EU Statement On the occasion of the 66th Session of Working Group B (Verification - related activities)

EU Statement On the occasion of the 66th Session of Working Group B (Verification - related activities)

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO)

Vienna, 9 - 19 March 2026

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The following countries align themselves with this statement: Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Republic of Moldova, San Marino, Serbia, Ukraine and the United Kingdom align themselves with this statement.

Chair,

The European Union wishes to express its appreciation to you and the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) for the timely preparation of this meeting, in close coordination with the Vice-Chairs and the Working Group B Task Leaders.

The CTBT's universalisation and entry into force remain a priority for the EU. We urge all States that have not yet done so - in particular the remaining Annex 2 States - to sign and ratify the CTBT without any preconditions or further delay. In the meantime, it is crucial for international peace and security that all States fully observe the existing moratorium on nuclear test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and refrain from any action contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty. We call on all States without exception to continue to honour their engagements, including those undertaken during the NPT Review Processes.

We reiterate our full confidence in the CTBT's verification regime, which has demonstrated its ability to provide independent and reliable data and constitutes a strong preventive measure against testing.

The EU condemns the DPRK's unlawful and destabilising nuclear actions including testing that undermine regional and international peace and security. Thanks to the detection by the International Monitoring System and analysis by the International Data Centre, States signatories have been provided with irreplaceable, neutral, trustworthy scientific and technical information on nuclear tests carried out by the DPRK. We strongly urge the DPRK to refrain from any further nuclear tests, re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on long-range ballistic missile testing and nuclear tests, and sign and ratify the CTBT without further delay or preconditions.

The EU takes note of recent statements expressing concerns about possible nuclear weapons explosive testing. These statements have to be considered seriously. The EU encourages the sharing of any relevant technical data available thanks to the IMS and, as appropriate, of possible additional scientific inputs. Any explosive nuclear weapon test by any State would be harmful and destabilising for global non-proliferation efforts and for international peace and security. In this regard, we would like to reiterate the urgent call for the Treaty's entry into force, which would enable the use of verification mechanisms addressing smaller explosions.

As we are well into the 30^th anniversary year of the CTBT, the EU looks forward to the activities planned to promote the Treaty. The upcoming Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, in May in New York, presents a significant occasion to reiterate the importance of the CTBT and renew our commitment to its universalisation and entry into force. The EU will present a dedicated Working Paper on the CTBT, which will be open to all states for co-sponsorship.

Chair,

We thank the Executive Secretary for his opening statement and report on verification related activities for the period July to December 2025 and look forward to the presentations by the PTS Directors and staff of the International Monitoring System (IMS), the International Data Centre (IDC) and On-Site Inspection (OSI) Divisions, on the implementation of the verification related programme.

The EU considers the completion and sustainment of IMS stations a priority and encourages the PTS to continue its important operations, including building, certifying, operating and repairing IMS stations. Even if in the context of a zero nominal growth budget, it is crucial to maintain the IMS network and ensure high data availability. As we have agreed to pursue scenario C, it is important that we collectively consider how to accommodate this. We look forward to a discussion focused on defining the programmatic priorities to be achieved through the budget. The EU supports the recommendation for the relocation of stations RN20 and RN69, to further improve the functioning of the IMS.

Data availability, including thorough, accurate and timely IDC reports, is equally essential. The EU welcomes the support provided by the PTS to States Signatories through the "National Data Centres (NDCs) for All" initiative, such as the provision of capacity building systems (CBS), which were procured in part through voluntary funding by the EU. The EU strongly supports the further development and usage of the tools in the NDC-in-a-box software package. It is an irreplaceable valuable package for independent analyses at NDCs.

The EU and its Member States have been one of the largest contributors to the financing of OSI technologies capacity building. OSI provides evidence-based procedure to establish whether a nuclear explosion has been carried out. We support the organisation of regular OSI exercises, including tabletop and directed exercises. We would like to express our appreciation to Namibia for hosting the milestone Integrated Field Exercise in the autumn of 2026, and look forward to receiving further information from the PTS during this session.

We would also like to underline the immense value of the information stored on particulate filters over the past twenty years, and its release from the PTS archive, for environmental research, atmospheric modelling or similar research activities. The rules and procedures for releasing filters should be agreed upon. After a certain time, it should be possible to release the filters back to the country of origin.

The EU, due to our continued political and financial commitment to the Organisation, provides significant voluntary contributions to support the verification regime as well as capacity building and outreach, particularly in developing countries. The Technical Experts Support Programme (TESP) continues to be financed through EU Council Decisions. We welcome the sustained efforts within the CTBTO towards gender equality and equitable geographical representation, including the enhanced participation of female experts in capacity building programmes and WGB activities.

In conclusion Chair,

We assure you of the EU's full support and cooperation in bringing this meeting to a successful completion, with the adoption of a concise Report, focusing on operative outcomes.

Thank you.