Trump’s Africa Policy: Commerce and Domestic Politics Clash

Commentary by Oge Onubogu

Published October 6, 2025

This commentary is part of a report from the CSIS Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department entitled Navigating Disruption: Ally and Partner Responses to U.S. Foreign Policy.

Introduction

The Trump administration has adopted a foreign policy approach of prioritizing economic and security relations with countries where interests converge. This strategy may be initially popular with some foreign leaders who think their countries could gain more from trade than they did from aid, but it is already clashing with the administration's credo of "America First." This tension is most visible in U.S-Africa relations.

The Trump administration's early push for a commercial diplomacy strategy for Africa that prioritizes trade over aid was welcomed by many African leaders. These leaders have long called for the United States to recognize the African continent as a commercial partner, and not only as an aid recipient. The United States, of course, has a long history of commercial diplomacy in Africa. The Trump administration is trying to distinguish its approach, especially for its domestic constituencies, by emphasizing trade benefits, private sector investments, and bankable partnerships for U.S. businesses, while also seeking to persuade African leaders of the potential for economic growth. Recently retired Ambassador Troy Fitrell, the State Department's senior bureau official for Africa who helped craft the administration's policy, told an audience in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, in May 2025 that the administration's strategy would be implemented in close partnership with U.S companies, African governments, and other stakeholders to create conditions for economic growth on the continent.

While the U.S.-facilitated peace agreement for the DRC and Rwanda is seen as a step in the right direction, the verdict is still out on whether this process can restore peace in the region.

Africa's growing strategic and geopolitical relevance-given the potential of its burgeoning population and its store of the critical minerals needed to serve the globe's high-tech needs-offers clear areas where U.S interests converge with opportunities, and a commercial diplomacy strategy could help achieve alignment. But foreign policy does not operate in a vacuum: All foreign policy is inherently domestic, and under this administration, domestic priorities such as supporting U.S. businesses strongly influence the foreign policy agenda. This creates challenges in the conception and execution of a commercial diplomacy strategy for Africa. Perhaps two areas where this tension is most visible are trade protectionism and immigration reform.

How Have Trump's Policies Impacted Africa? How Is Africa Responding?

Trade Protectionism

The Trump administration's April 2, 2025, "Liberation Day" Executive Order 14257, which proposed significant tariffs aimed at addressing trade deficits and promoting U.S. economic independence, undermines the administration's own trade-over-aid agenda in Africa. The order (since modified more than once) initially imposed baseline 10 percent tariffs on 29 African countries and placed higher tariffs on 20 more African countries, reaching up to 50 percent for Lesotho-the second-highest rate after China. Lesotho, one of Africa's smallest economies and greatly reliant on textile exports to the United States, declared a state of disaster in its textile industry before Trump announced a 90-day pause. Following the administration's modification of reciprocal tariff rates on July 31, Lesotho's new duty on imports decreased to 15 percent, which has provided some relief. But about 12,000 textile jobs in Lesotho hang in the balance. The country is now courting buyers from other markets for its goods.

Trump also has imposed a 30 percent tariff on select South African goods and has threatened a 10 percent increase in tariffs for nations aligned with the BRICS bloc of major emerging economies. These sets of tariffs impact two of Africa's largest economies, Nigeria and South Africa, along with many smaller countries. The 30 percent tariff on South Africa is expected to significantly impact the country's job market, especially in the automotive parts industry, which relies heavily on duty-free exports to the United States. Nigeria's tariff rate, now at 15 percent, may rise by an additional 10 percent given it recently joined BRICS in January 2025 as a partner country, just before Trump took office with a view of BRICS' policies as "anti-American."

Although the Trump administration ultimately modified some of its tariffs on Africa, the levies have caused uncertainty and panic for many African countries that rely heavily on trade with the United States. The tariffs have shaken African economies and raised significant doubts about the intent of the United States' commercial diplomacy strategy, with some questioning whether it is only about securing minerals from the continent and not a mutually beneficial partnership.

The Trump administration has demonstrated a preference for a transactional foreign policy approach on the continent; for example, earlier this year, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) offered exclusive mineral rights for U.S. companies in exchange for U.S. security assistance against the M23 rebel group, a paramilitary force backed by neighboring Rwanda. The request influenced a subsequent peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda, brokered by the United States, that apparently would grant rights to certain critical minerals to foreign investors, including from the United States. The declaration of principles for peace that was signed in June 2025 by the foreign ministers of the DRC and Rwanda purportedly is intended to provide economic incentives for all parties involved through what State Department Senior Advisor on Africa Massad Boulos described as a "regional economic integration framework."

The U.S.-facilitated peace agreement for the DRC and Rwanda is seen as a step in the right direction, the verdict is still out on whether this process can restore peace in the region.

The quest to secure critical minerals appears to be a key focus of this administration, playing a significant role in Trump's early overtures to Ukraine as well. And while the U.S.-facilitated peace agreement for the DRC and Rwanda is seen as a step in the right direction, the verdict is still out on whether this process can restore peace in the region. Notably, the presidents of the warring countries were absent from the June signing, which included an Oval Office appearance with the two foreign ministers; a key rebel group was not involved in those talks; and significant hurdles to implementation remain. Without an enabling environment of stability and security, it would be difficult for U.S businesses to operate in the region.

The tariffs also placed a question mark over the future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade deal, which has given African countries tariff-free access to U.S. markets for 25 years. AGOA expired in September 2025, and at the time of this writing, there is no clear indication of whether and how it will be renewed, a step that would have to be taken by Congress. Many in the Trump administration have noted its significance, and Trump himself, when asked about AGOA during the July 2025 summit he conducted with five African presidents-from Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, and Senegal-said that he would "look at" extending the trade pact. But many African leaders doubt the prospects of AGOA's renewal, given its no-tariff regime for some goods.

Meanwhile, China is already Africa's biggest trading partner, giving nearly the entire continent tariff-free access to its markets: In June 2025, China removed tariffs for 53 African countries. That will help expand the already notable gap between Chinese and U.S. trade figures with Africa-Africa's trade in goods with China rose 6.1 percent in 2024 to $295 billion compared with $72 billion of goods traded with the United States.

In response to this uncertain environment and to counter Trump's tariffs, African countries are doubling down on efforts to leverage their flagship free trade initiative, the African Continental Free Trade Area. That initiative, which began trading in 2021 to bring the continent's 1.4 billion people in more than 50 countries into a single market, has been slow in implementation. While 49 countries have ratified the agreement, fewer than half are actively trading under its umbrella-though the initiative has still seen some progress. In the meantime, African nations are expanding trade ties with China, the European Union, and Persian Gulf states.

Immigration Reform

The Trump administration's immigration policies also undermine its commercial diplomacy strategy and economic partnership narrative with Africa. Washington has imposed sweeping visa and travel restrictions under the premise that tightening them protects U.S. national security. But these moves significantly harm many African countries by, among other impacts, hindering the travel required for trade and investment, distracting African leaders who must deal with the sociopolitical effects, and poisoning the atmosphere between U.S. and African leaders.

Distracting from economic issues, the administration's July summit with the five African leaders included a push to have African countries accept third-country nationals deported from the United States, hardly creating the atmosphere of mutual respect needed to develop strong economic relations. Furthermore, the United States has imposed complete or partial visa bans on at least 19 countries, 10 of which are in Africa. All this comes on top of Trump's divisive new policy of admitting white Afrikaner South Africans who claim persecution because of discrimination and violence as refugees.

Multiple African officials have condemned the punitive Trump administration measures as unacceptable and counterproductive. Nigeria, for example, said that while it is eager to strengthen trade ties with the United States, the travel restrictions are a major hinderance. Nigerian Foreign Minister Yusuf Tuggar publicly rejected the Trump administration's pressure for the country to accept third-nation asylum seekers, saying the country has "enough problems of our own" and will not cave to U.S. coercion to take in deportees with no ties to Nigeria.

The Trump administration's new immigration policies also severely restrict student visas, with many African youth heavily impacted; even those already studying in the United States are being cautioned against leaving because they may not be able to return. This is another case of the Trump administration shooting its foreign trade and investment policy in the wallet, so to speak, as Africa's youth boom is becoming a major economic force globally. The World Economic Forum has reported that "by 2035, there will be more young Africans entering the workforce each year than in the rest of the world combined." And China already has a significant numbers advantage over the United States in attracting the best and brightest of them to its education system.

Implications and Recommendations for the United States

The United States must rightfully prioritize its domestic national interests. But foreign policy interests are inextricably intertwined with domestic priorities in today's globally interdependent world, even for the economically powerful United States. It would be shortsighted, to say the least, to hamper potentially beneficial and even lucrative economic ties abroad with counterproductive measures that might undermine the goals of trade and economic growth. The Trump administration risks falling further into that trap by failing to balance these interests in a way that helps, not hurts, Americans-not to mention, in this case, Africans as well. The administration's much-touted commercial diplomacy is at stake.

As Africa's geopolitical importance grows, the United States must clearly identify why it wants to-and why it must-engage with African countries.

As Africa's geopolitical importance grows, the United States must clearly identify why it wants to-and why it must-engage with African countries, and it cannot just be to displace China with more of the same. That would be of little interest to African leaders or Africa's citizens. Why shift from one usurious "partner" to another?

Instead, the Trump administration would find more economic success by understanding fully how it can distinguish itself in the eyes of potential partners. As noted, China already surpasses the United States in trade with African countries and is also increasing its investment in the soft-power approaches that the United States has been using for years, such as in education. And now the Trump administration is eviscerating many of the soft-power tools that gave the country a competitive edge in Africa, not only by restricting immigration and educational exchange but also by dismantling major institutions such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the source of extensive U.S.-Africa economic ties. Among other initiatives, the gutting of USAID took down the 2013 Power Africa project, which aimed to help the continent get up to par on energy production-crucial to any economic development. Another program that fell to the axe was Prosper Africa, a promising initiative created under the first Trump administration that facilitated the creation of the government-backed but private U.S.-Africa Trade Desk to further enhance trade cooperation. The Trump administration has also suspended the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, which once helped reduce risks in early-stage investments and could have been instrumental in ensuring a successful commercial diplomacy strategy. And while the administration retained its Africa bureau in a recent reorganization of the State Department, it has considered significantly scaling back embassy representation on the continent.

Some of the best-performing government agencies like the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) are now under severe budget-cutting pressure. Despite this, the MCC seems to be rebounding with the recent announcement of a $300 million electrification grant for Cote D'Ivoire. Investments like this by the MCC are crucial to deliver the infrastructure needed for successful trade and investment and ensuring that its high-profile senior-level delegations to the continent are not simply symbolic. The administration has signaled that it plans to rely much more on financial institutions such as the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation-also facing reauthorization this year-which provides financing and other assistance for development projects, and the U.S. Export-Import (EXIM) Bank, which provides credit to support U.S. trade. The EXIM Bank, for example, announced in August a $66 million guarantee for a small Washington, D.C.-based exporter of equipment for a new national data center in Côte d'Ivoire. But even then, the announcement makes clear that a key motivator is that the offer "displaces competition" from China. The project could nevertheless be promising, if it is accompanied by the right personnel on the ground-after all, people equal policy.

Similarly, the administration still has a chance to correct or offset its travel restrictions and tariff decisions and its extensive cuts to foreign assistance and diplomacy in ways that support the president's agenda of commercial diplomacy with Africa, rather than weakening U.S. influence around the globe. The reorganization of the State Department, which Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced in May 2025, should be aimed at ensuring that qualified personnel with experience on the continent are in decisionmaking positions for any offices or programs related to Africa. The department needs advanced skills and experience to successfully navigate complex relationships, not only with overseas partners but also with other U.S. government agencies that could be helpful if the president is really serious about an agenda that prioritizes trade over aid. Any budget deliberations with Congress for FY 2026 should ensure sufficient funding to keep embassies staffed and running and for the State Department to advance these priorities. Renewing AGOA should be another priority-it is not a perfect tool, but it offers the possibility to innovate and create more jobs and opportunities for both the United States and Africa.

In pursuing their commercial diplomacy, Trump and his cabinet should ask-and answer-a question honestly: What makes the United States different from China? The perceptions of citizens everywhere are shaped by their lived experiences, and Africans' perceptions of China remain relatively positive despite some recent decreases in Chinese funding to the continent. The most recent Afrobarometer survey of 30 African countries finds that 60 percent of Africans hold a positive view of China's economic and political influence, compared with 53 percent who say the same of the United States. Five years earlier, the two global powers were neck-in-neck, at 59 percent for China and 58 percent for the United States.

In an era in which Africa is being courted by other major countries, including U.S. allies such as Japan, with offers of free trade zones and immigration to foster cultural exchange, the United States must make clear what makes it different-and better. Only then can the Trump administration's commercial diplomacy reap the benefits it claims, for the United States as well as for Africa.

Oge Onubogu is the director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., where she is also a senior fellow.

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