Hoover Institution

01/13/2026 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 01/13/2026 03:50

Nuclear Arms Control in the First Year of the Second Trump Administration

  • Security & Defense
  • Arms Control
  • Determining America's Role in the World

This paper outlines the choices for the United States response in the aftermath of the expiration of the New START Treaty and the rise of China as a formidable nuclear player, within the context of the second Trump administration. This work advocates for US policymakers to pursue a more creative nuclear agenda that could ultimately support a more predictable and secure level of international peace and security.

Key Takeaways

  • The United States is about to enter a significant transition when it comes to its nuclear deterrence and strategic stability strategy.
  • The conventional wisdom has been that a minimalist agenda of confidence-building measures, risk reduction, improved communications, and improvements around the edges is the most attainable outcome as the world contemplates the immediate future.
  • It appears that China is transitioning from minimum deterrence to something else, but it has not yet presented any official rationale or goals for its current activities. Chinese doctrine on the subject also has not changed. How this concern translates into future US nuclear weapons levels will be a key decision for any US administration.
  • The United States has long had a different nuclear deterrence relationship with Russia from that it has had with China, due to the great disparity in the sizes of their nuclear forces and the lack of arms control agreements with China. It is time to modernize and make consistent these relationships.

Nuclear Arms Control in the First Year of the Second Trump Administration by Hoover Institution

Cite this essay:

Edward Ifft and James E. Goodby, "Nuclear Arms Control in the First Year of the Second Trump Administration," Essays of the Nuclear Security Dialogues series, Hoover Institution, Global Policy and Strategy Initiative, January 2026.

About the Authors

Edward Ifft, a distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, is a retired member of the US Senior Executive Service. He has been a senior State Department representative to both START and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty negotiations and an inspector for sensitive military installations in the former Soviet Union. Ifft holds a PhD in physics from the Ohio State University.

Amb. James E. Goodby is an Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution. A retired foreign service officer, achieving the rank of career minister, he was appointed to five ambassadorial-rank positions by Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton, including ambassador to Finland. Goodby served as negotiator or adviser in the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the negotiation of the limited nuclear test-ban treaty, in START, in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, and in cooperative threat reduction (the Nunn-Lugar program), and for many years worked closely with former Secretary of State George Shultz.

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