CEO of Iran Tech Company Arrested on Federal Charge of Supplying U.S. Equipment to Iran’s Nuclear and Military Establishment

SANTA ANA, California - A dual U.S.-Iranian national and CEO of an Iran-based technology company was arrested today on a federal criminal complaint charging him with violating U.S. sanctions against Iran by acquiring sophisticated U.S.-origin networking, security, and encryption equipment for Iranian customers - including the Iranian regime's nuclear and military.

Jamshid Ghomi, 63, of Newport Coast, is charged with conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

Ghomi is expected to make his initial appearance this afternoon in United States District Court in Santa Ana.

"Ghomi is accused of aiding our declared enemies by selling U.S.-origin computer networking parts to Iran and earning millions of dollars in violation of U.S. sanction laws," said First Assistant United States Attorney Bill Essayli. "Our nation's laws prohibiting doing business with one of the world's largest state sponsors of terrorism must be enforced and obeyed. We will hold him accountable by seeking an appropriate prison sentence and by seizing his assets, including his $35 million Newport Beach mansion."

"Today's arrest reflects our commitment to disrupt the illegal flow of American technology to foreign nations, especially our adversaries. As alleged, Mr. Ghomi spent years exploiting United States financial systems and procurement channels to move controlled equipment to Iran while hiding his activities behind front companies and falsified documentation," said Darren Lian, Acting Special Agent in Charge, IRS Criminal Investigation's Los Angeles Field Office. "We will continue to work with our partners to safeguard national security by utilizing our financial investigative expertise."

The IEEPA and the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR) impose controls and restrictions on transactions involving Iran based on the threats posed by Iran to the national security of the United States, including its pursuit of nuclear weapons and sponsorship of terrorism. The IEEPA and ITSR prohibit the export, re-export, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by a United States person, wherever located, of any goods, technology, or services to Iran or the Government of Iran without first obtaining authorization from OFAC.

According to the affidavit filed with the complaint, Ghomi is the founder, owner, and CEO of Faraz Pardaz Rayaneh Co. Ltd. (FPR), a Tehran-based computer networking company. For more than a decade, Ghomi has used FPR to procure U.S.-origin networking equipment for customers in Iran in violation of U.S. sanctions. At no time did Ghomi or FPR obtain a license from the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) authorizing those transactions.

Ghomi identified, negotiated, purchased, and arranged the shipment of large quantities of controlled U.S. technology for his own company. From 2011 to 2023, he used his own eBay and PayPal accounts to make hundreds of purchases of computer-networking equipment, directing the goods to intermediaries in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In 2023, Ghomi personally negotiated the purchase of U.S.-origin networking equipment directly from suppliers in Minnesota and Nebraska, routing it through a UAE front company and on to FPR in Iran.

None of these items could be lawfully exported to Iran without a license from OFAC.

From 2014 to 2018, Ghomi arranged the smuggling of more than 250 metric tons (275.6 U.S. tons) of networking equipment into Iran, using freight forwarders and intermediaries in Dubai to disguise that Iran was the true destination.

Ghomi knew this conduct was illegal and took deliberate steps to conceal it. He directed his UAE co-conspirators to keep his name off shipping paperwork, to omit invoices from shipments bound for Iran, and on at least two occasions to hide U.S.-origin computer equipment inside larger shipments. He used front companies in the UAE to obscure his role, and he personally received warnings on invoices and software licenses that exporting these goods to Iran was prohibited. Ghomi and his co-conspirators referred to Iran as "Motherland" in their internal correspondence concerning the equipment's procurement.

FPR's annual sales exceeded $10 million, and its clientele included hundreds of Iranian companies and government entities, many of which were subject to U.S. sanctions. A relatively small but significant portion of that business went to the most sensitive end-users in Iran: the Iranian regime's nuclear and military establishment.

From 2017 to 2023, FPR supplied U.S.-origin computer networking equipment to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) - the Iranian government agency responsible for Iran's nuclear program, including its centrifuge and uranium-enrichment programs. The U.S. State Department sanctioned AEOI in 2020 for playing a leading role in Iran's nonperformance of its nuclear commitments, including exceeding the limits on its uranium stockpile and enrichment levels. According to the affidavit, AEOI required FPR to register as an approved vendor, which it did in 2021 and 2022.

From 2014 to 2022, FPR supplied U.S.-origin networking, security, and encryption equipment to Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics - the Iranian ministry responsible for research, development, and manufacturing across Iran's defense enterprise -- and to affiliated military and defense-electronics entities. FPR's 2017 contract with Iran Computer Industries, signed by Ghomi, expressly identified the buyer as the "Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics - Iran Computer Industries."

Ghomi laundered the proceeds of his illegal business into the United States, depositing FPR's Iranian sales revenue into its operating account at a sanctioned Iranian bank and then sweeping those funds to himself. Within days, he received matching wires into his U.S. accounts from a rotating set of unrelated trading companies and exchange houses in the British Virgin Islands, Hong Kong, Turkey, and the UAE. Those wires bore false descriptions such as "Buying Goods" and "For Consulting Fees."

From 2011 to 2024, Ghomi moved more than $15 million from Iran into his U.S. bank accounts and into a construction escrow account held on his behalf. He falsely reported those funds to the IRS as a foreign inheritance. Ghomi's federal tax returns reported almost no income, his highest reported income in any year being $20,684. Ghomi claimed the Earned Income Tax Credit, a federal tax break for low- to moderate-income working individuals and families, in seven different tax years. Over the same period, Ghomi reported more than $1.7 million in home-mortgage interest and $1.25 million in state and local real-estate taxes on his federal income tax returns.

Ghomi funded the construction of his Orange County mansion with the proceeds of his sanctions-evasion scheme. Ghomi purchased a vacant lot in Newport Coast in March 2010 for $4,490,000 and paid approximately $10,490,371 to construct the residence from 2010 to 2013. From May 2011 to August 2015, foreign-source wires totaling more than $7 million flowed into the escrow account funding the home's construction. These wires came from many of the same trading companies as the transfers from FPR's operating account, were handled by the same FPR employees, and bore the same false descriptions.

A complaint is merely an allegation of criminal conduct, not evidence. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

If convicted, Ghomi would face a statutory maximum sentence of 20 years in federal prison.

IRS Criminal Investigation, in coordination with the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security, is investigating this matter.

Assistant United States Attorney David C. Lachman of the Major Frauds Section is prosecuting this case, with valuable assistance from the National Security Division's Counterintelligence and Export Control Section.