperative structures that put all participating nations on an equal footing. In the critical minerals case, he has been forced to adopt a different strategy because of the economics of that sector and the disadvantaged position the United States finds itself in. It is hard to see signs of other situations that might persuade him to change his usual tactics.

Related to that is the question of whether his bullying treatment of other countries, friends, and foes alike will constrain his ability to construct multilateral structures. In the minerals case, shared concern about China may prompt other nations to swallow their irritation with the United States and work together toward a goal important to all of them. So far, the other countries have approached the proposal cautiously. How the administration configures it, and the manner in which it is rolled out, will ultimately determine whether it is successful or simply one more Trump announcement made with considerable fanfare that does not end up amounting to much.

Whether it eventually succeeds is important, but the fact that it was even proposed by an administration committed to unilateralism is significant. Hopefully, it will be an example for future initiatives rather than a one-off curiosity.

William A. Reinsch is senior adviser and Scholl Chair emeritus with the Economics Program and Scholl Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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