10/23/2026 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 10/23/2026 00:56
Palantir has sought to reassure European governments that its military artificial intelligence software cannot be remotely disabled by the company or the US government, as concerns grow over Europe's reliance on American defense technology following disruptions to Ukraine's Starlink services.
Louis Mosley, Palantir's executive vice president for the UK and Europe, told Reuters on Wednesday that customers using the company's Maven Smart System retain operational control of the software, including the ability to operate it independently of Palantir. His comments come as European officials reconsider the risks of depending on US technology providers whose services have become important to military operations.
"What we have seen in the news over the past few days around Starlink is extremely concerning," Mosley said in an interview in Brussels.
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"But as concerns Palantir, I can provide categorical reassurance that where customers have bought our software, they are in full operational control of that software," he said. "There are no kill switches. There's no ability for Palantir or the US government to reach in and switch it off."
The assurance addresses a growing concern among European defense policymakers: whether access to critical military technology could be disrupted by a commercial provider or political decisions in Washington during a conflict.
The issue gained urgency after Ukraine reported restrictions affecting its use of Starshield, a military-grade satellite service that uses SpaceX's Starlink constellation. The reported disruption prevented terminals from working on fast-moving platforms, hampering operations such as the use of interceptor drones against Russian attacks.
U.S. and Ukrainian officials, along with SpaceX Chief Executive Elon Musk, offered conflicting explanations for the disruption. Ukrainian and European officials suspected a possible political motive because the restrictions emerged after US President Donald Trump demanded that Ukraine stop attacking Russian oil refineries. That interpretation has not been established as fact.
Palantir's Maven Smart System processes large volumes of information collected from satellites, radar installations and other sensors, helping military officers build a common picture of battlefield conditions and make decisions more quickly.
The platform is designed to turn disparate streams of operational data into information that military personnel can use to identify developments, assess threats, and coordinate responses. Its role places it within the important category of AI-enabled defense systems that support military decision-making by processing information at a scale that would be difficult to manage manually.
NATO purchased Maven for its Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in 2025 and declared the system had achieved "full technical operational capability" in June 2026.
That adoption gives Palantir a prominent position in the alliance's technology infrastructure. But it also places greater attention on the conditions under which NATO and individual European militaries can continue operating the platform if relations with the US deteriorate or the commercial relationship with Palantir changes.
Mosley said customers could operate Maven without Palantir's direct involvement. Whether company personnel participate in running the system is entirely at the customer's discretion, he said.
Where Palantir employees are involved, Mosley said, they would be citizens of the country concerned and hold the necessary security clearances.
"It can absolutely be operated independently of us, and we have many, many customers around the world, both actually in the military and in the corporate world, who do that," he said.
The debate is centered on the distinction between ownership, operational control, and technical independence. A customer may have authority over how software is used without necessarily controlling every component needed to maintain, update or adapt it. The degree of independence also depends on the system's technical architecture, contractual arrangements and access to specialist support.
Palantir's assurances address the possibility of the company or US authorities remotely switching off Maven. They do not, by themselves, establish that every European customer could sustain all aspects of the system indefinitely without external assistance. That would require a broader assessment of dependencies, including maintenance, updates, infrastructure, and the ability to modify the software when operational requirements change.
European governments have not taken a uniform approach to Maven. While NATO has adopted the system at its headquarters, countries including Germany and France have not deployed it for their own armed forces, citing concerns about dependence on a US technology provider amid recurring tensions between Trump and European leaders.
In April 2026, the head of Germany's cyber command ruled out purchasing Maven, saying it was "inconceivable" for employees of a private company to have access to the country's national military database.
The objection points to a major concern facing European defense planners: how to use advanced commercial technology while maintaining sovereignty over sensitive military information and operational decisions.
AI platforms can help militaries process intelligence and respond more rapidly to complex battlefield developments. But incorporating them into defense operations also creates dependencies on the companies that develop and maintain the underlying systems. Those dependencies can become particularly consequential when software is embedded in command processes or relied upon during active military operations.
The Starlink episode has brought that concern into sharper focus. Satellite connectivity is not the same as AI software, and the reported restrictions affecting Ukraine do not establish that Palantir could or would take similar action. The two cases nevertheless raise a common issue of the extent to which governments can guarantee access to critical capabilities when a private supplier retains control over essential parts of the technology.