Turkey’s Role in Ukraine’s Reconstruction

• Commentary Russia Caucasus and Central Asia
  by Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti
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Since Russia started its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Turkey stood out as one of the most relevant political and economic actors in the region and for the two belligerent sides. While Turkey condemned firmly Russia's aggression and violation of Ukraine's sovereignty since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, it also maintained a balanced approach - sometimes labelled as tarafsız, that is, unbiased or impartial in Turkish. This approach saw Ankara improve its business and energy ties with Russia, while contributing to Ukraine's military and economic needs, not least in the reconstruction process of the country.

Turkey's deepening economic cooperation with Ukraine

Turkey is the second most important destination for Ukrainian exports after Poland. Before the invasion, Turkish cooperation with Ukraine largely focused on defence-industry development. Post-February 2022, it expanded to direct military assistance, exemplified by the export of Bayraktar TB2 drones. Videos of these drones - and even celebratory songs - circulated widely, turning them into symbols of Ukrainian resistance, with Selçuk Bayraktar, son-in-law of the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, highlighting their morale-boosting role. Humanitarian support also increased: in the first two months of the war alone, Turkey sent 67 AFAD trucks delivering aid, while TIKA, Turkey's main state aid agency, intensified its activities in Ukraine.

Turkey has also emerged as a major investor in Ukraine, accounting for about roughly 20% of newly established foreign-owned companies in 2024. According to Burak Pehlivan, President of TÜRKONFED International and President of the Turkish Ukrainian Businessmen Association (TUID), Turkey is playing a very active role in reconstruction, thanks to Turkish companies' capability and speed in sectors such as construction, energy and logistics. The total investments of around 1,200 Turkish companies operating in Ukraine exceed $5 billion. In the last 5 years and during the war, Ankara has become the largest foreign capital investor in Ukraine. Turkey is also working on tripartite business models such as Turkey-Japan-Ukraine and Turkey-Poland-Ukraine.

In a meeting in February 2025, Erdoğan and Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed the goal of $10 billion in bilateral trade and Turkish backing for reconstruction - a goal which they have pursued since at least 2020. The means to achieve that goal could be the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) approved by Turkey and Ukraine in February. The FTA grants Ukraine access to Turkish markets, with a 0% import duty on roughly 95% of the total quantity of goods exported by Ukraine. As of September 2025, the agreement is still under review by the Ukrainian Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada.

At the Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) held in Rome in July, the Turkish business community was represented by Turkish infrastructure, energy, and machinery companies operating in Ukraine, including Onur Group, Doğuş Construction, and Eksim Holding. Established in 1981, Onur Group is recognised as the largest construction company in Ukraine, according to Forbes Ukraine. It has secured seven separate infrastructure contracts in Ukraine, totaling approximately $53 million. Even if the bulk of reconstruction falls on the shoulders of the EU, these projects are examples of Turkey's important role in Ukraine's post-war reconstruction efforts.

Turkey's "balancing act"

Russia's invasion of Ukraine compelled Erdoğan to clarify Turkey's political stance like never before. From the outset, Ankara faced a thorny decision over Kyiv's request to close the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Then foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu eventually declared the conflict a "war" under Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, which limited - but did not fully bar - Russian naval movements, a complication for the Russians given their base in Crimea. At the same time, though, Turkey refused to join Western sanctions, with Erdoğan insisting he had to take Turkish national economic interests into account and that he would not let Turks "freeze" without Russian gas. Balancing domestic economic pressures and the 2023 elections, he pursued a mediation-driven approach, seeking diplomatic credit while maintaining ties with both Moscow and Kyiv. The same independent posture was visible in Turkey's initial veto over Finland and Sweden's accession to NATO, reinforcing Ankara's image as an autonomous power.

While Turkey continues being a key partner for Ukraine, business with Russia reached unprecedented levels. Trade volume rose from $28.9 billion in 2021 to $68.1 billion post-invasion, decreasing to 52.5 billion in 2024. With Visa and Mastercard gone, Russian travellers relied on the Mir system, which Turkish banks, including Halkbank, supported until US' threats of secondary sanctions forced them to block its use Turkey became a haven for Russian citizens and investors, a real-estate hub for oligarchs, and a crucial transit point for Russian gas to Europe after the Ukraine transit deal expired in January 2025. Hence, while Kyiv regards Ankara as a key economic partner, a mediator in the peace negotiations and even a potential security guarantor in the future, Turkey's drive for strategic autonomy from the West, regional role in the Black sea, and close ties with Moscow will continue to be seen as the obstacles limiting how far the two countries can fully leverage their partnership. So far, these are not preventing Ankara from capitalizing on the early business opportunities in Ukraine's reconstruction, but they are likely to shape the future character of its strategic partnership with Kyiv.