Russia’s Intense Air Campaign in October

Commentary by Yasir Atalan, Erik Tiersten-Nyman, and Benjamin Jensen

Published November 14, 2025

Moscow's aerial campaign appears to be entering a new phase that sees higher ballistic missile strikes, sustained Shahed salvos, lower Ukrainian intercept rates, and increasingly fragmented launch patterns driven by industrial production cycles rather than coordinated operational design. These trends show that Russia's strike campaign is now shaped more by what its factories can produce than by integrated battlefield planning. To counter this turn, Ukraine's foreign backers must undermine the illicit supply network that allows Russia, despite sanctions, to import electronic components.

In October 2025, Russia conducted one of its most intensive strike months of the entire war. Moscow launched approximately 5,300 Shahed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 74 cruise missiles, and 148 ballistic missiles, marking a sustained high pressure across all three systems while also reviving its campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. This represents not only the largest ballistic missile salvo since the start of the conflict, but also one of the few months in which all systems operated simultaneously at above-average levels.

In the same period a year earlier, Russia launched roughly 1,900 Shahed UAVs, 42 cruise missiles, and 33 ballistic missiles-which was a period of Russia's consolidation of firepower strikes-but the 2025 numbers are nearly three times higher across all systems. The kamikaze drone alone increased from 1,900 to 5,300 monthly launches, driven by Russia's in-house expanding production capacity. In fact, Shahed drone launches are at wartime high levels in the last six months. With this saturation strategy, the hit rate is close to 20 percent, a significant increase from last year. Likewise, ballistic launches jumped from 33 to 148, a more than fourfold increase, showing that Russia can now sustain long-range strikes deep into the war. In fact, on October 16, Russia set a new record by firing 26 Iskander-M/KN-23-type ballistic missiles in a single day, nearly doubling its previous high of 14. These figures highlight that Moscow is not relying solely on kamikaze drones but can still generate large ballistic salvos after more than three years of sustained conflict.

Looking across the full campaign, October 2025 underscores how far Russia's strike capacity has evolved from its early, more limited posture. In late 2022, Russia launched only a few dozen drones and missiles per month, often constrained by inventory and operational uncertainty. Shahed activity, for instance, began with fewer than 300 drones per month, mostly imported, with hit rates under 10 percent, while ballistic launches were rare and sporadic. Entering 2024, Russia established a steady rhythm of multisystem attacks, with Shahed output consistently above 1,000 per month and growing sophistication in timing and targeting. The step change in 2025-peaking with October's more than 5,000 drones and 148 ballistic missiles-marks the culmination of this curve.

Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine continues to depend on sustained and adaptive strike campaigns. The ability to fire nearly 150 ballistic missiles in a single month shows that, despite sanctions and battlefield attrition, Russia's strike infrastructure remains resilient and capable of periodic surges. At the same time, the data shows a shift in launch behavior: What began as coordinated mass strikes has become more fragmented and system-specific, shaped by production cycles and stockpile availability rather than unified operational planning. In short, Russia's strike strategy now reflects industrial rhythm more than battlefield design-launching what it can, when it can, while still keeping sustained pressure on Ukraine's defenses.

Diverging Launch Patterns

In 2024, Russia's strike systems often moved together. Shahed UAV and cruise missile launches were moderately synchronized, with roughly 60 percent positive month-to-month correlation, while ballistic launches tended to move in the opposite direction-suggesting substitution between ballistic missile and drone use. By October 2025, that relationship has largely disappeared. The correlation among all three systems has fallen to near zero.

This means that Russia's drone, cruise, and ballistic launch patterns now operate independently of one another. Rather than reflecting coordinated targeting campaigns, their usage likely depends on separate supply chains, stockpile conditions, and production rhythms. The decoupling of these systems marks a transition from integrated strike coordination toward a more opportunistic, resource-driven model.

Shifts in Volume and Performance

Russia's overall strike volumes have not followed a single linear trend. Ballistic launches surged sharply in October 2025, when nearly 150 missiles were fired-one of the highest monthly totals since the start of the war. While the exact success rate varies by definition, the October spike underscores both Russia's production capacity and its willingness to employ more scarce systems during key operational windows.

By contrast, Shahed drone launches have stabilized at roughly 5,000 per month since May 2025. This plateau indicates a mature production and deployment rhythm rather than a continued climb. Hit rates for Shaheds hover between 15 and 20 percent, with recent months showing increases in both hits and shoot-downs. That pattern points to an adaptation race: Russia improving swarm coordination, and Ukraine upgrading short-range air defenses and electronic countermeasures.

Cruise missile use has remained comparatively flat across 2025. Earlier in the year, Russia appeared to reduce its reliance on cruise systems, possibly conserving them or facing production limits. Their performance trends have been volatile-hit rates declining for much of the year before rebounding in recent months. These swings likely reflect a mix of new missile variants, improved Ukrainian defenses, and evolving targeting priorities.

Operational Implications

The disappearance of correlations across strike systems highlights a broader change in Russia's operational approach. What began as coordinated mass-salvo tactics has become a more modular and adaptive structure: large Shahed and cruise barrages alternating with ballistic surges.

For Ukraine, these shifts demand continued agility. Air defense must be able to pivot rapidly between massed drone swarms and high-speed ballistic or cruise strikes. This reinforces the need for layered defense-integrating radar, mobile interceptors, and electronic warfare systems-and for steady resupply to offset rising interception demands. And it illustrates why Kyiv's foreign backers, including Washington, must sustain the flow of air defense platforms.

Just as important, when supply lines and production schedules become the driving force behind Moscow's battlefield strategy, the optimal counter is to attack the plan. It is time to revisit a mix of broader secondary sanctions targeting Moscow's ability to import critical electronic components. It is time for Europe and the United States to hold China accountable for sustaining the war in Ukraine and to link compliance with trade talks.

In sum, Russia's October 2025 strike behavior marks a transition toward flexibility and resource-driven tactics. The decoupling of its main strike systems-combined with stabilized kamikaze drone output, periodic ballistic surges, and volatile cruise performance-suggests a maturing but constrained firepower strategy, shaped as much by industrial capacity as by battlefield design. As a result, the only way to attack the plan is to restrict industrial capacity.

Yasir Atalan is a data fellow in the Futures Lab at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Erik Tiersten-Nyman is an intern with the CSIS Futures Lab. Benjamin Jensen is director of the Futures Lab and a senior fellow for the Defense and Security Department at CSIS.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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