Press Release: The DoD OIG Releases Reports and Management Advisory on Hawaii’s Red Hill Fuel Incidents

Inspector General Robert P. Storch announced today that the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) released two reports on the overall safety of the Defense Fuel Support Point Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam (JBPHH), including the operation of the Navy's Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility and the actions taken with regard to the contamination of the JBPHH Community Water System in Oahu, Hawaii. Additionally, the DoD OIG released a management advisory highlighting concerns with the Navy's handling of incidents involving aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF), a fire suppressant, at Defense Fuel Support Point JBPHH.

On May 6, 2021, Navy officials identified an unintentional release of jet propellant 5 (JP-5) fuel at the Defense Fuel Support Point JBPHH, specifically at the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility. During the May 2021 fuel incident, approximately 19,000 gallons of JP-5 fuel were inadvertently pumped into an overhead drainage pipeline, remaining undiscovered for about six months. On November 20, 2021, an employee driving a small vehicle hauling a cart accidentally struck a drain valve on the overhead pipeline, causing the pipeline to crack. The JP-5 fuel flowed from the pipeline for approximately 34 hours, and some of the fuel eventually contaminated the JBPHH Community Water System. Navy employees were injured during the incident and subsequent site cleanup.

The contamination of the JBPHH Community Water System directly impacted more than 90,000 people living in the local community. DoD medical providers documented more than 6,100 medical encounters with patients who experienced a range of symptoms, including gastrointestinal and neurological symptoms, as well as depression and paranoia. The drinking water contamination incident also displaced about 4,000 families from their homes for four months. Community members who stayed on the installation had to collect alternate water for drinking and other uses. In addition, American taxpayers carried the weight of the unexpected costs related to the response. DoD officials reported spending more than $220 million for the drinking water contamination incident. Furthermore, the National Defense Authorization Acts for fiscal years 2022 and 2023 included more than $2.1 billion in funding related to the drinking water contamination incident and the planned closure of the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility.

"It is imperative that the Navy address ongoing challenges with the management of fuel and water systems at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-­­Hickam," said IG Storch. "Although the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility was defueled and the DoD intends to close it permanently, the fueling operations at Naval Station Pearl Harbor and Hickam Air Force Base remain in operation. Moreover, the Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam Community Water System continues to provide drinking water to Service members, their families, and members of the public. Unless the DoD mitigates critical infrastructure issues, the readiness of Service members, the well-being of their families, and the environment are at risk. This is why our recommendations include that the DoD assess leak detection systems at other Navy fuel support points. The DoD must take this action, and others, to ensure that tragedies like the one in November of 2021 are not allowed to repeat."

Management of Defense Fuel Support Point Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam

The DoD OIG determined that Navy officials did not effectively manage Defense Fuel Support Point JBPHH operations, maintenance, safety, and oversight in accordance with federal and state laws and DoD policy. Navy officials also did not effectively manage the response to fuel incidents. The report cites a lack of accurate infrastructure records, poor infrastructure conditions, ineffective and inoperable fuel release detection methods, and an improperly managed fire protection system project as contributing to the fuel incidents. Interconnected fuel systems that are not well-maintained hold inherent risks to the community and environment. The DoD OIG found that the facility's inherent risks were well-documented before the fuel incidents and that DoD officials had incident response plans to mitigate them. However, the DoD OIG also found that Navy officials did not follow the basic tenets of their incident response plans or meet the reporting requirements for fuel incidents. Furthermore, the incident response plans were insufficient. The report identifies several reasons for the deficiencies, including that Navy officials did not consistently analyze trends in the fuel inventory to prevent, identify, and respond to potential or actual fuel incidents.

Contamination of Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam Community Water System

The DoD OIG found that systemic issues with the JBPHH Community Water System operations, maintenance, and management contributed to the contamination of the drinking water. The DoD OIG determined that Navy officials missed multiple opportunities to prevent or mitigate the November 2021 fuel incident and subsequent contamination of drinking water. Navy officials failed to take all precautionary measures to protect human health, including not issuing adequate or timely public notices to warn users of the contamination and not immediately providing alternate drinking water. Furthermore, officials wrongly assumed that the contamination did not spread throughout the JBPHH Community Water System. Therefore, JBPHH Community Water System users may have continued to consume contaminated drinking water and use it for domestic purposes, such as cooking and showering.

Concerns for Incidents Involving Aqueous Film-Forming Foam at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam

During the evaluation of the overall safety of the Defense Fuel Support Point JBPHH, the DoD OIG identified that Navy officials failed to report past incidents involving AFFF in accordance with DoD policy. The DoD OIG also found that Navy officials did not adequately document the response and environmental cleanup for the incidents involving AFFF.

Recommendations

Based on the findings in these reports, the DoD OIG made three recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and 13 recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy. The DoD OIG's 16 recommendations build upon, but do not duplicate, the recommendations made by other agencies in prior reports. The DoD OIG will continue to monitor the progress of the DoD and the Navy toward fully implementing all DoD OIG recommendations.

The DoD OIG's comprehensive evaluation was conducted partly in response to a December 2021 request from the Hawaii congressional delegation to assess the overall safety of the Defense Fuel Support Point JBPHH.

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