11/17/2026 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 11/18/2026 18:08
High Representative, distinguished Ministers, and representatives --
Thank you for welcoming me to the European Union. It is an honor to appear before the assembled Ministers and representatives from across Europe on behalf of Secretary Hegseth.
It is also timely and important - because we are at an historic juncture. This juncture is defined not only by urgency and need but also by opportunity. Despite a great deal of overheated commentary, the fact is that Europe and America are in the process of resetting the transatlantic bargain to make it more durable, equitable, and rational, and that will leave us all more secure. Moreover, this new bargain promises to strengthen Europe and make it more prosperous and productive.
The bottom line is that America wants a stronger, more prosperous, and more engaged Europe.
This is not because of sentimentality or a particular ideology. It is rather a structural interest derived from our Administration's approach of flexible realism and common sense. If we view the matter through this lens together, we will see an extraordinary opportunity for progress together that will leave both Americans and Europeans better off.
Allow me to explain, especially as this may seem quite different from what you read in the papers.
As our National Security Strategy makes clear, our approach to foreign, defense, and economic policy in the Trump Administration is defined by flexible realism and common sense. This is the realism of practicality, not of academia. That is, it is a commonsense approach that seeks to ensure our policies actually serve the concrete interests of regular Americans. It is distinguished from the heady idealism and ideological expansiveness of the post-Cold War era, but also the isolationism of the pre-World War II era. It leads us to look at policies and say: Does this make Americans more secure? Does it reasonably reflect their stake in the issue? Does it rationally balance between what Americans are called to do and our allies or trading partners are expected to contribute? It is, if you will, a businesslike approach.
In the security realm, I believe we have been clear what this entails. Not endless crusades to pacify distant regions. But also not withdrawal from the world. Rather, it is a strategy that recognizes and grapples forthrightly with the resources we have available and what can reasonably be expected from the United States going forward.
As the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy make clear, we start from the premise that Americans benefit from favorable regional balances of power in the world's key areas. But Americans cannot and should not be expected to shoulder those burdens alone. Rather, our alliances are immensely valuable in serving this goal. Moreover, a central part of our approach is our conviction that allies can and will shoulder more of this shared responsibility; it is neither reasonable nor prudent for Americans to be expected to carry a significantly disproportionate share.
In line with this approach, what we have done is recalibrate our strategy and posture to focus on where regular Americans' interests are most engaged and where the contributions of our second to none military are most necessary - a logical approach characterized by rigor and focused on strategic impact. The central problem we are trying to solve for is the potential for simultaneous conflicts. To be abundantly clear, we certainly do not seek such an outcome, nor do we see our potential opponents as a kind of axis tightly aligned against us and our allies. Rather, we want to deter such a grievous contingency, precisely by being ready for it, while supporting our leadership's diplomacy to avoid any such tight alignment. To use the old chestnut: peace through strength.
In light of this, in accordance with the NSS and NDS, we are prioritizing our military's focus on our own homeland and hemisphere and on deterrence by denial along the First Island Chain. In other areas, particularly Europe but also the Korean Peninsula, we are looking to our allies to take the lead in their conventional defense, with U.S. forces providing critical but more limited support. We assess this approach makes sense from the point of view of where our forces are most required, given the scale of the military challenge. We also think it is viable in light of the capability, wealth, and resolve to step up of our allies.
As part of this approach, we have clearly communicated this recalibration over the last eighteen months. I believe it is fair to say that no one can accuse us of having hidden this reprioritization. To the contrary, we have explicitly, directly, and consistently communicated what we are doing, why, and where we are headed. Despite a great deal of criticism, we have done this precisely to give our allies fair warning and clarity about where we are heading in order to give them as much time, space, and planning confidence as possible to adjust their own posture, policies, and levels of defense spending. We believe true allies, like true friends, are frank and direct when necessary. Polite evasions and fictions are not the marks of real partnership.
Moreover, Ministers, we believe firmly that this approach is working. In the Indo-Pacific, South Korea has committed to assuming primary responsibility for its own conventional defense vis a vis North Korea while Australia and New Zealand are stepping up in their defense spending and we are very hopeful Japan will as well.
But Europe deserves special attention and plaudits here. What has happened in Europe over the last eighteen months is extraordinary. Under President Trump's leadership, our judgment was that Europe can and would step up to assume the lead for its conventional defense.
And this has happened.
Last spring, NATO leaders revolutionized the situation by committing to the new global standard of 5% of GDP spending on defense and security, with 3.5% spent on core military capabilities.
And together we have gone well beyond that. NATO leaders formally recognized for the first time that Europe would assume the lead for its conventional defense. On the spending front, European governments have gone beyond words and even beyond allocation of Euros to make real defense investments that will before long result in real, combat-credible formations that are in line with General Grynkewich's very sound denial defense Theory of Victory and NATO's established Capability Targets. Poland was already above 4% and has been setting the standard for many years, but now it has been joined by Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden in rapidly moving to meet its Hague Commitments well before 2035. Of special significance, Germany - by far Europe's largest economy - is moving to meet its commitments by 2029, six years before due. It has published an excellent military strategy tightly aligned with SACEUR's Theory of Victory and is repurposing its world-class industrial base to restore Germany to its position as a central pillar for NATO's collective defense, a position it held as recently as the 1980s. And we are hopeful that others will soon join the ranks of these leaders in Europe's efforts on collective defense.
Meantime, in NATO, U.S. and SHAPE staff worked together closely to adjust the NATO Force Model to reflect our new strategy. Even more, Europeans stepped up almost immediately to fill the forces the U.S. withdrew from the Model, with France deserving special acknowledgement there. And NATO is working to update its Capability Targets and force planning criteria to closely map to this strategy and SACEUR's Theory of Victory. Within NATO, the U.S. is working closely with the fastest movers through the mechanism of the Bergen Group to help the Alliance meet its military requirements as rapidly and effectively as possible.
It is in this vein that we are conducting the Europe Posture Review (EPR), designed to update our military posture in Europe for a new generation and make it fully consistent with the NATO 3.0 model. Through this Review, we have seen the broad endorsement from our allies for the strategic requirements associated with a rebalanced, refocused, and ultimately more sustainable division of labor within the Alliance towards NATO 3.0. General Grynkewich and I are in close collaboration on this effort, and I look forward to presenting our report - grounded in strategic realism, clarity, and empirical rigor - to the Secretary soon. A critical part of this Review has been exhaustive and intensive consultations with allies in multiple formats, here in Europe as well as in Washington and through calls and video conferences. It is abundantly clear to us from Allies that the question is no longer "why" or "if" NATO 3.0, but "how."
Together, it is no exaggeration to say that these developments are historic.
For our part, we believe President Trump deserves unique credit - and I have heard many European leaders and officials say the same, in public and private. But we can acknowledge that success has many fathers, and you and your governments also deserve great credit. Many in Europe - but also in America, including many among Europe's most vocal putative friends - said this could not happen. Under President Trump's leadership, we believed Europe had the strength of resolve and ability to truly step up. And you do and demonstrated it. You certainly did not do it for us - you did it for your own reasons and interests. That is the point. But, still, the United States can stress that this deserves acknowledgement and applause.
But our work is far from done. We cannot afford complacency.
And it is in this spirit that I would like to address our approach toward the European Union in particular.
Our overall focus in this context remains on enabling Europe's ability to step up to meet its collective defense requirements. For us as for many in Europe, this means an integrated transatlantic defense industrial base open to European and American businesses. At the same time, our approach in the defense field, perhaps surprisingly to some, is more receptive to the EU in this arena than American governments have been in the past, provided the EU approach is non-exclusionary.
This receptivity is merely a logical deduction. Our goal is for Europe to step up to assume the primary responsibility for its conventional defense in NATO. It is important that we be clear about this because there are other defense objectives we might pursue. But what regular Americans - and Europeans - most benefit from is a Europe that can contribute more to NATO's collective defense.
If that is true, we can derive a few additional salient conclusions from it.
Europe is going to have to spend more on its own defense - and in fact is doing so. If that is the case, we can only reasonably expect that European voters will also want to see real benefits economically for Europe in addition to the security and strategic gains. This is only fair.
Our national interest, then, is in Europe meeting its NATO's military requirements as rapidly and effectively as possible. We want to see all these Euros and industrial capacity well-used. We do not want every country pursuing a separate defense industrial strategy that ends up with enormous waste and inferior military quality. Instead, we want European money and efforts to be invested efficiently, at scale, and with results that reflect the military environment - but serving collective defense, not parochial commercial or national interests.
This leads to two conclusions. The first is that we can and should be open to defense efforts at the European level, provided they are focused on military efficacy and efficiency and therefore open across the transatlantic defense industrial base. Only by generating scale can Europe allocate its resources at the frontier of military capability, where our collective interests require them.
We want European investments to be efficient, high quality, and thus scaled. So we are pragmatically open to efforts at the European level that contribute to collective defense.
At the same time, permit me to be clear that this comes with caveats in our position - caveats that are strategically grounded not only in our own interests but also in Europeans'. In particular, we strongly oppose measures to exclude American firms from competition in European markets. Of course this is only fair to our taxpayers, who should not be excluded from European competition as they support our continued commitment to NATO 3.0 - and of course the same goes for other non-EU NATO allies.
Even more on point, though, such an exclusionary approach is not in Europeans' interests. If, as Europeans regularly remind us, the threat to Europe is real, then how can it make sense to exclude what is, by all accounts, the world's highest quality defense industrial base from competing in Europe? Doing so would actually harm Europe's security by preventing Europe from getting access to the world's best weaponry through world-class innovative U.S. defense industry. That would be self-defeating - in other words, excluding U.S. defense industry is to Europe's detriment. This is why many European states share our opposition to this counter-productive approach.
If I may quote General Grynkewich's recent address to your Parliament: "I do caution against codifying preferences as to where military hardware is made. A focus on where something is made, rather than how well it performs in combat, how well it performs on the battlefield, only benefits our adversaries. Keeping the EU and NATO moving in sync toward procuring the best equipment for our men and women in uniform must be our ultimate goal."
The natural solution is a pragmatic, negotiated balance that emphasizes meeting military requirements efficiently and effectively - and thus is open across an integrated transatlantic defense industrial base. Thus American firms should be able to compete in Europe, but we also understand Europe will want to benefit from those efforts. Fortunately, there is abundant opportunity to satisfy these criteria through transatlantic joint ventures, licensed co-production, and co-development - particularly in high-priority areas like integrated air and missile defense, artillery and precision munitions, and building resilient supply chains.
In point of fact, we do not need to speculate as we are already seeing what this right approach looks like in practice: Poland has set the standard by pairing massive, rapid acquisitions of cutting-edge American capabilities with deep local industrial partnerships, while Germany is leveraging transatlantic co-production - such as producing PATRIOT missiles in Bavaria - to rapidly rebuild both its own readiness and European capacity.
To make this transatlantic industrial renaissance a reality, we are also seeking to step up on our end. Let me be very clear: The President's defense budget proposal is critical to our ability to work with Europe and help it rearm at speed and scale. By making historic investments in our own defense industrial base, expanding production lines, and reforming foreign military sales and technology-sharing bottlenecks, the President's budget ensures that the United States has the industrial capacity and flexibility to co-produce, deliver, and partner with Europe as it steps up. I should stress that, if we do not receive adequate funding, it will severely hamper our ability to meet not only our but particularly allied demand. It is in all of our interest for the Department of War to be sufficiently funded.
I think here you can clearly see how our approach is a more credible alternative for Europe compared to the so-called "middle powers strategy" that some nations are discussing. Our focus is on military readiness in the context of a clear strategy and an openness to industrial collaboration with Europe and other allies on the basis of pragmatism and a results-oriented approach.
The alternative is for smaller countries to try to band together to build alternatives to the American approach. The demerits of this approach should be clear, especially if one is actually focused on improving collective defense capabilities.
Take the F-35. Any professional will tell you it is the best aircraft of its kind available. As General Grynkewich regularly points out, it is the key capability that would allow a NATO 3.0 Europe to fight effectively to defend itself, and do so in a way that would help NATO avoid the kind of grinding war of attrition we see in the conflict in Ukraine. And the fact is that there is no way that a gathering of disparate so-called middle powers would ever be able to build a competitor to the F-35 in a timely fashion. In fact, the effort to do so would almost certainly result in the waste of European and Canadian money, with an inferior result - if any result emerges at all. It is also worth noting that, as the most successful co-produced platform on the planet, much of the F-35s that European nations are buying are produced here in Europe, providing jobs and benefiting your taxpayers.
The better approach is to work with America on the basis of mutual and enlightened self-interest, negotiating together on the basis of reasonable shares but ultimately military efficacy. Nor will this be a one-sided affair. With Europe spending hundreds of billions more Euros and assuming key roles in NATO, Europe will have more leverage and standing, making our transatlantic relationship more durable, pragmatic, and balanced.
Especially over time, this will result in a transatlantic and global allied defense industrial base that will equip us together to deal with the simultaneity problem and promote peace through strength. That is why we are hopeful about the trajectory of our efforts together. On this path, with Europe in the lead among our allies and hopefully setting the standard for our Indo-Pacific allies and Western Hemisphere partners as well, we are on the trajectory toward an alliance architecture that can field the forces needed for deterrence and defense focused on denial and favorably managing escalation as well as a defense industrial base that can produce at scale for ourselves, our allies, as well as partners outside the Alliance. This will provide the most solid and lasting basis for the kind of peace that we want.
It should also result in a reinvigorated Europe. We want a militarily strong Europe that can largely defend itself. This requires that Europe has the money to fund it, which requires economic growth and domestic prosperity. And it requires a Europe that is truly ready to fight in its own defense, which requires commitment and confidence. In other words: a strong, vigorous, and prosperous Europe.
This is the future that we hope we can stride toward together.
Thank you very much.