U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: Implementing GAO's Recommendations Would Help Manage Fraud Risks in Immigration Benefit Programs

What GAO Found

Each year, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) processes millions of applications and petitions for persons seeking to visit or reside in the U.S. or become citizens. USCIS's Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS) leads the agency's efforts to combat fraud. In September 2022, GAO reported that USCIS could better ensure its antifraud efforts are effective and efficient by taking a strategic and risk-based approach that aligns with leading practices in three areas of GAO's Framework for Managing Fraud Risks in Federal Programs (see figure).

Specifically, GAO found that USCIS had conducted fraud risk assessments for a small number of specific immigration benefits, but did not have a process for regularly conducting those assessments. In addition, GAO reported that FDNS had not developed an antifraud strategy to guide the design and implementation of antifraud activities, as well as the allocation of resources to respond to its highest-risk areas. GAO also found that FDNS had not evaluated its antifraud activities for efficiency and effectiveness. Taking action to implement these leading practices will help USCIS ensure that it is effectively preventing, detecting, and responding to potential fraud.

USCIS Should Take Action in Key Areas to Manage Fraud Risks

In December 2025, GAO reported that from May 2022 through September 2024, about 774,000 noncitizens were granted parole-temporary permission to stay in the U.S.-across three humanitarian parole processes for noncitizens with U.S.-based supporters. These processes included Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans; Uniting for Ukraine; and family reunification parole. USCIS was responsible for reviewing supporter applications for evidence they had sufficient financial means to support prospective parole beneficiaries and met other requirements. In early 2024, FDNS officials analyzed 2.6 million supporter applications and found that fraud risks were widespread in Uniting for Ukraine and Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans parole processes. For example, fraud indicators included supporter information belonging to deceased individuals and thousands of applications with at least one piece of fictitious supporter information. USCIS attributed the fraud risks to insufficient internal controls in its supporter vetting process-for example, not having automated processes to prevent or detect possible fraudulent activity. DHS has since suspended or terminated the processes. However, GAO found that USCIS has not developed an internal control plan for new or changed programs in the future. Such a plan could include basic antifraud controls and mechanisms to help proactively identify and mitigate fraud risks.

Why GAO Did This Study

Granting immigration benefits to individuals with fraudulent claims can jeopardize the integrity of the immigration system by enabling individuals to remain in the U.S. and potentially apply for certain federal benefits or pursue a path to citizenship.

In 2022 and 2023, DHS introduced new processes for humanitarian parole in response to increases in noncitizens arriving at the southwest border. The processes allowed eligible noncitizens from certain countries to travel to the U.S. to seek a grant of parole. To be eligible, noncitizens had to have a U.S.-based supporter apply to financially support them. As of December 2025, DHS had suspended or terminated the processes.

This statement discusses USCIS efforts to manage fraud risks (1) across immigration benefits it adjudicates and (2) in humanitarian parole processes for noncitizens with U.S.-based supporters. This statement is based primarily on our September 2022 and December 2025 reports on these topics.