What Trump’s Submarine Threat and Russia’s INF Exit Really Mean

Commentary by Heather Williams

Published August 7, 2025

Social media is again the preferred platform for nuclear signaling. On August 1, Trump announced in a social media post that he was ordering two U.S. nuclear submarines "to be positioned in the appropriate regions" in response to former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's "inflammatory statements." Medvedev had taken to X in the preceding weeks to mock U.S. "ultimatums" for Moscow to end the war in Ukraine.

Days later, on August 4, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced it "no longer considers itself bound" by the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Moscow announced it would suspend participation in the treaty in 2019 after the U.S. withdrawal but claimed to continue to observe a unilateral moratorium. Hours after the announcement, Medvedev posted on X, "This is a new reality all our opponents will have to reckon with. Expect further steps." How seriously should we take these online barbs, and what do Trump's announcement about submarine deployments and Russia's breakout from the INF Treaty mean for risks of escalation?

Nuclear signaling on social media is typically cheap talk: low cost, vague, and done with a predominantly domestic audience in mind. "Cheap talk" is not intended here as a derogatory term; rather, it refers to a means of strategic messaging and information exchange. Trump's submarine announcement is a perfect example of this because it cannot be verified but signals a wider policy position and desire to pressure Russia on Ukraine negotiations and to stand up to Medvedev's taunts. And while the INF news does augur increased regional competition, Medvedev's posts serve only to foot-stomp Kremlin talking points in a more colorful fashion. As it is the anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, however, it is particularly timely to also acknowledge the risks of such cheap talk and how it could lead to devastating consequences.

"Thank You for Your Attention to This Matter": Trump's Submarine Repositioning

In his August 1 post, Trump justified his decision to position nuclear submarines "in appropriate regions" as a response to Medvedev's "provocative statements" and warned, "Words are very important, and can often lead to unintended consequences, I hope this will not be one of those instances. Thank you for your attention to this matter!" The post came after weeks of Medvedev referring to Trump's "theatrical ultimatum" for Russia to make progress in ending the war in Ukraine, with a Trump-imposed August 8 deadline.

Thus far in his second term, Trump has been relatively quiet on social media about nuclear weapons. On June 21, following U.S. strikes on Iran's nuclear facility, he posted, "ANY RETALIATION BY IRAN AGAINST THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WILL BE MET WITH FORCE FAR GREATER THAN WHAT WAS WITNESSED TONIGHT." Otherwise, he has been less reliant on social media platforms to relay messaging about nuclear weapons policies. This is a stark comparison to his first term, when he used social media to target adversaries, such as referring to Kim Jong Un as "little rocket man," or his threat during the January 2020 crisis with Iran to target 52 Iranian cultural sites. In those instances, Trump appeared to predominantly use social media for domestic messaging purposes, as formal negotiations and dialogue continued to take place in more traditional channels.

The submarine post on social media similarly appears to have been largely performative. The United States operates 14 Ohio-class submarines, capable of carrying 20 Trident D5 missiles, which can carry up to eight nuclear warheads. Approximately 4-5 submarines are on patrol at a time, with 10-12 submarines operationally available. One of the strategic benefits of nuclear-armed submarines is that they are extremely difficult to track and locate, giving them unique survivability compared to land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles or bombers. On rare occasions, the submarines will surface or their locations will be made known, such as regular port visits to Faslane in Scotland as part of demonstrating extended deterrence commitment to allies. Otherwise, their locations are unknown, and there is no way to confirm if Trump ordered submarines to be repositioned. With that in mind, Trump's message could have been predominantly for domestic audiences looking for signs of strength in his foreign policy, particularly towards Russia, or a signal that he is standing up to Medvedev and serious about getting Russia to end the war in Ukraine.

"Compensatory Military-Technical Measures": Russia Is No Longer Bound by the INF Treaty

For over a decade, U.S. officials and international experts have determined Russia to be in non-compliance with the INF Treaty. The 1987 INF Treaty eliminated all ground-launch ballistic and cruise missiles with a range between 500 and 5,000 kilometers (km) and included intrusive inspections through 2001. A 2014 Department of State report concluded Russia was not in compliance with the treaty. Russia has insisted the system in question, 9M729, is treaty-compliant and suggested INF Treaty members observe a moratorium and return to dialogue to revive the treaty. The United States and other NATO members refused because of Russia's continued noncompliance with the treaty and perceptions of disingenuousness. According to NATO Spokesperson Oana Lungescu, "Unless and until Russia verifiably destroys the [9M729] system, this moratorium is not a real offer."

Moscow's announcement on August 4 that it would no longer be bound by the INF Treaty hardly came as a surprise. Russia suspended participation in the treaty in 2019 and said it was "formally dead." Just days earlier, on August 1, Putin announced the planned deployment of intermediate-range Oreshnik missiles, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, to Belarus. Oreshnik was already used conventionally in November 2024 in the war in Ukraine. In July 2024, following the announcement of U.S.-Germany cooperation on deployment of "episodic deployments" of longer-range ground-based missiles to Germany, the Kremlin announced it would, "consider in detail, in the current circumstances, the issue of the fate of the unilateral Russian moratorium on the deployment of land-based INF missiles and our possible further steps in this direction." The most recent announcement referred to Russian plans for "compensatory military-technical measures" in response to U.S. deployments and cooperation with allies, suggesting the forthcoming Oreshnik deployment may be the first of multiple announcements about Russian INF capabilities.

Russia's statement lists reasons for ending its moratorium; however, many of them are long-standing, such as its unreciprocated offer for dialogue on a moratorium, and many of the U.S. deployments happened over a year ago, such as the U.S.-Germany cooperation agreement. The statement points to specific incidents of concern with regard to U.S. INF developments and deployments, such as "the transfer of American systems capable of ground-based INF launches to European NATO countries" and, in particular, "training in Denmark, during which a mobile . . . launcher of the Mk70 standard was used." In his post amplifying the INF announcement, Medvedev stated this was a "new nuclear reality" and to "expect more steps." As with Trump, this announcement, too, may have been done for internal audiences as an act of defiance to Western pressure, given Trump's deadline for a ceasefire in Ukraine.

One noticeable trait about Russia's INF announcement was its emphasis on the Indo-Pacific. It specifically points to: deployment of Typhons to the Philippines in spring 2024; the use of Typhon launchers; the planned deployment of the Dark Eagle medium-range hypersonic system to Australia joint exercises in summer 2025; U.S.-Australia cooperation on the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM); and the launch of PrSM from Palau in June 2024. The Typhon is a ground-based precision-strike missile system with a range of 500-2,000 km using SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles. It is designed to deter China's aggression in the region that might threaten the territorial integrity and sovereignty of U.S. allies and partners. Dark Eagle is an intermediate-range surface-to-surface hypersonic missile with a reported range of 1,725 miles or approximately 2,777 km. The PrSM has a reported range of up to 499 km. It should be noted that none of these systems are nuclear-capable, and the United States is no longer bound by the INF Treaty after withdrawing in 2019, whereas Russia officially remains a party to the treaty despite suspending participation in 2019.

Russia's focus on the Indo-Pacific in its INF announcement is both a reflection of its concern for intermediate-range systems writ large and its partnership with China. Moscow and Beijing declared a "no limits" strategic partnership in 2022, which they reaffirmed earlier this year. Russia's INF statement closely mirrors Beijing's warnings in response to the Typhon deployment to the Philippines; for example, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said, "China strongly opposes the U.S. deploying medium-range ballistic missiles in the Asia-Pacific and strengthening forward deployment at China's doorstep to seek unilateral military advantage." The explicit mention of U.S. capabilities and allies in the Indo-Pacific suggests continued coordination of messaging between Beijing and Moscow.

A "New Nuclear Reality": Risks of Regional Competition and Nuclear Signaling

Many of these trends are quite familiar from the past decade: the use of social media for nuclear messaging, cheap talk for domestic audiences, and U.S.-Russia INF disputes. They hardly suggest the "new nuclear reality" Medvedev warns of. These recent developments are a symptom, rather than a cause of rising nuclear risks. It's worth recalling that social media messages are part of a wider political competition-"A tweet alone cannot escalate a crisis." Rather, Trump and Medvedev's ongoing social media clash, Trump's announcement about submarine repositioning, and Russia's INF deployment plans point to the wider trend in regional arms buildups. For example, Russia has been building up and expanding out its nuclear forces for years, to include the Burevestnik, a nuclear-powered cruise missile flight tested in October 2023; the Poseidon, which reportedly went into production in 2023; and the Kinzhal, an air-launched ballistic missile that has been used throughout the war in Ukraine. These capabilities indicate a deeper trend in Russia's nuclear expansion that focuses on regional capabilities and seemingly will now include more ground-based intermediate-range systems.

But nuclear signaling via social media is not always zero cost. Social media is the favored platform for spreading disinformation, such as overlapping messages from Russia, China, and Iran about the Covid-19 virus. Additionally, social media signaling could run a higher risk of misperception and escalation, particularly during times of crisis when time is short and distrust is high. For example, messages delivered via social media can exacerbate risks of inadvertent or intentional escalation. Vague and limited messages on social media can thicken the fog of war and increase uncertainty about an adversary's intentions. The impact of social media also varies by platform, with closed platforms having a higher potential to be exploited for nationalist and escalatory messaging. Disinformation campaigns that leverage social media can provide plausible deniability for intentional escalation, such as Russia's accusations of a Ukrainian dirty bomb.

At present, there are limited prospects for cooperative tools to mitigate these risks of escalation, whether they be due to misperception, social media, arms competition, or strategic deployments. From Moscow's perspective, which should be taken with a grain of salt, they have observed INF limits and made repeated offers for dialogue on an INF moratorium, but instead, the United States not only withdrew from the INF Treaty in 2019 but has since expanded its INF capabilities and deployed them to allied and partner countries. From Washington's perspective, Russia has violated at least nine of its major arms control agreements since 2000 and is not a trustworthy partner seriously interested in risk reduction. Russia's persistent nuclear saber-rattling throughout the war in Ukraine has also left an impression that Moscow is relying on nuclear weapons to deter Western intervention to stop its illegal invasion of a sovereign state. All to say, don't count on arms control any time soon.

These latest developments continue to turn up the temperature in U.S.-Russia relations. Nuclear signaling on social media is largely cheap talk for domestic audiences, but also an important barometer of geopolitics. With Russia's announcement, we should expect more nuclear saber-rattling either on or off social media, and more regional nuclear competition.

Heather Williams is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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