06/16/2025 | News release | Distributed by Public on 06/16/2025 13:42
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From June 24-25, leaders from NATO member states will gather in the Netherlands for the alliance's annual summit.
Sara Moller is an associate teaching professor and director of international and alumni affairs in the Security Studies Program at the School of Foreign Service.Agenda items include support for Ukraine and whether to implement a new target for member states to spend 5% of their respective GDP on defense, among other issues.
The summit comes amid political transitions in multiple member states, from newly elected leaders of member states to the collapse of the Dutch government in early June. It will also be the first summit under the leadership of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.
"This year's summit will look and feel very different from last year's 75th anniversary celebration in Washington," said Sara Moller, associate teaching professor in the School of Foreign Service. "It's been shortened, both in length and ambition, and the general sense is that the goal is to get through it quickly and quietly, without generating major headlines."
Here's what Moller expects from the NATO summit, from the likelihood of meeting a 5% defense spending target to U.S. priorities and the future of support for Ukraine.
Typically, the U.S. plays a leading role in shaping the agenda, with a well-coordinated interagency process behind it. That hasn't happened this time. Frankly, the administration hasn't been very focused on the summit, and as a result, other allies have stepped in to try and influence the agenda, particularly around Ukraine. But at the end of the day, Washington still holds veto power, which sets limits on how far those efforts can go.
As far as Washington is concerned, there's just one main deliverable at this summit: the 5% defense spending target.
Beyond that, I wouldn't expect much. I don't think we'll see any big announcements on Ukraine. The president's priority remains to end the war by getting Moscow and Kyiv talking. Everything Washington is willing to put forward on Ukraine right now flows from that single objective, which means the administration isn't prepared to offer more at this stage.
As for the Russia strategy that was promised in last year's Washington Summit statement - that's been quietly put on ice for now.
When the president first floated that number back in January 2025, I was skeptical it would gain traction, especially considering how hard it's been for many allies even to hit 2%. But fast forward six months, and it quickly became clear to everyone that the president wasn't going to show up in The Hague without that 5% target in hand. The new Secretary General Mark Rutte has been conducting extensive behind-the-scenes diplomacy across various capitals to secure support from allies.
The only real open question is the timeline - whether the target date will be set for 2032 or pushed out. Aside from the Baltics, who are pushing hard for 2030, most allies have been lobbying for a later date. But the Trump team clearly wants to light a fire and move things along faster.
There's also the question of what exactly counts toward the 5%. More specifically, what goes into the 1.5% portion, apart from the 3.5% earmarked for traditional hard military spending? Things like infrastructure, cybersecurity and civil defense will likely be included in that softer category. And, in all likelihood, so will support for Ukraine. However, I doubt we'll get a clear answer at the summit. Most allies prefer to keep things vague to maximize flexibility and boost their chances of hitting the target on paper. That said, I'd expect some behind-the-scenes negotiations on how that final breakdown gets calculated.
As of last year, 23 out of 32 NATO members were meeting the 2% benchmark. We usually get an updated number right before the summit as part of the alliance's public diplomacy and messaging push. I'd expect that figure to tick up slightly this year.
But it's important to remember: These are input numbers. They tell you how much is being spent, not how effectively that money is being translated into military power. What really matters is output, that is, actual military capabilities. That's why the national capability targets (which are classified) are a more meaningful metric. Those are what NATO really looks at when assessing whether an ally is pulling its weight.
I think his main priority is simply to get through the summit without any drama. One of the key reasons Rutte was selected is that he was seen as a safe choice, especially in the event of a "November surprise" in the U.S. election. He's widely viewed as a Trump whisperer, and like Stoltenberg, has shown he can manage the American president effectively.
That said, Rutte's deferential approach toward Washington has rubbed some allies the wrong way. There's growing frustration among those who want the secretary general to not just manage Washington, but also actively represent the views and interests of the broader alliance, especially when they diverge from the U.S. position.
The goal is to get through it quickly and quietly, without generating major headlines.
On the surface, probably not much. Diplomatic protocols will ensure that the summit runs smoothly. All of the pageantry and summit formalities will go ahead as planned. But behind the scenes, it underscores a deeper, often unspoken challenge for the alliance: domestic political instability. Whether it's democratic backsliding, weak coalition governments, or the rise of the far right, these trends directly affect alliance cohesion. So, while it won't derail the summit itself, it's a reminder that internal politics across member states are an increasingly serious strategic concern for NATO.
First, I'll be watching how prominently the European Union is represented - leaders like Ursula von der Leyen, Kaja Kallas and others. With a broader rebalancing underway in the transatlantic security relationship, NATO-EU coordination is becoming increasingly important.
Stoltenberg [former NATO Secretary General] had a somewhat complicated relationship with the EU, so with Mark Rutte now at the helm and given the evolving political landscape in the U.S., there's a real opportunity to reset and strengthen that partnership. This summit could be an early signal of where that's headed.
Second, I'll be looking to see how prominently industry features on the agenda. One of the great initiatives at last year's Washington Summit was the NATO Defense Industry Forum, hosted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. It brought together business leaders, allied defense ministers and NATO officials to boost transatlantic industrial cooperation. We've got the money now, and the orders are starting to come in, so the focus right now has to be on defense production and building industrial capacity to make sure allies actually get what they need.
Finally, I'll be keeping an eye on how many of NATO's Asia-Pacific partners, the so-called AP4 - Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea - show up, and what the summit communique says about cross-theater linkages. Since the Madrid Summit in 2022, there's been a clear effort to deepen ties between NATO and these partners. We already know that Japan and New Zealand are sending their leaders; whether Australia and South Korea do the same will be telling. Top officials in NATO and the Biden administration made a strong push to strengthen security ties between the Indo-Pacific and Europe. But with a new president in Washington and a new secretary general in Brussels, whether that momentum continues is still an open question.
There's a wide spectrum of views within the alliance. On one end, you have countries like Lithuania and the other Baltic nations that are still strongly lobbying for Ukraine's NATO membership, even though they know it's not in the cards right now.
On the other end, you've got countries like Hungary and Slovakia that not only oppose Ukraine joining NATO but are also pushing back against NATO playing a large role in coordinating military aid.
And the rest are somewhere in between. Some allies support NATO stepping up its coordinating role on Ukraine assistance; others are more cautious and worried about provoking a direct confrontation with Russia, and questioning whether they have the resources to sustain increased support to Ukraine over the long term.
I don't think the Trump administration cares howsupport for Ukraine gets organized. Their bottom line, which European allies fully understand, is: don't expect the U.S. to foot the bill.
Europe has already taken on a larger share of the burden of supporting Ukraine. But from the administration's perspective, it's still not enough. Judging by the writing on the wall in Washington - including the FY2026 discretionary budget - the message is clear: The U.S. isn't planning to do more. So, the real question becomes, how much more can Europe do, especially as it faces economic constraints and pressure to fund its own defense needs?
This is where the new 5% spending target comes back into focus, particularly the question of whether aid to Ukraine will count toward that figure. For many allies, including Ukraine-related assistance is likely the only realistic path to meeting the target.
I expect we'll hear the usual language about China, emerging technologies and space. But the real issue on everyone's mind is the timing and scale of the coming U.S. drawdown from Europe.
Right now, the administration is saying all the right things about its continued commitment to Europe. But at the same time, it's widely known that cuts to the U.S. force posture in Europe are coming, possibly as soon as this summer. That looming announcement will be front and center. Everyone will be watching closely for any signals about what, exactly, the Pentagon plans to pull from the European theater.