Welcoming remarks at the Visit by the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme to the OPCW

Dear Fellows,

Good morning, and welcome to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the OPCW.

We are delighted that you are visiting us, once again, as part of your programme this year.

I hope that the Fellowship Programme inspires you to sustain disarmament and non-proliferation as a lasting focus of your careers.

Today's volatile global security situation is placing the international disarmament architecture under unprecedented pressure.

The Chemical Weapons Convention is no exception.

At the same time, developments in science and technology, threats arising from non-state actors, and the use and allegations of use of chemical weapons, create new challenges.

Maintaining the integrity of the Convention will require an engaged and diverse community of diplomats and professionals like yourselves.

Dear Fellows,

It has been almost three decades since the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention on 29 April 1997.

The Convention was signed by 130 countries during the three-day signing ceremony in Paris; a powerful demonstration of the collective political will of the international community at the time.

Today, the Convention remains a central pillar of the international disarmament system, with 193 States Parties - all of whom have undertaken never to develop, produce, stockpile or use chemical weapons.

It is the disarmament treaty with the highest number of States Parties.

Only four countries have yet to join: Egypt, Israel, North Korea and South Sudan.

Upon entry into force in 1997, the Convention created the OPCW to oversee its implementation.

Since then, the Secretariat has worked tirelessly to realise the vision of the drafters of the Convention; a world free of chemical weapons.

We do this through verification of the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles; through continuous inspections of relevant, chemical industry; and through building the capacity of our States Parties to fully implement the Convention.

In recognition of its efforts to rid the world of chemical weapons, the OPCW was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013.

Ten years after this achievement, we reached a key milestone; the completion of the destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles in July 2023.

This was a major accomplishment for multilateral diplomacy and the international community.

But it does not mean we have finished our mission.

Since the completion of stockpile destruction, we have been deepening our focus on the preventive aspects of our work.

The cornerstone of these efforts is our industry verification regime, whereby we conduct hundreds of industry inspections every year.

This builds trust and confidence in the adherence to the Convention among States Parties.

Alongside this, the Secretariat assists States Parties in implementing the Convention, and in ensuring that they have the capacity to meet their obligations.

We provide assistance and protection to States Parties against use and threat of use of chemical weapons, and strengthen their capacity to respond to chemical incidents.

We also help States Parties develop their legitimate chemical industry within sectors such as agriculture and pharmaceuticals, while raising awareness of the Convention.

You will hear more about our verification activities, and our international cooperation and assistance programmes, from our experts today and tomorrow.

Dear Fellows,

As we pursue our mission of a world free of chemical weapons, we are adapting to a range of new challenges.

In recent years we have seen increasing geopolitical tensions, and escalating conflicts that are destroying lives and threatening global peace and security.

We are also witnessing the breakdown of consensus in multilateralism, and the erosion of the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture.

In this context, concerns have increased about the use and threat of use of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons.

In the past decade chemical weapons have been used in Iraq, Malaysia, the United Kingdom, Syria and the Russian Federation.

In the ongoing war in Ukraine, there are allegations of use of chemical weapons by both sides.

In three reports following technical assistance visits to Ukraine, carried out at Ukraine's request, the Secretariat has documented the presence of riot control agents on the battlefield.

The Convention prohibits the use of riot control agents in armed conflicts.

In the Syrian Arab Republic, after more than a decade of work, the chemical weapons file is still open.

As the Secretariat has consistently reported, Syria did not declare the full extent of its chemical weapons programme.

We know that the Assad regime used chemical weapons against its own population.

Following the fall of that regime in December 2024, the Secretariat immediately engaged with the new Syrian Authorities.

In February 2025 the Director-General and I travelled to Damascus with a delegation of experts from the Secretariat, at the invitation of Syria, and met with President Al-Sharaa.

This visit paved the way for renewed cooperation between the OPCW and Syria in containing the risk of proliferation of the Assad-regime's chemical weapons, and in irreversibly destroying all components of the programme.

Since the visit of the Director-General, the Secretariat has conducted numerous deployments to Syria, established a continuous presence in the country, visited sites of interest, taken samples and interviewed officials of the former regime.

During recent deployments chemical munitions were discovered, and information available to us suggests that more sites were involved in the chemical weapons programme than were declared in the past.

The priority for Syria, for the Secretariat, and for the international community, remains the prevention of proliferation or re-emergence of chemical weapons by ensuring complete destruction of any chemical weapons left behind by the former regime.

The risk of chemical terrorism is of serious concern in Syria, as it is in any country or context where non-state actors could access these dangerous chemicals.

This risk is made worse by the rapid developments in science and technology, which lower the technical barriers for acquiring and using toxic chemicals for hostile purposes.

Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum computing, robotics, 3D printing, biochemistry and drones, are all examples of technologies that will bring many benefits to humankind.

But they can also be misused.

Assessing the impact of all these new technologies on the implementation of the Convention, is a key priority for the OPCW.

Central to these efforts is the expertise in our Scientific Advisory Board.

Through its working groups and regular reports to the Director-General, the Board ensures that we are staying abreast of scientific and technological developments.

Dear Fellows,

Our Centre for Chemistry and Technology, which was inaugurated in 2023, is assisting the Organisation to adapt and respond to emerging developments.

You will visit the Centre tomorrow and learn more about the resources and the state-of-the-art capabilities that we have there.

In closing, I encourage you to make the most of your two days with us.

Take full advantage of this opportunity to engage with our staff, ask questions, and build connections.

The future of disarmament depends on disarmament diplomats and professionals who can engage constructively with each other and build consensus in the interest of our collective security.

I wish you an informative and engaging visit.

Thank you for your kind attention.