Krishnamoorthi and Scott Press CISA to Protect American Manufacturing and Critical Infrastructure from Russian Cyber Sabotage

WASHINGTON - Congressman Austin Scott (R-GA), Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's National Intelligence Enterprise Subcommittee, and Congressman Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL), Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, today sent a bipartisan letter to Acting Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Acting Director Nick Andersen following new reporting that a group of Russian hackers were behind last year's devastating cyberattack against Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) in the United Kingdom. The lawmakers urge CISA to develop and share a strategy to thwart such attacks while strengthening cybersecurity across American companies, government networks, and critical infrastructure.

The lawmakers write:

"Given that JLR is a major component of the UK defense industrial base, the attack raises significant concerns over Russian-backed efforts to sabotage manufacturers critical to defense supply chains here in the United States as well. Therefore, we urge you to develop and share a strategy to thwart such attacks and outline how you will support stronger cyber defenses across American companies, government networks, and critical infrastructure."

The lawmakers further write:

"While authorities are still determining the extent of the involvement of the Russian state, this cyberattack must cause us to question our own cyber defenses and whether cyber actors could infiltrate U.S. systems to shut down defense production and/or disrupt access to critical infrastructure including communications, electricity, transportation, and water."

The lawmakers requested responses to the following questions by July 28, 2026:

1. What assessment has CISA made of the cybersecurity posture of the U.S. defense industrial base with respect to disruptive ransomware and cyberattacks designed to halt production rather than just steal data?
2. Has CISA identified any sectors of U.S. critical infrastructure or manufacturing that are particularly vulnerable to a Jaguar-style attack? If so, what steps are being taken to address those vulnerabilities?
3. Is there currently any evidence of similar network infiltrations, state-backed or otherwise, in the United States?
4. What lessons, if any, has CISA drawn from the Jaguar incident, and how are those lessons being incorporated into guidance, assessments, or cybersecurity programs for U.S. industry?
5. What is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and CISA's current capacity to share threat indicators from foreign incidents like Jaguar with U.S. private sector partners in real time? How have the resource and personnel cuts since January 1, 2025 impacted CISA's capacity to share information with the private sector?
6. What additional actions are DHS and CISA taking to protect American companies and critical infrastructure from these kinds of hacks? Does DHS have a government-wide strategy to thwart these kinds of hacks?
7. How has the administration pushed back against nation-state sabotage efforts in the United States or among our treaty allies?
8. How is CISA working to ensure that small and medium-sized manufacturers-many of which lack dedicated cybersecurity personnel-receive timely threat intelligence and cybersecurity assistance? Does CISA have the proper resources to support this effort?
9. What authorities does CISA currently lack, if any, that would improve its ability to identify or mitigate threats to critical infrastructure and manufacturing networks?

The full text of the letter is available here.