Commentary by Alexander Palmer and Sofiia Syzonenko

Published July 28, 2025

Russia believes that it does not have to outproduce Ukraine and its backers or outfight the Ukrainian military if it can outlast U.S. interest in the conflict. In short, Russia believes that its road to Kyiv runs through Washington. To end the war in Ukraine, the United States and Ukraine's other supporters must target that belief. As long as President Putin believes that he can achieve his goals by simply outwaiting the West, he will be extremely unlikely to settle for anything less than the annexation of at least large portions of Ukraine by force. President Trump's announcement that he will increase aid to Ukraine and sanctions on Russia is an important step toward undermining that belief, but it requires follow-through if it is to bring the war to an end.

Russia's belief that it can defeat Ukraine by waiting for U.S. support to dry up is what strategists call a "theory of victory." A theory of victory is a story that a belligerent tells itself about how it will win a war. Demonstrating that an adversary's theory of victory is not viable is an important part of convincing it to seek a negotiated resolution or lay down arms.

Russia's theory of victory was not always to outlast the West. Rather, its initial belief was that a shock and awe campaign, combined with decapitation of Ukraine's political leadership, would allow pro-Russian elements in Ukraine to take charge with the support of Russian occupation forces. For Putin, this meant capturing Kyiv within three days. Internal emails from one of the Russian intelligence services from that period revealed the belief that 2,000 people in every Ukrainian city were ready to overthrow the Ukrainian president, highlighting the role of a supposed fifth column in Russia's theory of victory.

As the Russian assault on the capital failed in the face of Ukrainian resistance and unified Western support, signs of the Kremlin's strategic shift began to emerge. President Putin called up reserves, moved the economy to a war footing, and began a sustained internal propaganda campaign in preparation for a long war. Russia's strategy appeared to involve undermining Ukrainian will to fight by targeting critical infrastructure (energy grids, civilian houses, hospitals) and waging a war of attrition on the battlefield.

Although the Kremlin did not publicly articulate a new theory of victory, Western analysts concluded that Russia seeks to outlast U.S. patience, hoping that a decline in American support will, in turn, weaken Ukraine's will to fight, resulting in defeat on the battlefield. As the U.S. intelligence community's 2024 threat assessment said, "Putin probably believes . . . that Western and U.S. support to Ukraine is finite."

Russian statements during June's Iran-Israel war seemed to confirm these analyses. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Alexander Yakovenko stated that "The military conflict between Iran and Israel may lead to a rapid U.S. withdrawal from the war in Ukraine and increase Washington's efforts to normalize ties with Moscow." Russian state media argued that "By attacking Iran's nuclear facilities and starting a new war just months after Trump's re-election, the United States simultaneously crushed Zelenskyy's hopes for a radical change in the Ukrainian conflict."

The problem with convincing Russia that its path to victory will fail is that it actually might succeed. Ukraine has depended on U.S. weapons, planning, and intelligence support since the beginning of the war. Despite uncertainty about what exactly would happen if the United States ended its support for Ukraine, Ukrainian officials have been saying for years that reductions in U.S. military support would be disastrous. Simply waiting for the United States to stop weapons transfers and intelligence sharing would avoid the need to outproduce the West, which has a much greater industrial potential than Russia. It would also limit the need to outfight the Ukrainians, who have imposed horrific costs on Russia's military despite fluctuations in U.S. support.

Russia's theory of victory also seems reasonable in light of asymmetries in elite interest and public attention. Russian officials believe that the war matters to them more than it does to the United States. As Western commentators and Russian leaders have observed, the asymmetry of interest favors Moscow, which simply cares more about the fate of Ukraine. It is in this light that President Trump's desire for a negotiated end to the war has frequently been interpreted as acceptance of a Russian victory.

The U.S. public also seems to prioritize other conflicts over the one in Ukraine. Over the past 12 months, people in the United States and Western Europe searched more frequently for news on Israel, Hamas, or Iran than for news on Ukraine or Russia (see Figure 1). Although the interaction between foreign policy elites and public preferences is complex, Russia would hardly be unreasonable to assume that U.S. interest is unlikely to be sustained if other crises continue to distract both U.S. elites and the general public.

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