China’s Power Play Across the Pacific

Commentary by Kathryn Paik and Charles Edel

Published April 8, 2025

In an uncommonly frank moment in 2019, a Chinese diplomat shared that "we treat our friends with fine wine, but for our enemies we have shotguns." While the more acerbic edges of what is now known as China's "Wolf Warrior diplomacy" have softened, the last several weeks of Chinese activity in Oceania have proven that the message remains very much the same: boundless opportunity for those who accede to Beijing's demands, and unmistakable threats to those who dare to oppose them.

In mid-February, the Cook Islands, a country in free association with New Zealand, signed a series of comprehensive agreements with China, much to the alarm of New Zealand and Australia. When China conducted live-fire naval drills in the Tasman Sea with no prior notification, forcing Australia and New Zealand to reroute more than 50 commercial flights, both countries protested the short notice and unprecedented nature of the activity. China's Ministry of National Defense accused Canberra and Wellington of "hyping up" the situation, suggesting that these military exercises-which were not counter to international law-were reasonable and not in any way unusual. Despite China's framing, however, these events-and others-cannot be viewed in isolation. These actions are part of a broader series of moves by China throughout the Pacific, with an unmistakable message to Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands: The United States is far away and uninterested; China is a neighbor who offers great benefits to its friends, so long as you don't cross it. The Chinese-flagged hydrographic survey vessel sailing south of Australia just weeks after the live-fire drills, and China's unveiling of a powerful deep-sea cable cutter, both reinforce this new trendline. As the Australian Office of National Intelligence director general stated in a recent interview, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) live-fire drills were "intended to be provocative" and done to "establish a sense of normalcy" around these types of military activities.

China's Pacific Ambitions

The Pacific presents several strategic opportunities for China, from access to much-needed resources such as fish stocks, timber, and critical minerals to geostrategic objectives such as displacing the United States in its near region and complicating U.S. and allied contingency planning. China's interest in the Pacific is not new, but the willingness and ability to expand its influence in the region has accelerated over the past decade. As China's economic engagement has increased substantially-through both development aid and loans-so too has its diplomatic presence and pursuit of bilateral and mini-lateral agreements with Pacific countries. While economic assistance from any development partner is welcome in a region facing so many significant challenges, China's use of economic promises to shape Pacific security architecture and erode democratic norms poses a direct threat to the national security of all Pacific nations-including the United States.

When Kiribati and Solomon Islands switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in the fall of 2019, it demonstrated China's shift from economic partner to major strategic player in the Pacific. These diplomatic coups came as China's development assistance across the region-some via grants, others, more controversially, by loans-and diplomatic presence expanded. While China's growing interest in the Pacific certainly caught the attention of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and others, it was arguably not until the China-Solomon Islands secret security agreement in 2022 that alarm bells truly went off in Washington, Canberra, and Wellington. For the United States, the Solomon Islands deal reflected a similar Chinese playbook already seen in places such as Djibouti, Sri Lanka, and Cambodia, with perhaps even starker strategic consequences for U.S. national security.

China's inroads into the Pacific have not all proceeded smoothly. When the region pushed back on then-Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's table-dropping of a region-wide security arrangement in 2022, China learned what many other larger powers regularly contend with: The Pacific Islands as a united region-particularly when acting through the regional architecture like the Pacific Islands Forum-does not view kindly heavy-handed diplomacy. China's efforts to make gains in the Pacific Islands through bilateral or mini-lateral agreements, however, have yielded some results in smaller deals throughout the region. Most notably, Chinese diplomacy and Chinese diplomats have also evolved. Agreements are now preceded, at least nominally, by consultation and relationship building, and Beijing now sends higher-caliber diplomats to the region.

Trade is not a major factor driving China's growing relations with this region, but, for a resource-hungry nation like China, resource extraction is. China has significantly increased its trade with Pacific Islands in recent years, but overall trade with Pacific Island countries accounted for only 0.2 percent of China's global trade in 2022. In addition to its strategic location, the real prize is what the Pacific offers to an acquisitive China. In addition to large fishing stocks, much of which is within islands' exclusive economic zones (EEZs), the Pacific is also home to other valuable resources such as critical minerals and timber. Thus, Chinese agreements often include provisions on critical mineral rights, such as with deep sea mining in the Cook Islands, or partnership on fisheries and ports-the latter of which also carries with it a clear security component, should China build up a dual-use or Chinese-owned port facility.

Testing the Waters-and the West

The rash of recent activity, however, demonstrates yet another shift in China's Pacific strategy. New Zealand's shock at the China-Cook Islands agreement was likely more than a tertiary benefit for China. Sealing this deal, over the adamant protestations of New Zealand (and potentially in contravention of the Cook Islands-New Zealand security treaty), was a clear message to Wellington (and Canberra, and Washington). China can and will assert itself in Wellington's near abroad. The series of new agreements includes a comprehensive "deepening blue economy" deal that encompasses a range of maritime initiatives from partnering on deep-sea mining to building out port infrastructure. Both of these have outsized implications for the region's ecological and security environment.

Likewise, the unveiling of the game-changing cable cutter and the naval activity in the Tasman Sea-notably just outside the EEZs of both Australia and New Zealand-assertively broadcast China's military reach. Yet while most of the coverage of this deployment centered on the live-fire exercises, the circumvention of the Australian continent began with the deployment of a drone well into Papua New Guinea (PNG) territory while one of the PLAN frigates transited the Torres Strait. PNG Foreign Minister Justin Tkatchenko later confirmed that PNG had not been notified of this territorial incursion, nor given any more heads up than Australia of the PLAN naval deployment. This ship then joined up with two other PLAN vessels to cruise down the eastern coast of Australia, operating and then conducting live fire exercises without significant prior warning.

The brazenness with which China conducted its live-fire drills, knowing the consternation and annoyance it would cause Canberra and Wellington, had an almost flaunting nature about it. China can reach your shores, it said, and you can't do anything about it. As China's ambassador to Australia, Xiao Qian, stated on 27 February, "I think our naval vessels (are) present in this part of the world, just like they're present in many other parts of the world" and regarding the live fire exercises that resulted in the rerouting of over 50 commercial aircraft, "I don't see there's any reason why the Chinese side should feel sorry about that, or even to think about [apologizing]." In other words, get used to it, as such visits are likely to increase in scale, scope, and frequency.

When you look at these individual occurrences, they seem troubling but limited, perhaps in scope and meaning. However, understanding the context of growing Chinese influence in the region and Beijing's hunt for a strategic foothold to project power, these seemingly unrelated events in fact convey a not-so-hidden message regarding China's influence and presence in the Pacific. The timing, as well, is not a coincidence. Part of the impetus may have been the shift seen from Australia itself in 2024 towards a much more transactional, security-focused Pacific approach. Through a series of bespoke, targeted agreements with Tuvalu, Nauru, and then PNG, each of which incorporated security provisions, Australia took explicit steps to limit China's ability to make inroads into Pacific security architecture. These were significant moves and elicited, from China, a response.

And yet China is also likely taking advantage of what it sees as a period of uncertainty in U.S. reliability in the region, reminding smaller and middle powers alike of the economic and military might that China can bring to bear on the region. As the United States rescinds or pauses virtually all its development assistance abroad, and while the Trump administration ponders downsizing diplomatic presence worldwide, it plays directly into the narrative of a disinterested and unreliable global power. This withdrawal from the Pacific has the potential to do far more than create a vacuum-it presents an open playing field, with many of the best defenders walking off the pitch.

In addition to presenting more carrots to the Pacific Islands with which China wishes to partner, the Cook Islands deal and PLAN deployment also strive to change Australian and New Zealand calculus when it comes to aligning with the United States, especially at a time when U.S. commitment to the region is becoming less certain. Through sailing and operating its vessels down the Australian coast, China demonstrated that it can harm Australia and New Zealand, threaten their civilians, and apply pressure to their militaries (such as the base in Northern Australia that China sailed past). Combined with the growing chorus of voices questioning U.S. leadership in the region, these actions are a not-so-subtle way to exacerbate Australia and New Zealand's greatest fears of being isolated, alone, and cut off in a time of conflict. In other words, the cost versus gains calculus for China just became that much more compelling.

Aligning Strategy and Presence in the Pacific

The response for the United States and its allies should be just as compelling. For Washington, this means understanding the importance of its engagements across the region for its own national security-as well as for the security of its allies. It means speaking in a way calibrated to appeal to the region. The pausing of U.S. foreign assistance around the world has looked more like a dismantling than a review-especially in the Pacific, where a large proportion of U.S. engagement is development assistance. In a region where presence and relationships are the currency of influence, this is creating a perception challenge. With the Department of State's foreign assistance review concluding in April, now would be the time to signal that the Trump administration intends to align efforts and resources to strategic objectives. And with such an intention, U.S. efforts to engage with the Pacific should resume.

It means an Australia willing to assert itself as a regional middle power. Australia has already begun to explicitly factor security objectives into its dealings with Pacific counterparts. It can complement those policy efforts by demonstrating to its neighbors that it is a formidable military power that can more explicitly identify, shadow, and target Chinese forces that enter this vital region.

It also means an increased ability of New Zealand to play a greater role in asserting its own interests and supporting its friends. This, in large part, will boil down to decisions in Wellington about the size of its defense, diplomatic, and aid budgets.

Finally, the Pacific Islands themselves have a vital role to play-calling out destabilizing behaviors, articulating the types and manner of development their nations are pursuing, and strengthening their own regional institutions in a way that amplifies their collective voice and strength.

Kathryn Paik is deputy director and senior fellow with the Australia Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Charles Edel is a senior adviser and the inaugural Australia Chair at CSIS. He previously served on the U.S. secretary of state's Policy Planning Staff.

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