CSIS - Center for Strategic and International Studies Inc.
09/22/2025 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 09/22/2025 13:18
Hearts, Minds, and Uniforms: New Data Reveals China and Russia’s Growing Military Diplomacy Footprint in Latin America and the Caribbean
Hearts, Minds, and Uniforms: New Data Reveals China and Russia's Growing Military Diplomacy Footprint in Latin America and the Caribbean
Photo: Wang Xiaojun/China News Service/Getty Images
Commentary by Ryan C. Berg, Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Jessie Hu, and Henry Ziemer
Published September 22, 2025
Introduction
Evidence of military cooperation between China and Russia around the world has contributed to a growing perception of an emerging "axis of autocracies" rising to challenge the collective West. In the Western Hemisphere, where the United States remains the region's preferred security partner, concerns around Chinese and Russian military activity have been more muted.
However, since 2010, the annual posture statements submitted by U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have consistently identified competition with China and Russia in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) as the key challenge. While the United States remains the preferred partner for most LAC countries, China and Russia have significantly expanded military cooperation with the region in recent years. One avenue through which China and Russia have advanced military cooperation in LAC is through military diplomacy-leveraging diplomatic instruments and soft power activities like dialogues between military and defense officials and international military education and training programs, paired with army games and exhibitions. These tools strengthen military cooperation with LAC by serving as confidence-building measures, enhancing interoperability, and fostering a favorable image of the Chinese and Russian militaries in the region.
A new dataset of Chinese and Russian military diplomacy in LAC compiled by CSIS reveals key patterns, as well as differences in the two countries' approaches to defense engagement. Concerningly, China's military diplomacy already appears to surpass that of the United States in key areas such as the number of LAC students enrolled in Chinese military colleges, which was more than five times the number in the United States starting in 2020.
U.S.-LAC Military Cooperation
SOUTHCOM is at the leading edge of U.S. military-to-military engagements in LAC. In addition to partnerships in traditional security issues, the combatant command hosts flagship initiatives like the National Guard State Partnership Program, the Theater Maintenance Partnership Initiative, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Technical Assistance Program, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief programs. SOUTHCOM has also developed extensive international military education and training programs in LAC.
Thanks to U.S. assistance, LAC also boasts a wealth of multilateral bodies for defense engagement. Programs like the Inter-American Air Force Academy, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, the Inter-American Defense College (IADC), the U.S. Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School, and the Combating Terrorism and Irregular Warfare fellowships from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency have provided comprehensive training for LAC military officials and forged long-lasting bonds between all levels of command. In particular, the IADC has trained 3,169 students from 29 different countries-over 27 percent of whom have reached general officer or flag ranks.
So far this year, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, traveled to Panama and met with President José Raúl Mulino, in addition to the Argentine Minister of Defense, Luis Petri. SOUTHCOM Combatant Commander Admiral Alvin Holsey visited at least eight countries in his first months in office and has engaged several regional leaders, while the United States has also stepped up its deployments of naval and air assets to the region.
However, close military cooperation appears to have declined in recent years due to both longstanding and new challenges. Bureaucratic red tape, such as the extensive reporting requirements and restrictions on the use of U.S. government funds to support education and training programs with partner countries, continues to limit the scope and extent of cooperation. In addition, beginning in 2014, SOUTHCOM has seen a noticeable decrease in the resources and forces needed to support its mission. In fiscal year 2025, SOUTHCOM reported over $322.6 million in unfunded "wish list" items, one-third of which is typically allocated for engagement with LAC partners. According to the Center for International Policy's Security Assistance Monitor, U.S. training for Peru shrank from approximately 1,000 trainees in the mid-2010s to less than 200 in 2019, and for Argentina, they fell from over 500 trainees in the late 2000s to just over 100 in 2019. The IADC has also been impacted by reduced funding from the Organization of American States to the Inter-American Defense Board, of which the IADC is an educational entity.
These gaps in defense cooperation between the United States and LAC present opportunities for China and Russia to exploit and forge inroads in LAC's security ecosystem.
China-LAC Military Cooperation
Remote Visualization
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Ryan C. Berg
Director, Americas Program
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Christopher Hernandez-Roy
Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Americas Program
Jessie Hu
Research Intern, Americas Program
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Henry Ziemer
Associate Fellow, Americas Program
Programs & Projects
- A New CRINK Axis of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea?
- Americas Program
- Geopolitics and Foreign Policy
China deems military diplomacy as a critical element in how it engages with other countries. China's ambition to extend military cooperation with LAC first emerged in the country's 2008 Policy Paper on LAC, and was later reinforced in the 2016 Policy Paper. In a January 2015 speech at the All-Military Diplomatic Work Conference, President Xi Jinping highlighted the effectiveness of military diplomacy in "protecting [China's] sovereignty, safety and developmental interests." While China's engagement with LAC is often framed in economic terms, military cooperation has emerged as a useful tool for strengthening relationships, as it often flies under the radar compared to arms sales or dual-use technology transfers.
To attract foreign military students, Chinese international military education programs offer to pay for business-class travel, five-star hotels, and other expenses while students live in China, and offer courses in Spanish. They also provide more opportunities for lower-ranked field grade officers-as opposed to the United States' tendency to selectively recruit primarily senior officers. According to CSIS' research, between 2022 and 2025, military officers from 20 LAC countries attended short-term exchange programs, such as the Senior Commander Course and the Latin American Military Officer Seminar for senior officers hosted by the PLA National Defense University, as well as specialized courses like the Helicopter Maintenance Course at the PLA Air Force Command College and the Intermediate Sniper Course at the PLA Infantry College for more junior officers. Representatives from Chinese military colleges and military officials have also frequently visited military colleges in LAC, further strengthening institutional ties.
China has held frequent high-level meetings between defense, military, and diplomatic officials. In 2022, China held the fifth China-LAC defense forum with officials from 24 countries, including the ministers of defense of Chile, Argentina, Suriname, the chief of Brazil's Armed Forces, China's minister of defense, and the vice-chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission. Bilateral dialogues have also included top-level officials such as the commander of the Brazilian Army, Tomás Paiva, and the Chinese minister of defense, Dong Jun. Most recently, Brazil dispatched an army general and navy admiral to serve as defense attachés in its embassy in Beijing.
In total, from 2022 to 2025, China conducted 97 military exchanges with 18 different countries. However, China's most frequent defense cooperation in LAC has been with Brazil and Argentina. In Brazil's case, exchanges span all three military branches-army, air force, and navy, and are likely the result of the Joint Commission for Exchange and Cooperation, established in 2004 to enable regular ministerial dialogue and training programs. Brazil's efforts to position itself in a multipolar world order have also created rare opportunities for China-U.S. interaction in the military space, such as when both countries participated in Exercise Formosa, hosted by Brazil in 2024.
Military exchanges between China and Argentina also encompass all three branches and are heavily concentrated on educational exchanges. The bulk of the exchanges took place in 2023, coinciding with efforts by China to sell the JF-17 fighter jet to the Argentine Air Force. Although the research by the U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office finds that the current influence of China's international military education and training programs is low, Argentina has participated in all of the large China-LAC training programs and the two countries are also in the process of signing cooperation frameworks on academic exchanges between the National Defense University of Argentina and the National Defense University of PLA.
Russia-LAC Military Cooperation
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Russia's military influence reemerged in LAC beginning in the early 2000s, as part of the "Primakov Doctrine," which posited that Russia should level the playing field by inserting itself into the U.S. sphere of influence as reciprocity for U.S. policy in Eastern Europe. While China has been relatively cautious with the deployment of military assets in the region, Russia has been more willing to deploy assets in LAC, sometimes in a very ostentatious manner, and often as retaliation for perceived U.S. escalations. In 2024, Moscow sent warships to the Western Hemisphere on not one but two occasions, including deploying a nuclear-capable submarine with hypersonic missiles in Cuba and two nuclear-capable bombers dispatched from Moscow to Venezuela in 2018. Despite ambitions for a broader regional agenda for defense cooperation, Russia often focuses chiefly on cooperating with historical Cold War-era allies Nicaragua and Cuba, as well as Venezuela.
However, since the outbreak of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, military diplomacy has become a more strategic tool to sustain military cooperation with LAC. Not only does Russia have a lower capacity to supply weapons to the region, but the sanctions placed on Russian imports have also undercut the consumer base for Russian weapons systems. The technical-military partnerships sustained by Soviet legacy weapons also seem to be facing increasing challenges, as some LAC countries begin exploring-though not always finalizing-deals to trade Soviet era equipment with the United States for important upgrades.
Between 2022 and 2025, Russia regularly received students from historical allies in its military academies, such as the Tyumen Higher Military Engineer Command School and the Mikhailovskaya Military Artillery Academy. Russia also signed new agreements strengthening military education exchanges with Nicaragua and Venezuela.
Although high-level meetings between Russia and LAC were not as frequent as those between China and LAC, bilateral meetings have included ministers of defense of Venezuela, Bolivia, Brazil, the Bolivian chief of armed forces, the general inspector of the Nicaraguan Army, Russia's minister of defense, and the vice-minister of defense.
Nonetheless, the diplomatic tool that has stood out the most in Russia's military diplomacy with LAC is its soft power activities. Russian military delegations have appeared at Mexico's and Venezuela's Independence Day parades, and Mexico's Heroico Colegio Militar's 200th anniversary. Russia has also attracted delegations from LAC countries to attend the Army Forum-a flagship annual defense exhibition aimed at showcasing the country's innovations in its defense industry.
Unsurprisingly, the countries with which Russia has the most frequent exchanges in LAC are Nicaragua and Venezuela, followed by Cuba. During the course of three years, Russia and Nicaragua signed two major agreements on defense cooperation, including one long-term agreement signed for a term of five years (with a clause on automatic extension) aimed at increasing engagements, and high-level meetings have included top defense and military officials: Russia's former minister and deputy minister of defense, Sergey Shoigu and Alexander Fomin, commander in chief of the Nicaraguan Armed Forces, Julio César Avilés Castillo, and Marvin Corrales, the inspector general of the Nicaraguan Army.
In 2022, during the visit of Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, President Maduro pledged that the two countries had entered a new era of military cooperation. In the last three years, high-level engagements have included Russian Vice Minister of Defense Alexandr Fomin, Venezuelan Colonel General Renier Enrique Urbáez Fermín, and Defense Education Vice Minister Omar Enrique Pérez La Rosa. On the education front, Venezuelan cadets have studied at Russia's elite Tyumen Higher Military Engineer Command School, specializing in advanced ground force technologies like drones, robotic systems, and remote mining. Russia's sponsorship of the International Army Games also serves as an opportunity to showcase its capabilities and reinforce ties. Russian allies in LAC have even had opportunities to host parts of these games, such as Venezuela, which ran the Sniper Frontier 2022 competition.
An interesting case is the exchanges between Russia and Ecuador. In January 2024, President Daniel Noboa announced that Ecuador would transfer several pieces of Russian-made equipment to the United States to be repurposed in Ukraine. Russia retaliated with the decision to ban imports of bananas from Ecuador, which led President Noboa to call off the arms transfer. Despite this rift, military exchanges between the two countries continued apace. In August 2024, delegations from the Ecuadorian Army participated in the "Climbing for Peace on Mount Elbrus" event hosted by Russia's International Military Sports Council. The Embassy of Ecuador in Moscow also invited Russian military officials to join defense attaches in the celebration of the 203rd anniversary of the Battle of Pichincha earlier this year.
Remaining the Preferred Partner
Russia's military diplomacy remains far short of U.S. influence in LAC, and it seems to be ebbing, given that Russia recently cancelled the Army Expo 2025. Nonetheless, in light of the new agreements (both formal and rhetorical ones) with Nicaragua and Venezuela, Russia's military diplomacy is likely to remain in at least part of the region and could pave the way for further military cooperation.
China's military diplomacy appears to surpass the United States in key areas already. As mentioned, the number of LAC students enrolled in Chinese military colleges was already more than five times higher back in 2020-an area where China has been outpacing the United States since 2015, following the first China-Latin America High-Level Defense Forum (a sub-forum of China-CELAC forum). China has also been attracting more cooperation through pioneering initiatives in non-traditional security issues, such as the China-LAC Military Medicine Forum.
More concerning still is that under the framework of China's Global Security Initiative, Chinese military diplomacy is poised to expand significantly in the coming years. In particular, China's fusion of international security concepts-blurring the lines of security and military cooperation, and masking military activity under the emphasis of nontraditional security issues such as emerging technologies, climate change, and health-broadens the definition of defense beyond conventional military affairs and subtly expands the scope of permissible cooperation.
While Chinese and Russian military diplomacy currently operates primarily as a soft power tool and has yet to translate into tangible threats to U.S. military influence in the region, the United States should not underestimate its long-term consequences. For now, Washington remains the preferred defense partner for many LAC countries. However, the United States must do more to preserve this advantage, as well as minimize opportunities for China and Russia to leverage military diplomacy into more arms sales, status of forces agreements, or basing in the region. Fully funding and expanding billets for regional officers at U.S. defense colleges is one way the United States can continue to ensure it is shaping the next generation of military leaders. Working with Major Non-NATO Allies like Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia to streamline arms procurement processes and encourage greater interoperability with U.S. forces can help to minimize the appeal of Beijing or Moscow's offers. Finally, to effectively compete with China's eagerness to lead in nontraditional security issues, doubling down on historic humanitarian assistance and disaster response efforts where the United States' geographic proximity to the region offers it a natural leg up should be an area for continued focus.
Ryan C. Berg is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Christopher Hernandez-Roy is the deputy director and senior fellow of the Americas Program at CSIS. Jessie Hu is an intern with the Americas Program at CSIS. Henry Ziemer is an associate fellow with the Americas Program at CSIS.
Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2025 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
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