DNFSB - Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
09/25/2026 | Press release | Archived content
Savannah River Week Ending September 25 2026
DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
September 25, 2026
Savannah River Site Resident Inspectors Activity Report for Week Ending September 25, 2026
Savannah River National Lab (SRNL): BSRA personnel and the resident inspector (RI) walked down and discussed the Athena Project, which is focused on developing equipment capability and workforce competence for plutonium processing. They have installed lab-scale mixer-settlers in one of the radiological labs and will install ion-exchange columns in another lab. BSRA personnel have installed centrifugal contactors for solvent extraction and will install dissolvers in the shielded cells that will eventually operate with spent nuclear fuel. The RI and project personnel discussed that these capabilities will not require controls beyond those that already exist in the facility. The RI noted that configuration management may become important if the project expands to meet a variety of other customer needs after the capability is developed and as the flowsheet changes.
Savannah River Tritium Enterprise (SRTE): Construction personnel were demolishing and removing fume hoods that were no longer in service when a plant air line was cut. The line had been air-gapped; however, the line was cut on the supply side, which was pressurized to 110 psig. As soon as air was heard escaping the line, personnel stopped cutting and notified the outside facilities shift operations manager, who called a timeout. Radiation protection personnel collected and tested smears and checked the air quality of the room and did not identify any radiological hazards. At the issue investigation meeting, construction management discussed that the work documents contained warnings for the potential exposure to hazardous energy when cutting installed conduit/piping and required a form be completed prior to performing cuts. The form required identification of specific cut locations and that the cut locations were verified and marked/flagged prior to performing the work. Construction personnel failed to complete the form and the required actions prior to cutting the plant air line. No injuries occurred as a result of this event, and management is in the process of developing corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF): The site conducted an emergency preparedness drill at TEF simulating a cybersecurity attack and radiological release. The RIs observed the response from the control room and the implementation of protective actions in the field. The players and controllers self-identified areas of weakness in the debrief after the drill and discussed corrections to and opportunities for improvement for the procedures being developed. Earlier in the week, an RI had identified an issue with accessing a ventilation shutoff switch (which is to be used in a radiological event for the remain-indoors protective action), and which had been identified as being behind a locked door previously (see 1/9/2026 report). The contractor is planning to relocate the switch from behind the locked door and into the hallway. Until that is complete, there are posted instructions that have personnel contact the control room for the access code, but when the RI called the control room, the shift manager did not know where to find the code. This was shared with the SRTE emergency preparedness manager, who promptly addressed the issue and subsequently successfully demonstrated the effectiveness of the corrective actions in this drill scenario.
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