09/18/2025 | Press release | Archived content
MUNICIPALITIES-STATUTORY AUTHORITY-HOUSING FUNDS-TAXATION-BONDS-Authority of Municipalities to Use Lodging Tax Revenues to Repay Revenue Bonds Issued to Finance Affordable Workforce Housing Within One-Half Mile of a Transit Station
RCW 67.28.160 authorizes a municipality to use lodging tax revenues to repay bonds issued to finance affordable workforce housing within one-half mile of a transit station.
September 18, 2025
The Honorable Jamie Pedersen Majority Leader 43rd Legislative District 307 Legislative Building P.O. Box 40443 Olympia, WA 98504-0443 |
Cite As: AGO 2025 No. 3 |
Dear Senator Pedersen:
By email previously acknowledged, you have requested an opinion on the following question:
May a municipality use lodging tax revenues to repay revenue bonds for affordable workforce housing within one-half mile of a transit station?[1]
BRIEF ANSWER
Yes. RCW 67.28.160 provides specific authority for a municipality to use lodging tax revenues to repay revenue bonds issued to finance affordable workforce housing within one-half mile of a transit station. RCW 67.28.160 is a more specific statute than RCW 67.28.1815, and accordingly, We interpret RCW 67.28.160 as an exception to RCW 67.28.1815's general restrictions on use of lodging tax revenue.
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BACKGROUND
A county or city may levy and collect a special excise tax on charges for lodging within their jurisdiction. RCW 67.28.180(1), .181(1). RCW 67.28.1815 generally limits expenditure of lodging tax revenue to "paying all or any part of the cost of tourism promotion, acquisition of tourism-related facilities, or operation of tourism-related facilities[,]" except "as provided in RCW 67.28.180[.]" In addition to authorizing the lodging tax, RCW 67.28.180 specifies certain permissible or required expenditures for counties and cities based on population size and whether they pledged tax revenues for payment of bonds prior to certain dates. For example, and pertinent to your question, after January 1, 2021, a county with a population of one million five hundred thousand or more must use at least 37.5% of the revenues on "contracts, loans, or grants to nonprofit organizations or public housing authorities for affordable workforce housing within one-half mile of a transit station," for "housing, facilities, or services for homeless youth[,]" or to repay bonds issued pursuant to RCW 67.28.150 and .160. RCW 67.28.180(3)(d) (emphasis added). Currently, King County is the only county with a population of one million five hundred thousand or more.[2]
Although RCW 67.28.1815, which generally restricts lodging tax revenue expenditure to tourism promotion and facilities, refers only to RCW 67.28.180 as a source for other allowable uses, there are two more recently-amended provisions in RCW 67.28 that describe lawful uses of lodging tax revenue. As amended in 2015, RCW 67.28.150 and RCW 67.28.160(1) empower municipalities to issue general obligation and revenue bonds, respectively, to "carry out the purposes of this chapter, including . . . financing loans or grants to nonprofit organizations or public housing authorities for affordable workforce housing within one-half mile of a transit station[.]" These amendments were part of a bill enacted in 2015 titled "AN ACT Relating to allowing the use of lodging taxes for financing workforce housing; and amending RCW 67.28.150, 67.28.160, and 67.28.180." Laws of 2015, ch. 102. The statutes expressly authorize municipalities to repay general obligation and revenue bonds with the tax revenue authorized by RCW 67.28. RCW 67.28.160(1) ("[T]he legislative body of any municipality . . . may pledge the special taxes provided for in this chapter to the repayment of such revenue bonds."); RCW 67.28.150 (providing similarly with respect to general obligation bonds). As noted, RCW 67.28.1815-which was last amended in 2008-does not expressly reference the uses authorized in RCW 67.28.150 and .160(1).
ANALYSIS
You have asked whether a municipality may use lodging tax revenues to repay revenue bonds issued to finance affordable workforce housing projects. To answer your question, we must consider both RCW 67.28.1815's general restriction and the specific authorization in
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RCW 67.28.160(1). Because RCW 67.28.160 is the more specific and recently enacted statute, we conclude that RCW 67.28.160(1) operates as an exception to RCW 67.28.1815's general restriction and authorizes municipalities to use lodging tax revenues for this purpose.
The goal of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. Wash. State Ass'n of Cntys. v. State, 199 Wn.2d 1, 10, 502 P.3d 825 (2022). To do so, we first look to "the statute's plain language and ordinary meaning." Id. (quoting State v. J.P., 149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003)). "The plain meaning of a statute may be discerned 'from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.'" Id. at 11 (quoting J.P., 149 Wn.2d at 450).
Here, as most recently amended, RCW 67.28.160(1) describes a legislative purpose of developing affordable workforce housing. Specifically, it states that municipalities may issue revenue bonds "[t]o carry out the purposes of this chapter, including . . . financing loans or grants to nonprofit organizations or public housing authorities for affordable workforce housing within one-half mile of a transit station[.]" Further, the plain language provides municipalities a mechanism to effect the stated purpose by authorizing repayment of bonds from the lodging tax authorized in RCW 67.28. RCW 67.28.160(1). RCW 67.28.160 does not limit this authorization to municipalities of any particular size.
If RCW 67.28.160 was the only statute addressing lodging tax revenue expenditure authority, the analysis would end there. But it isn't the only statute regulating lodging tax revenue expenditures. As noted earlier, RCW 67.28.1815 provides that use of lodging tax revenue is limited to the enumerated uses "[e]xcept as provided in RCW 67.28.180[.]" Nothing in RCW 67.28.1815 or .180 authorizes a municipality (other than a county "with a population of one million five hundred thousand or more") to use lodging tax revenue for affordable housing. Thus, reading RCW 67.28.1815 in isolation, one might conclude that municipalities with populations smaller than one million five hundred thousand are not authorized to spend lodging tax revenue on affordable housing.
However, in statutory construction, we cannot "read a statute in isolation;" we must consider "'the context of the entire act' as well as other related statutes." State v. Gray, 189 Wn.2d 334, 340, 402 P.3d 254 (2017) (quoting Jametsky v. Olsen, 179 Wn.2d 756, 762, 317 P.3d 1003 (2014)). Both RCW 67.28.160 and RCW 67.28.1815 address permissible lodging tax revenue expenditures but appear to contradict each other. Specifically, RCW 67.28.160 allows a municipality of any size to use lodging tax revenues to repay revenue bonds issued for affordable workforce housing, but RCW 67.28.1815 restricts expenditure of lodging tax revenue except in certain circumstances, which do not include those outlined in RCW 67.28.160. We turn to the tools of statutory construction to resolve the conflict. Wash. State Ass'n of Cntys., 199 Wn.2d at 12. Several canons of statutory construction support a reading that RCW 67.28.160 serves as an exception to RCW 67.28.1815 and provides specific authority for municipalities to spend lodging tax revenues on servicing revenue bonds for affordable workforce housing.
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Fundamentally, RCW 67.28.160 is the more specific and later enacted statute. "A general statutory provision must yield to a more specific statutory provision." Ass'n of Wash. Spirits & Wine Distribs. v. Liquor Control Bd., 182 Wn.2d 342, 356, 340 P.3d 849 (2015). "To resolve apparent conflicts between statutes, courts generally give preference to the more specific and more recently enacted statute." Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wn.2d 201, 211, 5 P.3d 691 (2000). "It is a fundamental rule that where the general statute, if standing alone, would include the same matter as the special act and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to, or qualification of, the general statute, whether it was passed before or after such general enactment." Wark v. Wash. Nat'l Guard, 87 Wn.2d 864, 867, 557 P.2d 844 (1976).
RCW 67.28.1815 (last amended in 2008) addresses general expenditures of lodging tax revenues, while RCW 67.28.160 (amended in 2015 to add the relevant language) provides specific authorization for "any" municipality to use lodging tax revenue to repay revenue bonds for affordable workforce housing. And the 2015 amendments call out a specific purpose to "financ[e] loans or grants . . . for affordable workforce housing within one-half mile of a transit station[.]" Laws of 2015, ch. 102, ยง 2(1). Read together, RCW 67.28.160's specific authorization is an exception to RCW 67.28.1815's general rule. Courts presume that a material change to a statute reflects a change in legislative purpose. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Dep't of Lab. & Indus., 1 Wn.3d 666, 679-80, 531 P.3d 252 (2023). This does not mean RCW 67.28.160 invalidates RCW 67.28.1815's general limitations on spending lodging tax revenue. See Wash. State Ass'n of Cntys., 199 Wn.2d at 13. Instead, RCW 67.28.160 creates an exception to RCW 67.28.1815's general limitations by authorizing a municipality of any size to spend lodging tax revenues on repaying revenue bonds to finance affordable workforce housing.
We considered whether a conflict between RCW 67.28.160 and RCW 67.28.1815 could be avoided entirely by interpreting RCW 67.28.160 to apply only to counties with a population of one million five hundred thousand or more. But two additional canons of statutory construction counsel against this interpretation. First, statutes should not be read "in a way that would render any language 'meaningless or superfluous.'" Wash. Ass'n of Cntys., 199 Wn.2d at 12-13 (quoting J.P., 149 Wn.2d at 450)). Second, we try to avoid reading words into a statute that are not there. Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wn.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598 (2003); see also Perez-Crisantos v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 187 Wn.2d 669, 680, 389 P.3d 476 (2017) ("[W]here the legislature includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another, the exclusion is presumed intentional."). RCW 67.28.160(1) authorizes the legislative body of "any municipality" (emphasis added) to pledge lodging tax revenues for repayment of general revenue bonds used to finance loans or grants for affordable workforce housing.We would be ignoring the word "any" before "municipality" and inserting the words "with a population of one million five hundred thousand or more" after it in order to read RCW 67.28.160 as being limited to King County. In contrast, reading RCW 67.28.160 as an exception to RCW 67.28.1815's general restriction available to "any" municipality gives meaning to all of section .160's words and avoids reading words that do not appear in that section.
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In a similar vein, this interpretation gives effect to the statement of legislative purpose in RCW 67.28.160. We consider enacted statements of legislative purpose when reading the statute's plain language. G-P Gypsum Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 169 Wn.2d 304, 310, 237 P.3d 256 (2010). Here, RCW 67.28.160(1) includes a legislative purpose of funding affordable housing with lodging tax revenues. This legislative purpose is carried out by giving any municipality discretion to "pledge the special taxes provided for in this chapter to the repayment of such revenue bonds." RCW 67.28.160(1). Reading RCW 67.28.160 as an exception to RCW 67.28.1815 preserves this legislative purpose.
Our conclusion is also consistent with the legislative history. As previously noted, the title of the 2015 bill that amended RCW 67.28.150 and .160 is: "AN ACT Relating to allowing the use of lodging taxes for financing workforce housing . . . ." Laws of 2015, ch. 102. When construing statutes, courts sometimes consider the title of the underlying legislation. See, e.g., Covell v. City of Seattle, 127 Wn.2d 874, 887-88, 905 P.2d 324 (1995), abrogated on other grounds by Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682, 451 P.3d 694 (2019). Similarly, courts have also considered final bill reports. See, e.g., Wright v. Lyft, Inc., 189 Wn.2d 718, 730, 406 P.3d 1149 (2017). The final bill report for the 2015 legislation recognizes that any county or city may spend lodging tax revenues to repay bonds for financing affordable workforce housing. Final Bill Report on Substitute H.B. 1223, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015). The bill report does not reflect limitations on which counties may spend lodging tax revenues on servicing affordable workforce housing revenue bonds.
We recognize that there may be contrary legislative history indicating that one or more individual legislators believed the new authorization to spend lodging tax revenue on affordable housing was limited to King County, the only county currently larger than one million five hundred thousand. See, e.g., Senate Floor Debate on Engrossed Second Substitute H.B. 1850, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. Apr. 15, 2015), at 04:32:17, video recording by TVW, Washington State's Public Affairs Network, https://www.tvw.org/watch/?clientID=9375922947&eventID=2015041094 (indicating this was a "King County bill only"). However, statements of individual legislators are not conclusive, particularly in the face of contrary legislative history and statutory language. Seattle Times Co. v. County of Benton, 99 Wn.2d 251, 255 n.1, 661 P.2d 964 (1983); Wash. State Legislature v. Lowry, 131 Wn.2d 309, 326-27, 931 P.2d 885 (1997).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that RCW 67.28.160 authorizes any municipality to use lodging tax revenue to repay affordable workforce housing revenue bonds and is an exception to RCW 67.28.1815's general restrictions on spending lodging tax revenues.
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We trust that the foregoing will be useful to you.
NICHOLAS W. BROWN
Attorney General
SHELLEY WILLIAMS
Senior Counsel
lrv
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[1] Your question arises in the context of a specific city's inquiry, but consistent with our usual practice, this opinion sets forth a general analysis of the applicable statutes and does not attempt to resolve any specific dispute or provide advice to a specific city.
[2] See Municipal Research and Services Center of Washington (MRSC), Washington County Profiles, https://mrsc.org/research-tools/washington-county-profiles (last visited Sept. 10, 2025).