07/14/2025 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 07/15/2025 02:23
Despite years of debate, failed attempts, and high-level summits, migration diplomacy between the European Union and African countries remains largely dysfunctional. What recent developments have shown is not a progressive evolution toward realism and pragmatic solutions, but rather a stubborn refusal by many European governments to acknowledge the political and demographic realities on the ground. Paradoxically, among the few actors to exhibit any learning from past mistakes are those you might least expect under the current political climate, such as Italy. Overall, however, EU migration diplomacy continues to be shaped by misconceptions, short-term fixes, and political posturing. This reflects poorly on a continent that is in urgent need of regular, stable and predictable immigration, including from African countries.
It is true that irregular migration flows from Africa to Europe have decreased over the past year. However, this latest decline has come on the back of a sharp rise. In 2019, the last year before the Covid pandemic upset human mobility everywhere, around 45,000 irregular migrants reached Europe from African countries. Fast forward to 2023, and these had jumped to 215,000, the highest level ever recorded, only to then decrease again to 130,000 in 2024 (a figure in line with the average of the past decade). Most of this decline has come on the heels of a specific (and highly controversial) deal struck with Tunisia, the main country of irregular transit in 2023, through the EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding.
These kinds of short-term arrangements can temporarily reduce irregular crossings, providing European politicians with visible metrics to showcase "success". But such measures are inherently fragile. For one, they rely on political goodwill and stability in partner countries, which can shift rapidly. Tunisia itself is evidence of this: in the first few months of implementation of the MoU, migrant departures from the country actually starkly increased, only to collapse when the government really decided to crack down. Second, the human rights concerns around the Tunisian government's treatment of migrants further complicate the narrative of a "successful" deal. Third, the volatility of any such deal has a clear track record: think of the Italy-Libya deal (collapse in departures in 2017, but increase since 2020 and now yearly arrivals surpassing 50,000 - ten times higher than during the Gaddafi era) or the EU-Turkey deal (over 60,000 arrivals last year, and the constant threat from Erdogan to "open the floodgates"). In summary: while these agreements can buy time, they do not offer a structural solution.
European efforts to raise return rates for irregular migrants remain a cornerstone of current migration policy, despite overwhelming evidence of their ineffectiveness. The current EU-wide return rate (the share of migrants effectively returned to their country of origin, compared to those ordered to leave) of 23% is even too generous, as it gets a lift thanks to highly compliant countries such as those from the Western Balkans, who have a clear stake in their hope to become members of the EU. Instead, return rates to African countries average 15%, and are significantly lower in several cases. For example, over the past five years EU countries attempted to return nearly 40,000 migrants to Senegal, with only 4% successfully returned. Mali performed even worse, with a return rate of just 2% for around 34,000 attempted returns.
Specific political initiatives aimed at increasing these rates have systematically failed. Take the case of The Gambia and Germany. A few years ago, negotiations led to limited cooperation on returns, only for political backlash in The Gambia to force a reversal in the span of just one year. This shows that these kinds of agreements are inherently unstable, as governments in African countries face immense domestic pressure not to be seen as complicit in Europe's migration containment strategies.
Another failing approach is the EU's growing reliance on conditionality, which mostly consists in linking development assistance from European countries to cooperation on migration control from African governments. In the current negotiations for the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the language is unmistakable: "Increased coherence between migration, asylum and external policies is needed to ensure that the Union's external assistance supports partner countries to manage migration more effectively." In plain terms, Europe is increasingly using aid as leverage; a practice that has been employed more and more over the past decade, and now risks becoming the new status quo. This tactic may work sporadically, in particular with countries that still rely heavily on aid from the EU as a share of their GDP, such as Niger, but at the concrete risk of eroding long-term trust. It also reduces Africa's complex developmental priorities to a narrow migration control agenda, something many African governments understandably resist.
The most extreme version of this strategy is the ultra-externalization of asylum processing, exemplified by Italy's recent deal with Albania. Under this arrangement, Italy planned to process asylum seekers in facilities on Albanian territory. While legal challenges from courts have upstaged the process, delaying it by months or even years, the precedent it sets is concerning. Other European countries are reportedly exploring similar schemes, signaling a broader drift toward policies that prioritize distance over responsibility. These ideas may appeal to domestic audiences, but they are unlikely to foster constructive diplomacy with African partners.
Amid this bleak picture, one counterintuitive trend stands out: the increase in regular migration channels to Europe. As stated earlier, Italy offers an instructive example. While the current government's rhetoric on irregular migration is often harsh, it has significantly expanded its decreto flussi, a mechanism for issuing work permits to non-EU nationals, making it part of a three-year forward-looking plan rather than a short-term yearly measure, and increasing the foreseen quotas by a factor of five. This move even allows the Italian government to tie legal migration to formal cooperation with countries of origin, creating a more predictable and mutually beneficial framework. And after all Rome's decision to expand quotas acknowledges a simple reality: Europe's aging population and labor shortages make legal migration not only necessary but desirable.
By offering African countries legal pathways for their citizens to work in Europe, the EU can create incentives for cooperation that go beyond short-term border control or negative reinforcements ("you don't cooperate, I cut your aid"). These initiatives are harder to negotiate, slower to produce results, and politically less popular. But they build trust, contribute to reducing irregular flows, and recognize the economic drivers of migration that no crackdown can eliminate.
Unfortunately, the direction of travel in European politics is not favorable to these more sustainable options. The rightward drift of many European governments has amplified calls for "crackdowns" and visible deterrents. From cracking down on internal Schengen borders to offshoring asylum processing, these measures may score points with voters but do little to foster meaningful diplomacy with African nations.
In many ways, the political incentives are misaligned. Voters demand quick fixes, while sustainable migration partnerships require long-term commitment, diplomatic subtlety, and often uncomfortable compromises. As a result, European migration diplomacy is caught in a feedback loop: short-term deals to reduce flows temporarily, followed by public demands for even tougher measures when those deals falter or expire.
Looking ahead, the most probable outcome is a hardening of positions on both sides. European governments are likely to double down on deterrence and conditionality. In response, many African countries may grow even more reluctant to cooperate, especially when they perceive Europe's approach as coercive or disrespectful of their own sovereignty.
Yet, the few positive actions that are being recorded in Europe in terms of larger regular migration quotas are a testament to the fact that EU-Africa migration diplomacy does not have to be a zero-sum game: there are paths forward that are both humane and pragmatic. However, they require a shift in mindset: from containment to cooperation, from reaction to strategy. Until that happens, the dysfunction will continue.