Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby's Discussion Following Remarks at the Naval Submarine League's Annual Symposium and Industry Update

To read Under Secretary Colby's remarks to the Naval Submarine League's Annual Symposium and Industry Update, click here.

Edited for Clarity

VICE ADMIRAL JEFFREY TRUSSLER (RET) - So about 15 years ago, when I still acted as a sweaty captain in the Pentagon, just trying to get papers for the admin through, I got to be the SecDef Orders Book briefer. So you're familiar with that process; you see it. And this was 2011, and General Mattis is pounding the table. He wants two carriers there, permanent, not just across the line, but in the theater. So a little bit, maybe what we hear now and what's talked about now, and that process always was about the readiness of the future - presence now is risk later. And so it was fascinating for me to see the discussions between the service chiefs, the chairman, and the Secretary's team. Is that rigorous debate happening right now? Because you hear a little bit about readiness of carriers or destroyers or submarine forces. Is that a rigorous process of talking about readiness and making those decisions?

UNDER SECRETARY OF WAR FOR POLICY ELBRIDGE COLBY: Well, thank you, and again, it's a real honor to be here and thank you for the invitation, Admiral, including the invitation. Excellent question, and a couple thoughts.

First of all, absolutely, there is a very sophisticated and detailed, and I would say nuanced conversation, including the Secretary himself and the leaders of the Department, both civilian and uniform, that is intimately familiar with the very real issues that come across in what's called the SWOB now, the Secretary of War Orders Book, and just thinking about considerations of force employment and Global Force Management and readiness and so forth, And a number of key players, I'm one of the one of the participants on the civilian side. You also have people like Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness Tata plays an important role, of course, on the on the military side you have the Joint Staff and combatant commands and services, etc.

What I would say, I think the main thing, obviously, I can't get into any detail, is the strategy that we are pursuing is focused and specific for geopolitical reasons. It is a denial defense strategy along the first island chain, and also in line with General Grynkewich's Theory of Victory - a denial defense strategy for NATO as well. That's designed to link up with the geopolitical strategy of the administration, which is peace through strength, looking for favorable balances of power. It's not a sort of liberal imperialism or what have you. It's a more or less status quo approach to defending our alliance network, broadly construed and designed to persuade the potential aggressor that today is not the day, hopefully into perpetuity.

It's also designed at the military strategy level, if you will, to be more focused. And I feel that often the conversation in the public, which I participated in over the years, but is a bit sort of gross or sort of it colors with two broad colors. Because we are not seeking to say the whole Joint Force must be used for a denial defense in a "A" or "B" theater.

Rather, we're saying the denial defense, this is what the military needs to be able to perform, coming down from the National Security Strategy and through the National Defense Strategy, obviously from the president to the secretary. And certain forces by deduction are very relevant in certain contingencies. And of course, as I elaborated today, the submarine force is exceptionally important in the Indo-Pacific, given the maritime and given our first island chain defense perimeter and kind of the archipelagic nature of it. That becomes very relevant.

In other theaters, other kind of capabilities are very relevant. You do get certain kind of capabilities that are called upon in various scenarios, and obviously some people have different views on what's most relevant. I think we have a very clear sense. Certainly, I have a clear sense in our view, based on the best kind of military and strategic advice of what's most relevant to serve the criteria or serve the demands of the first island chain of denial defense. And that's why I'm here because you guys are absolutely essential.

So I'm known, internally as a submarine guy. I super admire what you do. But from my point of view, it's more about that is the capability that allows us to reach out, that can operate independently. Obviously, you've got your supply chain, needless to say, but can deliver decisive effect from zero hour, like from the very get-go, and have very decisive effect on the potential aggressors' critical military forces.

And one of the things that I often say, even internally, is let's focus on what we need to do to achieve the strategy. Obviously, we need very modern forces like Virginia-class submarines. On the other hand, you can use relatively primitive or simple capabilities to help achieve a denial effect, that's great too. So it's not like we always need everything and the most exquisite capability to achieve that goal. We need the right capabilities in the right place at the right time at the right operational readiness.

So if you look at how we've actually happened - I can't obviously get into specifics - but we have actually prioritized critical capabilities for the National Defense Strategy's and the National Security Strategy's priorities in ways that do line up.

And the strategy is not designed to say this is a procrustean, this is how you have a straitjacket, this is how the political leadership has to act. No, no, no. The strategy is designed to give a steer, like a big ship, right, and orient the force over time, not only in terms of Global Force Management, but investment, technology development, etc.

And by the way, much of the force is still going to be available for discretionary operations at the political leadership's decision, which we're using. I don't want to get into specific capabilities because people get very emotional about which capabilities those might be. But a lot of the forces that are not most relevant for first island chain defense or defense of NATO or denial defense are kind of the kind of capabilities that you end up using a lot. Those are often more relevant to presence, or they're more, we used to call rogue state capabilities. So, is the force perfectly optimized for that? No, that's where we want to move towards. By the way - and this is a critical point - if you build the force for the pacing challenge, generally speaking, you'll be better prepared for lesser included. It's not a perfect map, but if you try to build the force for maximum optionality, you won't be able to do the pacing challenge, and you court disaster.

I always like to point out Operation Midnight Hammer - the President was just speaking about security, speaking about it eloquently recently - B-2s, attack submarines, those were all designed for the Soviet Union. Those were not designed for a Middle East contingency, but they're used because, and I think you probably all know in this in this context. In fact, I was talking to Admiral Caudle about this a while ago, how rapidly some of those technological and operational tactical innovations get out from the pacing challenge to other capabilities. So that's sort of the logic of how we're looking at this. But my bottom line there would be: Look, obviously, you have to Global Force Management, how you employ the force often presents tough choices, but we are very focused on making sure that we can get the priorities elucidated in the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, right. And critical to those is the submarine force, and that's why one of the key reasons I'm here today.

VICE ADM. TRUSSLER: Great, thank you, sir. So with that force posture, a decade and a half ago, we, the national leadership, the military leadership, really talked about we need to pivot to Asia, pivot to the Pacific, and this is an area of concern for competition and potential conflicts. And we started working on. In fact, the Navy takes great pride in saying we've already been shifting, we've already made a shift, and 60/40 split and things like that. But so now, it doesn't feel like the rest of the world got our memo and is adhering to it and keeps us occupied when you talk about Russia and Middle East and other places. And now we're rolling into 2027, the famous Davidson Window we call it, everybody's got it marked on the line. Do you think we've postured ourselves well around the world? And are we concerned about this Davidson Window in 2027?

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: Well, I think the answer to your first question, admiral, is yes. In the sense that, again, our administration's policy is not 'put as much stuff as possible in the Pacific.' That's not the approach. Our administration's approach is 'make sure you get the right stuff to achieve the specific military strategy,' which is defense by denial along the first island chain. So you guys are really important in general, certainly in prioritizing that. And I think we have done a good job on that.

And then it's not to hope for the best in the rest of the world - I think it's still another thing that distinguishes us - it's rather than say we are going to, and I'm going to go speak to the EU defense ministers next week and talk about this. It's to say, 'hey, look at the whole world. Look at the potential for simultaneous conflicts, which we certainly don't want.' We don't believe in the axis of adversaries or stuff like that, that they're all GI Joe versus Cobra. No, there's a fissure. There is a degree of collaboration. That's a nuanced conversation. But we have to be prepared for the worst-case scenario, worst case plausible scenario, which is potential opponents acting together, whether in concert or opportunistically. Because that's the most stressing situation. How do we deal with that? Well, we have a certain amount of resources. We are trying to amp that up. We have the best military in the world, as the president and secretary rightly point out. But as the Secretary has said, we can't do everything everywhere all the time. I mean, it's kind of common sense. I don't need to tell, I mean, the Navy's people work in a lot these days, right?

So, and I think what we're saying is, hey, a lot of people say, hey, we've got this incredible alliance network, the wealthiest group of countries in the world, and our view is, yeah, right.

You know what? We can induce and invite our allies to step up in a situation where instead of European countries and some Asian countries spending 1% while we're all spending 3.5% and have a military that's operating at a given tempo, we can recalibrate that and balance it. It's not that we're cutting our military; we're trying to grow our military and employ it confidently. But we're saying that our allies can and will step up, and the way we'll do that is we'll treat them candidly like adult partners, and say, "Hey, the old way where the United States kind of did everything, and you guys come along and wait, that's not working anymore." We're going to have a more equitable and durable approach that's actually going to help us out, and it's going to benefit the American people by being more equitable, but it's also going to benefit you by leading us all into a situation in which we're prepared for this simultaneity situation.

You hear Secretary General Rutte talk about it - and the thing is, it's working. And this is a thing that I don't think gets enough attention. It is happening. It is extraordinary what has happened in the last 18 months. I mean, what's happening in NATO - people said it couldn't happen. In fact, the biggest, loudest, putative friends of Europe said it couldn't happen, and it is.

The Europeans have committed to 5% in the Hague Commitment, and moreover, it's going way beyond that, like Germany, which is the fourth largest economy in the world and knows a thing or two about exercising military power, and did so responsibly during the Cold War, is going to hit 5% by 2029, and has put out a superb military strategy, has a defense planning guidance that is really tightly aligned with what we're doing and what General Grynkewich is doing, who's amazing in terms of putting a NATO capability target. By the way, the Poles were already there. The Scandinavian countries are all there. And so, what's happening? And similar things are happening in South Korea. There's issues with the South Korean government, but the South Koreans have committed to taking primary responsibility for their own conventional defense vis-a-vis North Korea, and committed to reaching 3.5%, which is the core military figure, I can't remember the exact year, but as part of the joint fact sheet last year. That is a huge step forward.

Where we're saying we're all going to be able to defend ourselves better in this potential for simultaneity, which by the way is going to make the alliance architecture more durable and less reliant on a potential bluff - which we don't think is prudent. And by the way, in this context, then the United States is focusing its military capability on where U.S. interests of regular Americans are most impinged upon. Think about our own hemisphere, where we're kind of like, hey, we should be able to use our military to promote American security in our own hemisphere, not just in the other hemisphere - that's sort of common sense. And then, of course, in the Pacific, which the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy make very clear. Why? Because that's where the challenge is greatest. That's where our military power is most at a premium and in demand.

It's not that we're pulling out; we're conducting, along with General Grynkewich, a posture review of our European posture right now. The idea is not like, hey, oh, we have to get to zero. No, no, no. The idea is let's take our posture in light of the global situation, in light of the strategy, in light of the fact that our allies are stepping up and say what makes sense for our European posture looking into the 2030s and the 2040s, not just being stuck in amber from 1995 or 1975 or what have you. Pretty common sense. So I think that's how that's how we're looking at, and so I won't get into the specifics of timelines and so forth, but we don't take anything on faith, and we watch everything very very very very very very carefully, and we're sort of trust but verify, and fortunately we've got you guys out there operating every day, and nobody really knows where you are, and I'd be worried about you too. And if anybody's feeling cocky, I think they can spend a little time with this community, and maybe they'll come away feeling less cocky. That's sort of the vibe that we want.

VICE ADM. TRUSSLER: Great, thank you. So a little shift as we chatted about Monday. This is mainly an industry audience, and we have lots of international industry representatives today. So sometimes we hear this message from the administration: a America first or build it here, and versus a discussion of our using our allies' industrial capability for our gaps in capacity, and do you see these messages or behavior is actually conflicting, or are we on a good path to openly work with our allies for some industrial capacity?

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: Well, I can say what our position in the Department of War is, and I think generally the position that I ascertain the administration, which is: look, our core interest is in getting our allies to step up and spend more on defense. That's the core interest of the American people: a more equitable kind of burden-sharing thing that's to everybody's benefit. Okay, if that's going to happen, it's only reasonable to expect our allies to want to keep some of their euros or yen or won or whatever Australian dollars, et cetera, at home. That's just like common sense, right?

Moreover, if it's going to be sustainable in our interests, that's part of the deal. So, that's kind of a practical thing. So, what we're saying, and what I'll say next week, for instance, I think in in Europe, is just let's just work together, and you should focus your you our allies focus your military investments on military requirements that are real, like what General Grynkewich as the Supreme Allied Commander, is saying, are his military requirements or the agreed capability targets in NATO, rather than using your investments as essentially a kind of domestic industrial strategy.

Sometimes you hear people talking about like the middle power strategy. That's actually, first of all, that is going to be counterproductive for our allies. Because if you're actually worried about your security, you want to get the best stuff as quickly as possible at the best cost, which means that you should work with us because we have the best defense - We can't provide everything all the time, obviously. So there's going to be other markets. We understand that other people are going to compete and can fill niches, or there's plenty of demand to go around. But like, if you want to - General Grynkewich always points out, if you want to be able, if NATO wants to be able to fight effectively, especially European-led NATO, and not fall into a war of attrition, hopefully, you're going to want to use the F-35 because that's going to help you gain air superiority. So praise the submariners. I mean, also our airmen, right? I mean, F-35 is an extraordinary aircraft, which, by the way, has had many international partners. So, you, from a military point of view, why wouldn't you want to buy the F-35 if you're trying to fill military requirements, like in NATO or, for that matter, in NORAD, you buy the F-35. Now we have F-35 buyers out the door and around the corner, around the Pentagon, like 12 times, including our own services.

So that's it's not like a national industrial policy thing. It's more like, well, wait a minute, if you're saying that you're worried about defense and you're not focusing on military efficacy, what does that suggest about how genuine the other country is being? So that's sort of our - and then let's lean forward, and that's what we're doing. I was in Poland last week talking about it - I was also in Romania. The Poland is - this Bergen group that we've set up, which is the fastest movers within NATO at scale, to try to kind of drive, kind of bring NATO forward as rapidly as possible. Countries like Germany, which is looking at F-35. You have Poland is buying F-35. Finland is getting F-35. Norway is getting F-35. And I'm not here talking about F-35.

I'm just saying it's a good example. But then again, for instance, the Canadians, for instance, went with the German Norwegian consortium on submarines. We don't make conventional submarines, so yeah, it makes sense. And, you're choosing between that consortium versus South Korea. Just our recommendation, strong recommendation, is to do that based on military efficacy. And then what we can help with, certainly I work very closely with Under Secretary Duffey, who's the lead on this - great, great partner. But our policy point of view is just to say where we can lean forward with countries that are really trying to push forward: Poland, Germany, Australia, etc., where they're hitting their spending constraints, those are the countries - hopefully, Japan will make a significant commitment - we're going to want to see the countries that are really leaning forward on spending and other things. That's where we're going to concentrate our energy in terms of recommending co-production, co-development of these kinds of things.

VICE ADM. TRUSSLER: Sir, thank you. Hey, let's talk AUKUS a bit. So, what a tremendous idea. I mean, it is a multi-decade generational investment and agreement by the three countries. But that first decade, decade and a half, really important to make it real. And I noticed you led a policy review early in the administration. I mean, is this…all democracies, they're going to have many administration changes over all three countries. I mean, are we going to survive those administration changes?

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: Well, that's certainly our goal. I mean, as the President said, we are full steam ahead on AUKUS. I think that the Review is the similar approach as what I was just laying out and saying in the NATO context, which is to say, here's what you're going - because at the end of the day, this is a - it's a practical arrangement that involves the eventual sale of some of our crown jewels of our military capabilities.

I've been emphasizing today to Australia: We have no better ally, in my view, than Australia. They've been with us all the time in the last century, so they're the best of the best from our point of view. But it's one thing, I actually think it's less the first part of that. It's the later part because the first part was the 2021 announcement, the political level announcement, that's the intention. Then you to follow it on, and that's what the AUKUS review did, I think. And we've communicated that to Australia and also our British counterparts, which is this is going to take like real block and tackling. We've been making a lot of progress, I think, over the last 18 months, and I'm proud of that.

I think one of the things that's going to be really important. I mean, we've been leaning pretty hard on the Australians and the Brits. For instance, the Australians, we've been urging them to increase their defense spending to 3.5%, which is the new global standard set by the Hague Commitment, which South Korea has also matched. But we also are going to have to hit our SSN production timelines, right? And numbers, and that's where the budget becomes really important, and the industrial efforts become really important.

And I think one of the things that - our view is strong and clear, but quiet. We've been having very productive conversations with the other - kind of reconciling and understanding, and how submarines might be employed. Obviously, understand that everybody has political constraints, and there's been some reporting that's false about like we're trying to insist that they sort of sign on the dotted line. But we're basically saying, look, we want to understand if we're going to at some point in the 2030s, a President is going to make a decision to go ahead with this, we want to understand and operate like in the way that we operate in NATO, which is at the end of the day, all of the alliance leaders have the political authority about whether to commit troops or not. But there's a lot of understanding about what's expected. That's how that's how close alignment, same in the in the Korean Peninsula. That's the sort of model that we're moving towards, and that's I think what AUKUS represents. And that's my view is that the way that - the AUKUS Review is the best thing that ever happened to AUKUS because it's like a real to you point like, okay, we're going to actually do this. Here's how it's going to work, and we're going to give you as much heads-up as possible. If you really wanted to undermine AUKUS, you could just like hope for the best, right? And that's not that's certainly not how this community operates, and it's not I think our approach in the Pentagon right now.

VICE ADM. TRUSSLER: Okay, Midnight Hammer, Absolute Resolve, Epic Fury. In general, the public, we see what we get in the news and commentary or speeches, and it's always very what can be visual, something kinetic, showing a chart or a map. But I heard you said somewhere command we need command and control to move at the speed of war and resilient command and control. And I have a feeling what we don't see before anything ever for any bomb, anything kinetic, is some control in space, cyber, electronic warfare of the RF spectrum - there's a lot of capabilities out there that we're just not going to hear about or see about that we may have, frankly, in these conflicts, we have some pretty much free reign of those domains. I'm not sure that'll happen in a near period. Maybe say in the Western Pacific. Are we capturing the lessons learned and how we apply that? Because we probably applied it at scale, we never had before, and are we learning from that?

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: I think so. Of course, I defer to my military colleagues, but I work very closely with Admiral Paparo, who's superb, and one of the points that he's made is he prefers his force that's ready to be 'bloodied,' I think that's his term, which is they've been through the crucible of combat and they've learned and they've experienced directly. And I think sometimes people can exaggerate how salient that would be in a near-peer conflict because it's different. But our top-line aircraft are getting experience in things like Operation Epic Fury and Operation Midnight Hammer.

I also think, we definitely have a bunch of tricks up our sleeves. I would just be like, the public conversation doesn't always factor in everything. I'm not saying-I'm definitely not saying we're omnipotent, but that that again gets back to the 'what is it that we are trying to achieve' in a battleground analogy, right? Because if we are trying to defend the first island chain from military aggression, that's a much lower political strategic standard and thus military requirement than seeking to conduct regime change and stabilization operations like we did with the two regional war construct in the 1990s and the 2000s.

So we're, it's really important for us, and I struggle with this to kind of get people to index on this, but I think in the public conversation even more, it's like just remember what we're trying to achieve. And our goal at the end of the day is peace, peace through strength, right? And but also the ability for favorable balance of power to exist so that we can negotiate. Our country, our economy is growing very rapidly relative to the OECD competitors. So we're confident in our long-term trajectory. So it's our it's in our interest to maintain stability and peace, and we need to have the military forces to be able to do that.

VICE ADM. TRUSSLER: Sir, you're responsible for the National Defense Strategy, and that rolled out earlier this year. As you heard during my introduction, I spent some mornings listening to some interviews with you, and that's what gave me the confidence, the Council on Foreign Relations and other places. I'm not going to ask you any questions you can't field. Watching how tough they are. But so nine months later, how are we doing on that National Defense Strategy? And do you think there are pieces that are either may not be understood or are misinterpreted out there about how we're executing?

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: Actually, we did, speaking of the Hill. We did an update on the implementation of the National Defense Strategy, which is available publicly when I, which was released, I think probably about six weeks or two months ago, which goes at I think our sense that we are implementing it reasonably well. I mean, it's government, so you don't always get everything you want. But I mean, I think one thing that I would just say is again, the defense strategy is not a straitjacket, and it is not, it is primarily involved in the kind of like the major processes of the Department, which I think probably many, if not most of you, are all familiar with here. Whether that's, Global Force Management, planning for contingencies, the Defense Planning Guidance and the budget bill and the guidance for development of research and development over the long term. Those kind of tectonic shifts are where a defense strategy is most relevant, rather than saying here's exactly what we're going to do, it's more - I always think a strategy is more of like a heuristic, it's more of a framework, and saying here are where the priorities are that we want to develop, and then of course it's going to be up to the Secretary and higher up echelon for them to decide.

But I think the strategy is built with that in mind, and in fact was explicit about giving the President options. For instance, in employing forces in the Middle East to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapon. So, I don't think there's anything that's happened that we regard as far from invalidating the defense strategy, also, the strategy is designed to adapt events. A previous administration's defense strategy, the major Russia-Ukraine war happened, and they had to apparently rewrite the thing. And I'm like, well, wait a minute, shouldn't you countenance - like something that was not totally implausible? You shouldn't have to rewrite your strategy because your strategy should be sort of pretty resilient. It's like, for instance God forbid. I mean, we work hard to make sure there's never again another 9/11 - - I had the honor to be in the Pentagon on the 25th anniversary - it's not like we're saying that couldn't happen again. No, we're just going to assume that doesn't happen. No, but there's a there's a way.

Obviously, 25 years, our military, our intel community, law enforcement, etc., have refined this capability, and we're trying to say, here's how you do that. Here's how you focus on it. We're not trying to end terrorism until the end of time, we're going after terrorists who are threatening the American homeland or key allies, that have the potential to do so. We keep, intel committee keeps a very keen eye on all that, and ear. So that's sort of how we think about it. So that's, and again, just stressing the part about the idea is to build a force that can do the hardest relevant strategically material mission, and if you can do that, you will be better off for other elective applications of force over time.

VICE ADM. TRUSSLER: Sir, the other day on my way to see, I'm always fascinated by the Pentagon of how some things never change, but then how fast others do. I'm going down one of the half corridors and Project Agincourt. The signs up there. You already got a sign. They got office, beehive of activity. People coming in and out. I tried to walk in. I got a stiff arm. Don't you know who I am? Answer was no, so I continued on to our meeting. I love the effort. I love the emphasis. I love the effort. So autonomous systems. Is there really an underlying effort to replace our battle force? Capabilities of ships, aircraft, submarines, or is this meant to be an additive capability to what we have?

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: Yeah, and I mean this is something I've given some thought to over the years. I think you mentioned in the first term, the National Defense Strategy. I mean, I think one of, it built a lot on the work of great visionaries, great leaders like Bob Work, the Deputy Secretary, former Deputy Secretary of Defense. I think one distinction from his Third Offset initiative and what we're trying to do in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and then certainly carrying on into this one, is less purely focused on technological disruption or sort of revolution, not contesting the frame so much like an intellectual level, but really saying being a bit more, I would say, kind of moderate in the debate between somebody like Chris Brose very eloquently making the case for like dump everything and invest in newfound stuff. And then you have other people in some of think tanks or something, saying we got to stick with the traditional tried and true stuff.

I think our view, and I think the way they built the budget, from my impression, is more balanced approach. And this is again where the strategy becomes really an important, that's like my key contribution to that discussion, such as it. Which is to say, let instead of having an abstract conversation about what's better or what's more modern or whatever. Let's use what is really important and invest in what is really important for that strategy, for that military strategy, like a denial of defense along the first island chain. Well, turns out submarines - I mean, it's pretty old technology at that point. I mean, nuclear-powered submarines go back to the Nautilus, right, 1950s. But they're still really cracker-jack, that's something really important.

And there's been obviously innovations, but the platform is still with it. The B-52 is still a great aircraft. I mean, that's designed in the 50s, maybe even started in the 40s. I don't know. But obviously re-engining and all that. Then there are new capabilities like unmanned drones and so forth in all kinds of different domains. That's great as well. But if you put it together in a way that's designed to achieve an effect, I think that, and I am very confident that that's how someone like Admiral Paparo is thinking about or General Grynkewich. I think that is a realistic way, which is not to take a kind of an extreme position in terms of how we integrate, and I think that, and then also just kind of learning what we can, learning from Ukraine, which is really important, but also not overlearning. For instance, the Ukrainians don't have air superiority, unfortunately. But NATO probably could reasonably expect to have NATO air superiority. So that's a different situation, and that's a better situation for NATO. God forbid that anything were to happen. But then you can factor in - you have to be conscious of that and how you think about these unmanned systems.

But I think Project Agincourt and a lot of these initiatives are really important, and an attempt to say we're going to drive this forward. We understand that the normal speaking about the normal way of doing things if you let it, you just kind of let the system work and hope for the best. That's not going to get you the output you want. But the budget, for instance, has major investments in drone and counter-drones. But as part, I would say, a sort of a balanced force focused on a strategy.

VICE ADM. TRUSSLER: Thank you. You've been extraordinarily helpful with your time today, generous of your time today. One final question: So it's tough out here, just when you're just reading the news, you're listening to commentary, you're just trying to get meetings with people like you, trying to keep up with what's going on, what's real, what's true. So it can be a little confusing out here in the unclassified world, quite frankly, of how our undersea forces stand in comparison to potential adversaries. The seas are transparent, there's all kinds of things. Now, I have some bias when I listen to these two talk. They stand up, stick my chest out, or they let me sit up and tell me a little more. I stick it out further. But I mean, where do you stand? How do you feel if we had to go to conflict right now against a near peer, you know how our underseas forces are postured and how they're going to do and how they're going to support our national strategy.

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: Well, it's interesting, and I talk to Admiral Seif about this, and Admiral Goucher, especially in 2025, to kind of really stress test that because you hear in the unclassified domain how significant our undersea advantage is, but you want to make sure. Obviously, we've seen the issues with production, despite significant investment, and that's something I've also talked Admiral Goucher about recently. I know it's got Deputy Secretary Feinberg's priority attention as well. My top priority, every time I'm at any budget issue, I ask how the submarines are doing. So, what I would say is. I would not want to be on the other side of our submarines. I mean, I think the debate that we were having is probably internally and kind of stress testing and looking at the empirical and assessments is, despite coming in with an obviously constructive, constructively and positively skeptical approach, I come away thinking, "Wow, like I just really wouldn't want to be on the on the other side."

And I think it's not it's not a speculation, there's pretty strong empirical basis, obviously, I can't get into details, but we can't take that for granted. But one of the things, and that's why I talk so much about culture, I mean, I think the submarine force has that culture of unforgiving, like really unforgiving, having dealt with submariners over the years, really unforgiving excellence and professional expertise, and not, of course, traditionally being the silent service and so forth. But really, that culture of taking nothing for granted and excellence, and unforgiving, I don't know if perfection is the right standard but something darn close to it. That's what's going to-and - we will probably be surprised, God forbid. But if we are surprised, it's resilient even to that surprise, and obviously that's going to be people's lives, and I don't discount that in the slightest, maybe in closing is, that's really a national asset of the United States. What you got, what you and your community is, because obviously joint forces being employed across a range of contingencies. People are putting themselves into dangers and we have we have special operators, et cetera, that deserve all the aplomb that they get, and those who are in the sandbox, as it's often called, deserve every ounce of appreciation - I had the honor to be there at Veterans Day yesterday.

Obviously, the submarine force has not been employed in the same way over the last generation, but don't let that dissuade you from the highest levels of the Pentagon, just to understand how much we honor and appreciate and count on that, and God forbid, if the balloon did go up, that would be what we would count on decisively, and I have confidence. I've dealt with lots of submariners over the years that they would live up to that standard. But your country's fate would depend upon it. So know that and know how grateful we are, and don't stop what you are doing.

Thank you very much.