11/19/2026 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 11/20/2026 06:05
Recent enforcement actions by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) against large US banks identify systemic weaknesses in Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money laundering (BSA/AML) compliance frameworks. Findings cover risk assessment, transaction monitoring, customer identification and due diligence, suspicious activity reporting, correspondent due diligence, independent testing, staffing and training, and insider-associated activity.
Risk assessment focused on a narrow deposit business and gave insufficient weight to the dominant credit and charge card products, so control scope did not reflect the business model.
Transaction monitoring risk weights and thresholds lacked empirical support and remained largely static, and sub-threshold activity with high SAR yields was left uninvestigated.
Monitoring coverage had gaps across negotiable instruments, credit cards, trade-based money laundering and correspondent accounts of foreign branches and affiliates.
Customer risk profiles and reviews omitted third-party payments, negotiable instruments, international activity and geographic exposure; a compliance recommendation to exit a high-risk customer was not adopted.
Suspicious activity reports (SARs) were untimely, missed or incomplete, with a large volume filed only after regulatory requests; one lookback identified nearly 8,900 unfiled SARs.
Audit coverage, staffing and training were insufficient to detect, escalate and remediate weaknesses, and some suspected trade-based money laundering involved insider-associated accounts.
Several remediation requirements address areas that map only to general duties in 12 CFR § 21.21, or exist only as consent-order requirements.
This analysis maps the findings to the underlying obligations in CUBE's obligation index and to the relevant controls in CUBE's control index. Each topic is set out in the same four parts: requirement, breaches, beyond the regulation, and mapping. Where available, controls are shown with their CUBE control ID and a fit rating (primary, equivalent or partial). The banks are not named. This document does not constitute legal advice.
Q What are US regulators penalising banks for in AML enforcement?
Systemic program weaknesses. Findings span risk assessment, customer identification, due diligence, transaction monitoring, suspicious activity reporting, audit, resources and training. Inadequate audit scope and effectiveness delayed the detection and remediation of weaknesses, and staffing, expertise and training were insufficient to administer the program.
The two actions differ in form. In the FinCEN action, the bank admitted wilful violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (wilfulness in the civil-enforcement sense of reckless disregard or wilful blindness) and paid a substantial civil money penalty, alongside parallel actions by other agencies and a third-party lookback of historical activity. The OCC consent order examined here imposed no monetary penalty and made no express wilfulness determination, and the bank neither admitted nor denied the findings.
Q. Which BSA/AML regulations did the actions cite?
The actions cited the following obligations.
|
Obligation |
Citation |
Requirement |
Deficiencies identified |
|
BSA/AML compliance program |
31 U.S.C. § 5318(h); 31 CFR § 1020.210(a); 12 CFR § 21.21 |
Written, board-approved program with internal controls, independent testing, a designated BSA officer and training |
Monitoring design, independent testing, resourcing, training |
|
Customer due diligence (CDD) |
31 CFR § 1020.210(a)(2)(v) |
Understanding of the nature and purpose of customer relationships to develop a risk profile; ongoing monitoring and risk-based updating of customer information |
Risk ratings; periodic and event-driven reviews |
|
Customer identification (CIP) requirements |
Risk-based procedures providing a reasonable belief that the bank knows each customer's true identity; collection and verification of identifying information; procedures for unsuccessful verification |
Inconsistent collection of identifying information; unreliable verification |
|
|
Suspicious activity reporting |
31 U.S.C. § 5318(g); 31 CFR § 1020.320(a)(2), (b)(3); 12 CFR § 21.11 |
Identification and reporting of qualifying suspicious activity within the filing deadlines |
Untimely, missed and incomplete SARs |
|
Correspondent account due diligence |
31 U.S.C. § 5318(i); 31 CFR § 1010.610(a) |
Due diligence program for correspondent accounts maintained in the US for foreign financial institutions |
"Simplified" due diligence for correspondent accounts of the bank's own foreign branches and affiliates |
The control mappings also reference provisions the actions do not cite. 31 CFR § 1020.320(a)(1) is the general duty to report suspicious transactions and (b)(1) covers completing the SAR and keeping supporting documentation; the FinCEN order cites (a)(2) and (b)(3). 31 CFR § 1020.315(h) keeps the SAR obligation in force for exempt customers and requires a monitoring system reasonably designed to detect reportable currency transactions for non-listed business and payroll customers. FinCEN's penalty provisions (31 U.S.C. § 5321(a); 31 CFR § 1010.810) are sanctioning authorities rather than breached provisions.
Q. What root causes underlie these failures?
Revenue and relationship interests were given priority over compliance escalations.
Risk assessment and control scope focused on a narrow part of the business and gave insufficient weight to the dominant products.
Monitoring was calibrated on unvalidated judgement rather than empirical risk evidence.
Customer identity and risk information was insufficient to support risk-based due diligence and monitoring.
Audit coverage, testing, governance, staffing and training were insufficient to detect, escalate and remediate weaknesses.
Q. How do consent-order remediation requirements apply beyond the institutions subject to them?
Remediation requirements bind only the institution subject to the order. For other banks, they serve as assurance benchmarks alongside their own legal obligations.
The OCC order's corrective measures (Articles III to XIV) cover governance, remediation planning, risk assessment, due diligence, monitoring, a SAR lookback, audit, staffing, training and insider escalation. The FinCEN order requires a third-party lookback and independent reviews of monitoring, customer due diligence, correspondent due diligence and AML data governance.
A SAR lookback is a consent-order requirement, not a generally applicable regulatory obligation. In the FinCEN action, a 2024 lookback under revised thresholds identified nearly 8,900 unfiled SARs totalling nearly $4 billion.
Q. How was risk assessment found deficient?
Requirement. No mapped obligation text addresses AML risk assessment directly. The relevant duties are general: a written, board-approved program reasonably designed to assure and monitor BSA compliance (12 CFR § 21.21(c)(1)) and a system of internal controls to assure ongoing compliance (12 CFR § 21.21(d)(1); 31 CFR § 1020.210(a)(2)(i)). The detailed risk-assessment requirements in Article V of the OCC order go beyond these duties.
Breaches. The OCC found that the business risk assessment focused on a relatively narrow deposit business and insufficiently on the dominant credit and charge card products, so control scope did not reflect the business model. Limited credit card coverage in monitoring was also found in the FinCEN action (see monitoring coverage below).
Beyond the regulation. Article V requires a detailed analysis of pertinent data (including transaction volumes by geography and numbers of higher-risk customers, drawing on CIP and CDD information), assessment of risk within each business unit and in aggregate across products, assessment of affiliate relationships and shared services, governance over overrides to inherent risk, control-effectiveness and residual risk assessments, annual refresh, Board approval, and annual independent testing of the risk assessment.
Mapping. Obligation: 12 CFR § 21.21(c)(1) and (d)(1), general duty only. Controls: none mapped for business and product risk coverage, risk-assessment data, aggregation or affiliates. 3956 Financial Crime Risk Assessment Review (Retail Banking - Credit Cards) is mapped as a partial fit. Compliance Governance Review (Global Markets - Compliance) and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorist Financing (CTF) Framework Review (Securities Services - Compliance) are mapped only to the remedial items on control effectiveness and risk-assessment refresh.
Q. What transaction monitoring weaknesses attract enforcement?
Requirement. The mapped obligations are general: a system of internal controls and risk-based ongoing monitoring to identify and report suspicious transactions (31 CFR § 1020.210(a)(2)(i) and (a)(2)(v)(B); 12 CFR § 21.21(d)(1)). No obligation text addresses monitoring thresholds, transaction limits, or alert suppression and ranking, so those expectations come from the findings and consent-order requirements. The FinCEN action attributed the program failure mainly to deficiencies in the bank's transaction monitoring system.
Breaches. Findings across both actions:
Risk weights unsupported by empirical evidence and left largely static, with a case-creation threshold set by "stakeholder judgment"
No false-negative tolerance until late in the review period, and threshold testing that ignored the volume of missed activity, leaving sub-threshold activity with high SAR yields uninvestigated A recalibration that reduced weights and caseload to improve SAR yield
Rescoring and suppression rules that zeroed alerts without testing or governance; de-duplication, ranking and suppression practices identified as weaknesses
Alert aggregation and retirement practices that delayed investigation, with a material portion of SARs filed more than six months after the activity
Internal validation findings on weights and thresholds not acted on, and an earlier sub-threshold finding overturned on re-test
Independent testing that failed to escalate monitoring effectiveness issues
Beyond the regulation. The OCC order requires governance of rescoring, suppression, de-duplication, ranking and exemption logic, with identified weaknesses tracked to validated correction (a direct failing with no mapped control), and addresses monitoring thresholds and transaction limits and the validation and population completeness of monitoring.
Mapping. Obligation: 31 CFR § 1020.210(a); 12 CFR § 21.21(d)(1); 12 CFR § 21.11(c) for alert review and investigation. Controls for design and calibration: 3161 Transaction Monitoring - Model Tuning and Optimization Review and 3160 Transaction Monitoring - Model Optimisation and Review (both Banking - Compliance, primary; these are two distinct controls with near-identical names). Controls for alert review and investigation: 4714 Transaction Monitoring Case and Alert Investigation Review (Banking - Compliance) and 2953 Transaction Monitoring Review (Banking - Credit and Lending), both primary. Further controls: Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Transaction Monitoring Review (Banking - Cash Management); AML Red Flag Transaction Review (Banking - Operations and Banking - Trade Finance); Client Transaction Surveillance Review (Global Markets - Compliance). Gap: no control is mapped to rescoring and suppression governance; 4619 and 3989 only touch change approval.
Q. Which products and channels fell outside monitoring coverage?
Requirement. The mapped obligations are the general program duties above (partial fit). For cash, 31 CFR § 1020.315(h) requires a bank to keep complying with SAR requirements for exempt customers and to maintain a monitoring system reasonably designed to detect reportable currency transactions for non-listed business and payroll customers. Expectations on specific products, such as negotiable instruments and credit cards, come from the findings.
Breaches. Findings identified coverage gaps in the following areas:
Negotiable instruments: deposits effectively unmonitored, with no distinction between money orders and other instruments and no coverage assessment
Credit cards: cards excluded from the cash structuring model until late in the review period, and no trigger for spending above stated income
Trade-based money laundering (TBML): a TBML feature used only on cases already under investigation and not deployed to monitor proactively, and controls that failed to capture the full suspected activity, including card charges and repayments
Correspondent accounts: narrow monitoring models for foreign branch and affiliate accounts
Cash: the ATM large cash deposit model required five conditions to alert although internal analysis showed a SAR could be warranted on one; key cash risk factors carried one-point weights despite SAR yields above 50%; and cash structuring and ATM alerts for customers on the currency transaction report exemption list were rescored to zero, although the exemption does not relieve the bank of its SAR obligation
Beyond the regulation. Proactive scenarios for TBML (the OCC order requires an action plan for monitoring controls that identify TBML red flags, Article VIII(2)(d)); monitoring of money orders and cheques deposited by customers; credit card triggers for spending above stated income, with limits on additional cards; and, in the OCC order, a third-party BSA/AML risk management framework with limits and controls for automated clearing house (ACH) activity (Article VII(2)(d)), which maps to Third-Party Payments Review (Global Markets - Front Office and Global Markets - Operations).
Mapping. Obligation: 31 CFR § 1020.210(a); 31 CFR § 1020.315(h) for cash. Controls: 4619 Transaction Monitoring Coverage Gap Review (Banking - Compliance, primary); 3989 Transaction Monitoring Rules Review (Retail Banking - Credit Cards, primary); 3956 Financial Crime Risk Assessment Review (Retail Banking - Credit Cards, partial); 3434 Cash Activity Review (Retail Banking - Current Accounts, partial: non-face-to-face deposit deviations only; equivalent 3993 in Retail Banking - Debit Cards). AML Red Flag Transaction Review (Banking - Operations and Banking - Trade Finance) is matched for TBML detection. Gaps: the cheque controls (4630, 4899, 3336) cover processing, fraud and screening, not AML monitoring, and no control covers stated-income triggers or additional-card limits. No dedicated control covers proactive TBML scenarios (3144 is investigation and referral; 4727 is trade finance red flags).
Q. Why is reliance on subpoenas and law enforcement requests a concern?
Requirement. A bank must file a report of any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation of law (31 CFR § 1020.320(a)(1)) and conduct ongoing monitoring to identify and report suspicious transactions (31 CFR § 1020.210(a)(2)(v)(B)). No mapped obligation text addresses how cases are sourced; the concern arises from the findings.
Breaches. In the FinCEN action, auto-promotion risk factors, a material portion of them based on subpoenas, seizure warrants and employee referrals, drove over one-third of cases (nearly 50% in 2023), and for several years over one-third of investigations were prompted by law enforcement, other institutions or manual referrals instead of the bank's own controls. Customer risk ratings were also driven by subpoenas (see customer due diligence).
Beyond the regulation. Monitoring how much detection depends on law enforcement and referral inputs.
Mapping. Obligation: 31 CFR § 1020.210(a); 31 CFR § 1020.320(a)(1). Controls: 4714 Transaction Monitoring Case and Alert Investigation Review (Banking - Compliance) and 2953 Transaction Monitoring Review (Banking - Credit and Lending), both primary. Gap: control 4114 only handles the law enforcement request process, not monitoring of reliance on external inputs.
Q. What are the SAR requirements, and where did banks fall short?
Requirement. A bank must report a transaction if it is conducted or attempted by, at or through the bank, involves or aggregates at least $5,000, and the bank knows, suspects or has reason to suspect that it involves illicit funds, is designed to evade BSA requirements, or has no business or apparent lawful purpose (31 CFR § 1020.320(a)(2)). A SAR must be filed no later than 30 calendar days after initial detection of facts that may constitute a basis for filing. Where no suspect is identified, filing may be delayed by up to a further 30 calendar days to identify a suspect, and never beyond 60 calendar days after initial detection. Violations requiring immediate attention, such as ongoing money laundering schemes, require immediate telephone notification to an appropriate law enforcement authority (31 CFR § 1020.320(b)(3); 12 CFR § 21.11(d)). The SAR must be completed on the prescribed form, with supporting documentation retained (31 CFR § 1020.320(b)(1)).
Under 12 CFR § 21.11(c), insider abuse can require a SAR regardless of amount. Other thresholds are $5,000 for violations where a suspect is identified, $25,000 regardless of whether a suspect is identified, and $5,000 for transactions involving potential money laundering or BSA violations. Management must promptly notify the board of each SAR (§ 21.11(h)), and a SAR and any information revealing its existence must not be disclosed except as permitted (§ 21.11(k)).
Breaches. Untimely, missed and incomplete SARs; investigation breakdowns that impaired reporting; SARs filed more than six months after the activity; more than $5 billion of suspicious activity reported late in the FinCEN action; and a large volume of filings made only after regulatory requests. The OCC order requires procedures for reporting continuing suspicious activity and for escalating problems identified through repeat SAR filings (Article VIII(2)(j)).
Beyond the regulation. Several remediation items are consent-order requirements rather than generally applicable obligations. OCC Article IX requires a risk-based SAR lookback (population, methodology and timeline) and a review of previous SARs for amendment, with a list of customers and transactions where the bank declined a consultant's recommendation and its reasons, and the FinCEN order requires a third-party lookback. The OCC order also addresses front-line ownership and referral of suspicious activity. Only the general SAR duty in 12 CFR § 21.11 is matched to the lookback and corrections, and only partially.
Mapping. Obligation: 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g); 31 CFR § 1020.320(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1) and (b)(3); 12 CFR § 21.11(c) and (d). Controls (aligned on the reporting-duty and deadline obligations): 3159 Suspicious Alert Reporting Review and 3144 Financial Crime Investigation and Referral Management Review (both Banking - Compliance, primary), with equivalents 2524 (Cash Management), 4675 (Operations), 4823 (Trade Finance), 4884 (Credit and Lending) and 4940 (Payments). Further controls: Suspicious Alert Reporting Review (Global Markets - Operations) for decisioning and filing, and Regulatory Reporting Pre-Submission Review (Global Markets - Compliance) for timeliness, completeness and quality. Gap: no control is mapped to the SAR lookback or to SAR corrections and disputed decisions.
Q. What customer due diligence failures are regulators identifying?
Requirement. A bank must have appropriate risk-based procedures for ongoing customer due diligence, including understanding the nature and purpose of customer relationships to develop a customer risk profile, and ongoing monitoring to identify and report suspicious transactions and, on a risk basis, to maintain and update customer information, including beneficial owner information for legal entity customers (31 CFR § 1020.210(a)(2)(v)(A) and (B)).
Breaches. Recurring findings:
Customer relationships not effectively understood, and customer risk ratings inappropriate
Dynamic risk ratings driven by subpoenas and blind to negative news, including a customer's public disclosure of a government investigation
Customer risk profiles and periodic reviews that omitted third-party payments, negotiable instruments, international activity and geographic exposure
Periodic and event-driven reviews not responsive, profiles not updated, and activity not compared with expected activity
No timely reassessment of related customers despite SARs, a customer exit and external inquiries
High-risk customers without enhanced measures
Beyond the regulation. The OCC order addresses higher-risk customers and CDD gaps and the linkage between CDD accountability and risk assessment. Customer source-of-funds assessment for inbound third-party payments.
Mapping. Obligation: 31 CFR § 1020.210(a)(2)(v)(A) and (B). Controls: 4612 Risk Rating Methodology Review (Banking - Compliance); 4597 Know Your Customer (KYC) Ad-Hoc/Event-Driven Review and 4599 Know Your Customer (KYC) Periodic Review (both Banking - Compliance); 3096 Ongoing Customer Due Diligence Review and 3073 Know Your Customer (KYC) and AML Monitoring Review (both Banking - Cash Management); 3058 Enhanced Client Due Diligence Review (Banking - Cash Management) for high-risk customers. All are primary, with equivalents 4651 (Operations), 4790 (Trade Finance) and 4869 (Credit and Lending). Further controls: Know Your Customer (KYC) Refresh Review and KYC New Product Review (Global Markets - Operations); KYC Ad-Hoc / Periodic Client Due Diligence Review and KYC Ongoing (trading activity) Review (Global Markets - Front Office); AML Compliance Review (Securities Services - Fund Administration). Gap: for inbound third-party payments (payments from persons with no direct relationship to the customer), controls 973 and 2811 are a false match because they cover payments the firm makes. Third-Party Payments Review maps to a different requirement, third-party compliance risk and ACH limits (Article VII), so it does not close this gap.
Q. What did regulators find on customer exit decisions?
Requirement. No exit-specific obligation is mapped. Exit decisions are mapped to the general customer due diligence duty in 31 CFR § 1020.210(a), as a partial fit. FinCEN states that account closure is not the only appropriate response to heightened risk: once elevated risk is identified, the bank must apply customer due diligence, ongoing monitoring and other controls reasonably designed to mitigate it, which may include enhanced monitoring or restrictions on products and services.
Breaches. In the FinCEN action, compliance recommended exiting a high-risk customer, and the recommendation was pending for months and then withdrawn and replaced by a mitigation plan. The customer continued to accept third-party payments until June 2025, and the bank did not update the customer's risk profile or monitoring to reflect that risk.
Beyond the regulation. None identified beyond the root-cause finding that revenue and relationship interests were given priority over compliance escalations.
Mapping. Obligation: 31 CFR § 1020.210(a), partial. Controls: 4738 Client Exit Decision and Execution Review (Banking - Trade Finance), partial because it is scoped to trade finance clients, mapped alongside 3058 Enhanced Client Due Diligence Review (Banking - Cash Management). Gap: no control covers exit decisions for other client types.
Q. What does the customer identification (CIP) rule require, and where did gaps arise?
Requirement. Banks must collect name, date of birth (for individuals), address and identification number, and verify identity through documents or non-documentary methods. Procedures must address cases where identity cannot be verified: when not to open an account, terms of use while verification is pending, when to close an account and when to file a SAR. Records must cover identifying information, documents relied on, verification methods and results, and resolution of discrepancies; identifying information is retained for five years after the account is closed (or becomes dormant, for credit cards) and other records for five years after the record is made. For credit card accounts, identifying information may be obtained from a third-party source before credit is extended (31 CFR § 1020.220(a)).
Breaches. The OCC found substantial gaps in CIP procedures that did not enable the bank to form a reasonable belief that it knew each customer's true identity, resulting in inconsistent collection and risk-based verification of identifying information. The Order does not say which identifying information or verification methods were deficient.
Beyond the regulation. The OCC order addresses procedures for unresolved identity verification (a suggested peer-bank test rather than a finding) and CIP records.
Mapping. Obligation: 31 CFR § 1020.220(a)(2)(i) to (iii) and (a)(3). Controls (matched): Know Your Customer (KYC) Initial Review and Client Onboarding Quality Assurance Review (both Global Markets - Operations). For unresolved verification: KYC Ongoing (trading activity) Review, KYC Ad-Hoc / Periodic Client Due Diligence Review and KYC Trade Review (Global Markets - Front Office). For CIP records: AML and CTF Framework Review (Securities Services - Compliance) and AML Transaction Monitoring Review (Banking - Cash Management). The FinCEN action did not cite the CIP rule.
Q. What did regulators find on correspondent due diligence?
Requirement. A covered financial institution must establish a due diligence program for any correspondent account it establishes, maintains, administers or manages in the US for a foreign financial institution (31 CFR § 1010.610(a)). The program must form part of the AML program and include risk-based and, where necessary, enhanced policies, procedures and controls to detect and report known or suspected money laundering. These must assess the account's money laundering risk (including the nature of the foreign institution's business and the jurisdictions it serves, the account's purpose and anticipated activity, the relationship and any affiliates, the AML regime of the relevant jurisdiction and the institution's AML record) and include periodic review of account activity against the anticipated activity.
Breaches. The bank applied "simplified" due diligence, until late 2024, and narrow monitoring models to correspondent accounts of its own foreign branches and affiliates. Those accounts served more than 250 non-bank financial institution customers, including money services businesses.
Beyond the regulation. The FinCEN order requires an independent review of correspondent due diligence.
Mapping. Obligation: 31 U.S.C. § 5318(i); 31 CFR § 1010.610(a). Controls: 4902 Correspondent Bank Due Diligence Review (Banking - Payments), partial against all four mapped obligations because it covers correspondent banks, with no evidence that it covers affiliates or "simplified" due diligence. Gap: no control addresses foreign branch and affiliate accounts.
Q. What do the actions require of independent testing and audit?
Requirement. The program must include independent testing for compliance, conducted by bank personnel or an outside party (31 CFR § 1020.210(a)(2)(ii); 12 CFR § 21.21(d)(2)).
Breaches. Internal audit scope and effectiveness were inadequate for the bank's risk profile, and independent testing failed to escalate monitoring effectiveness issues. Ineffective testing delayed the detection and remediation of weaknesses.
Beyond the regulation. Related requirements cover audit coverage aligned to the actual risk profile and performed by qualified independent personnel, prompt reporting of material audit findings to senior management and the board, and corrective actions tracked and validated by audit. The FinCEN order also requires independent reviews of monitoring, customer due diligence, correspondent due diligence and AML data governance.
Mapping. Obligation: 12 CFR § 21.21(d)(2) and (d)(1); 31 CFR § 1020.210(a)(2)(ii). Controls: none mapped to audit scope or to audit findings and verified closure (both direct findings). Gap: no control covers independent testing of the AML program; 3161 covers model validation only.
Q. What did regulators find on staffing and training?
Requirement. 12 CFR § 21.21 requires designated individuals responsible for coordinating and monitoring day-to-day compliance ((d)(3); 31 CFR § 1020.210(a)(2)(iii)) and training for appropriate personnel ((d)(4); 31 CFR § 1020.210(a)(2)(iv)), within a board-approved program ((c)(1)).
Breaches. Findings identified resources, skills and expertise insufficient to administer the program, and training that did not address job-specific duties.
Beyond the regulation. Related requirements cover assessment of staffing and skills, capacity plans, resourcing of the BSA officer, succession and contingency arrangements for key AML managers, and training completion, including for outsourced functions.
Mapping. Obligation: 12 CFR § 21.21(d)(3), (d)(4) and (c)(1). Controls: for role-specific training and training completion, Mandatory Training Review (Global Markets - Compliance, Global Markets - Front Office and Global Markets - Operations). None mapped to staffing and expertise or key-person continuity. Training controls 3186, 3970, 3982 and 4816 are related indirectly.
Q. Why is insider activity a distinct area of focus?
Requirement. Insider abuse involving any amount can require a SAR (12 CFR § 21.11(c)(1); thresholds are set out under suspicious activity reporting). Management must promptly notify the board of each SAR, and where the suspect is a director or executive officer, all directors who are not suspects must be notified (§ 21.11(h)). SAR confidentiality rules apply (§ 21.11(k)).
Breaches. In the OCC action, the bank processed approximately $13 billion in suspected TBML over about eleven years, including in certain instances through accounts associated with bank insiders. The Order gives no further detail on the insider-associated accounts.
Beyond the regulation. Article XIII requires an insider activity program with controls and transaction monitoring rules to identify, measure, monitor and mitigate insider risk and insider suspicious activity, senior management and Board reporting on suspicious insider activity, and referrals for disciplinary action. The board-notification and confidentiality rules in 12 CFR § 21.11(h) and (k) are the underlying obligations mapped to this item; the Order itself does not mention them.
Mapping. Obligation: 12 CFR § 21.11(c)(1), (c)(4), (h) and (k); 12 CFR § 21.21(d)(1). Controls: none mapped to insider activity monitoring or to insider escalation and discipline.
Q. Which areas lack a consistent control approach across peer institutions?
CUBE's control index is built from controls submitted by peer institutions. A control enters the index only where similar controls appear in at least two peer submissions.
The findings and remediation requirements below have no dedicated CUBE control, because fewer than two peer submissions contain a comparable control. Each is therefore an area where no consistent peer control is indexed.
Several of these areas map only to the general duty to maintain a system of internal controls (12 CFR § 21.21(d)(1)). The SAR lookback and amendments are consent-order requirements rather than generally applicable regulatory obligations.
|
Area |
Finding or requirement without a dedicated peer-based control |
Obligation basis |
|
Business and product risk coverage |
AML risk assessment covering the dominant products, transaction types, geographies and insiders |
12 CFR § 21.21(c)(1): general duty only |
|
Risk assessment data |
Reconciliation of risk-assessment inputs to customer and transaction populations |
12 CFR § 21.21(d)(1): general duty only |
|
Business unit and enterprise aggregation |
Testing whether exposures that look modest in one unit become material when combined |
12 CFR § 21.21(d)(1): general duty only |
|
Affiliates and shared services |
Inventory and risk assessment of affiliate relationships and shared services used in AML operations |
12 CFR § 21.21(d)(1): general duty only |
|
Rescoring and suppression governance |
Governance of rescoring, suppression, de-duplication, ranking and exemption logic, with identified weaknesses tracked to validated correction |
12 CFR § 21.21(d)(1): general duty only |
|
Negotiable instruments |
Monitoring of money orders and cheques deposited by customers |
31 CFR § 1020.210(a) |
|
TBML detection |
Proactive scenarios for trade-based money laundering |
12 CFR § 21.11(c); 12 CFR § 21.21(d)(1) |
|
External-event reliance |
Monitoring how much detection depends on law enforcement and referral inputs |
31 CFR § 1020.210(a) |
|
Credit card monitoring |
Triggers for spending above stated income, and limits on additional cards |
31 CFR § 1020.210(a) |
|
Third-party payments |
Customer source-of-funds assessment for inbound third-party payments |
31 CFR § 1020.210(a)(2)(v) |
|
Correspondent due diligence |
Due diligence for foreign branch and affiliate correspondent accounts |
31 CFR § 1010.610(a) |
|
Independent testing and audit |
Independent testing of the AML program; audit scope aligned to the risk profile; validated closure of audit findings |
12 CFR § 21.21(d)(2); 31 CFR § 1020.210(a)(2)(ii) |
|
Staffing and continuity |
Staffing, skills and capacity plans; succession and contingency arrangements for the BSA officer and key AML managers |
12 CFR § 21.21(d)(3), (c)(1) |
|
Insider monitoring and escalation |
Identification of insider-associated accounts; escalation through independent governance; disciplinary referral |
12 CFR § 21.11(c)(1), (c)(4), (h), (k); 12 CFR § 21.21(d)(1) |
|
Historical SAR review and corrections |
Risk-based SAR lookback population, methodology and timeline; review of previous SARs for amendment, with disagreements logged and escalated |
12 CFR § 21.11: general SAR duty only; Article IX consent-order requirement |
Q. Which other risks do these controls address?
Breach of AML/CTF regulations is named in the objectives of every mapped control. Across the controls mapped to the FinCEN action (18 primary controls, 30 including equivalents), breach of financial sanctions is named on 11 of the 18 primary controls and tax evasion facilitation on 9, followed by anti-bribery and corruption (6), external fraud (4), card fraud (2) and KYC failure (1, control 3058). Across the 19 controls mapped to the OCC action, breach of financial sanctions is named on 10, external fraud on 4, tax evasion facilitation, anti-bribery and corruption and KYC failure on 3 each, and regulatory reporting failure on 2. These counts reflect risks named in the mapped control objectives, not additional legal breaches found in the actions.
-
COPYRIGHT NOTICE
© 2026 CUBE. All rights reserved
Any person or entity that quotes from, references, reproduces or otherwise uses any portion of this report must provide clear and prominent attribution to CUBE as the author and publisher.
Any person or entity that quotes from, references, reproduces or otherwise uses any portion of this report must provide clear and prominent attribution to CUBE as the author and publisher. This attribution requirement applies to all uses, including but not limited to:
Direct quotations or excerpts.
Data, statistics or survey findings.
Charts, graphs or visual materials.
Paraphrased content or insights derived from this report
Social media posts, articles, presentations or publications.
Internal or external business communications.
TERMS OF USE
Permitted use:
Citing specific findings, sharing or referencing the report or referencing with proper citation to CUBE. Prohibited uses:
Prohibited use:
Reproducing substantial portions without attribution to CUBE.
Misrepresenting the source or authorship of the content.
Removing or obscuring CUBE's copyright notices or branding.
Creating derivative works for commercial purposes without written permission from CUBE.
Implying CUBE's endorsement without written permission
Disclaimer
This report is provided for informational purposes only. While CUBE has made reasonable efforts to ensure accuracy, the content is provided "as is" without warranties of any kind, express or implied. CUBE does not guarantee the completeness, accuracy, timeliness or reliability of any information contained herein.
Limitation of liability
CUBE shall not be liable for any direct, indirect, incidental, consequential or special damages arising from the use of or reliance on this report, even if advised of the possibility of such damages.
Enforcement
Failure to provide proper attribution or unauthorised use of this report may result in legal action. CUBE reserves all rights to enforce its intellectual property rights.
Contact information
For permission requests, licensing matters, or questions about proper attribution, please contact CUBE directly. By accessing, downloading or using this report, you acknowledge that you have read, understood and agree to comply with these terms, including the mandatory attribution requirement.
Find out more
Email us at [email protected]