WATCH: In SASC Hearing, Kelly Raises Concerns About “Golden Dome” Missile Defense and China’s Growing Space Capabilities

This week, during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the posture of U.S. Space Command and U.S. Strategic Command, Arizona Senator and Navy combat veteran Mark Kelly raised concerns about the cost, feasibility, and strategic implications of the administration's proposed "Golden Dome" missile defense system, while also warning about China's rapidly advancing space capabilities.

Kelly questioned whether the "Golden Dome" missile defense system could realistically work at the scale envisioned, cautioning against massive spending on a system that may not deliver: "I understand the argument that a more robust missile defense architecture could strengthen deterrence by denial and provide additional protection for the homeland, but at scale, this becomes a question of cost, capability, and plain physics. One of my big concerns is that we spend $500 billion, $1 trillion, we get to the end of the timeline, and we have a system that just fundamentally does not work or does not work well enough to increase deterrence."

Kelly also raised alarm about China's recent satellite activity, including a potential first-of-its-kind on-orbit refueling demonstration, warning it could significantly expand China's ability to operate in space: "There have been reports that last year, China's SJ 5, SJ 21 maneuvered, we think they may have done a satellite refueling experiment. If confirmed, this would be the first time that a satellite in GEO refueled another. That's my understanding. That represents a significant leap, not just in sustainment, but in China's capability to discuss operations. Taken together with their captors' basic abilities, they are building a dynamic and maneuvered approach to space, one that would allow them to persist on orbit longer, reposition assets and potentially hold U.S. systems at risk."

Click here to download a video of Kelly's questioning. See the transcript below:

Sen. Kelly: Admiral, I want to start with you, talk about missile defense and "Golden Dome." As I understand, the architecture and visions to a much more expansive, layered system capable of defending against large-scale missile threats. Maybe including up to a salvo from pure adversaries. That kind of vision requires a large number of interceptors far beyond our current inventories. We are talking about different ways about how we can do this. But also increasingly sophisticated electromagnetic countermeasures to deal with decoys, jamming, other countermeasures. It's a complicated problem. We could be seeing issues with trying to intercept ICBM's that are on trajectories on different orbital inclinations because of the latitude they are launching from. Some land-based, some see based. Admiral, how do you assess the operational feasibility of this approach? I understand the argument that a more robust missile defense architecture could strengthen deterrence by denial and provide additional protection for the homeland, but at scale, this becomes a question of cost, capability, and plain physics. One of my big concerns is that we spend $500 billion, $1 trillion, we get to the end of the timeline, and we have a system that just fundamentally does not work or does not work well enough to increase deterrence.

Admiral Richard A. Correll: From my perspective, senator, the work initially on the sensor layer and the capability to detect and track advanced missiles, that would be advanced hypersonics, advanced cruise missiles, fractional bombardment capability. That is step one in architecture that we are talking about.

Sen. Kelly: I also agree, I see the benefit in that. Hypersonic glide vehicles being able to maneuver, coming from a nonstandard let's say direction is something we have to focus on. It is like the bigger picture of a salvo, being able to intercept multiple rounds coming at us simultaneously.

Admiral Correll: Yes, senator. There is a universe of capabilities and efforts associated with that. You talk about space-based interceptors. That is one technology that we will need to mature to see what the limits are of that in terms of interception capabilities. Gen. Guetlein is approaching it from a kill chain perspective, understanding the whole system that goes into the ability to launch an attack against the U.S. That includes looking closely at left of launch capabilities. You are looking at left of launch, initial launch, boost phase, and the full range of capabilities there in terms of golden dome for America.

Sen. Kelly: You think we can build something that achieves the requirements?

Admiral Correll: I think we are going to advance our understanding and capabilities considerably without effort, yes, senator.

Sen. Kelly: Thank you. General, there have been reports that last year, China's SJ 5, SJ 21 maneuvered, we think they may have done a satellite refueling experiment. If confirmed, this would be the first time that a satellite in GEO refueled another. That's my understanding. That represents a significant leap, not just in sustainment, but in China's capability to discuss operations. Taken together with their captors' basic abilities, they are building a dynamic and maneuvered approach to space, one that would allow them to persist on orbit longer, reposition assets and potentially hold U.S. Systems at risk. Can you comment about your concern, what steps we should be taking to counter that, or build our own capability to be able to match the on-orbit persistence?

General Stephen N. Whiting:Thank you for the question. We're watching that operation last year very closely. I think your question well articulated what is happening. China has demonstrated their sophistication on orbit to include starting to deliver a broad maneuver capability on orbit. My concern is if they develop that, they will have the ability to maneuver for advantage, the way the United States has for decades on land, at sea and in the air, use maneuver for our advantage. We talk about maneuver warfare. I believe we need to deliver our own maneuver warfare capability to make sure we can leverage the advantages the joint force has developed over the decades in space, as we have in other domains.