Economic Fury Targets Networks Generating Billions for Iran’s Terrorist Regime

Action Targets More than 50 Companies, Individuals, and Vessels Generating Revenue for the Regime

WASHINGTON-Today, as a part of Economic Fury, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated a prominent Iranian foreign currency exchange house and associated front companies that oversee hundreds of millions of dollars in transactions on behalf of sanctioned Iranian banks. Collectively, Iranian exchange houses facilitate billions of dollars in foreign currency transactions each year, enabling the regime and its armed forces to evade sanctions, access the international financial system, and move funds derived from oil and petrochemical sales.

OFAC today also blocked 19 vessels involved in Iranian petroleum and petrochemicals shipments to foreign customers, transactions that have generated hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue. Together, today's actions further reduce the revenue available to the Iranian regime to develop weapons, support terrorist proxies, and siphon funds outside Iran for personal enrichment.

"Iran's shadow banking system facilitates the illicit transfer of funding for terrorist purposes," said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. "As Treasury systematically dismantles Tehran's shadow banking system and shadow fleet under Economic Fury, financial institutions must be alert to how the regime manipulates the international financial system to wreak havoc."

ECONOMIC FURY DELIVERS MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON IRAN

The Treasury Department is maintaining maximum pressure on Iran and targeting the regime's ability to generate, move, and repatriate funds. Treasury is aggressively advancing Economic Fury and has disrupted billions in projected oil revenue, taken actions that have led to the freezing of nearly half a billion dollars in regime-linked cryptocurrency, and cracked down on Tehran's shadow banking networks. In addition, Treasury has designated networks supplying weapons and other military components to Iran. Treasury has also sanctioned a corrupt Iraqi official who has facilitated the sale of oil along with Iran-backed militias operating in Iraq.

Treasury will vigorously target both traditional sanctions evasion schemes and the exploitation of digital assets while continuing to freeze funds stolen from the Iranian people. Treasury is also prepared to take action against any foreign company supporting illicit Iranian commerce, including airlines, and, as necessary, may impose secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions that facilitate Iran's activities-including those connected to the People's Republic of China's independent "teapot" oil refineries.

Through the blockade, the Trump Administration is directly targeting the regime's primary revenue stream. Any person or vessel facilitating the illicit trade of oil or other commodities, through covert trade or financial channels, risks exposure to U.S. sanctions.

Today's action is being taken pursuant to E.O. 13902, which targets persons operating in Iran's financial, petroleum, and petrochemical sectors. These designations build on a series of OFAC actions targeting Iran's shadow banking mechanisms, including exchange houses, Iranian bank rahbar companies, digital asset exchanges, and facilitators used to evade sanctions.

Additionally, the U.S. Department of State's Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program is offering a reward of up to $15 million for information leading to the disruption of the financial mechanisms of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its various branches. More information is available on the RFJ website.

AMIN exchange

The Iranian regime's shadow banking networks are composed of numerous exchange houses that oversee a sprawling network of foreign front companies, which allows sanctioned Iranian banks and their respective rahbar companies to facilitate receipt of funds from Iran's overseas sales of oil and petrochemicals, among other goods.

Iran-based Ebrahimi and Associates Partnership Company, commonly known as Amin Exchange, is a significant player in Iran's foreign exchange market, and has facilitated hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign transactions for sanctioned Iranian persons. Amin Exchange has collaborated with sanctioned Iranian banks and petrochemical exporters, to include the National Iranian Oil Company, Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industry Commercial Company (PGPICC), and Triliance Petrochemical Co. Ltd. Amin Exchange maintains a widespread network of front companies spanning multiple jurisdictions, including in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Türkiye, and Hong Kong. These front companies conduct cross-border money laundering activities to support sanctioned Iranian importers or exporters, making them indispensable to Iran's banking sector.

Turkish, Iranian, and Dominican national Yousef Ebrahimi (Ebrahimi) owns and operates Amin Exchange. Ebrahimi is aided by Iranian national Samad Nemati, Amin Exchange's current chief executive officer (CEO), a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officer, and Türkiye-based Iranian national Ali Hazrati Chakherlo, who serves on Amin Exchange's board. Turkish and Iranian national Mahmoud Ebrahimi, the brother of Yousef Ebrahimi, also serves as an employee of Amin Exchange.

Senior shadow banking network officials, including exchange house owners and their families, routinely maintain multiple foreign citizenships, often obtained from offshore jurisdictions through citizenship-by-investment schemes. These foreign identity documents, which can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, allow such individuals to travel freely and establish new companies overseas. They also demonstrate how shadow banking personnel personally enrich themselves and live lavishly at the expense of the Iranian people.

Ebrahimi and Associates Partnership Company is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy. Yousef Ebrahimi, Samad Nemati, Ali Hazrati Chakherlo, and Mahmoud Ebrahimi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Ebrahimi and Associates Partnership Company.

OFAC is also designating the following front companies, all of whom are involved in Amin Exchange's financial activities and other sanctions evasion activities, to include facilitating payments for shipments related to the Iranian petroleum, petrochemical, metals, manufacturing, and automobile industries. The below entities are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the financial sector of the Iranian economy:

• China-based Ningbo Jiarui Trading Co., Ltd.;
• Hong Kong-based Starshine Petrochemical Corporation Limited;
• Hong Kong-based Vigorous Trading Limited;
• UAE-based Alieen Goods Wholesalers LLC;
• UAE-based Bold Trading FZE;
• UAE-based Materium Group FZE;
• Hong Kong-based Bestfortuna Company Limited; and
• Hong Kong-based Cheng Pan Co., Limited.

SHADOW FLEET ACTORS

Iran continues to exploit the maritime domain by relying on non-Iranian flagged vessels transporting Iran-origin oil, petroleum products, and petrochemicals to foreign customers. The following vessels are being added to OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) as blocked property of their designated owner or manager:

• The Barbados-flagged liquified petroleum gas (LPG) tanker GREAT SAIL (IMO 9177583), which is owned by Hong Kong-based Great Sail Shipping Limited, has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian petrochemicals since 2025.
• The Palau-flagged products tanker OCEAN WAVE (IMO 9387152), which is owned by Liberia-based Ow Maritime Incorporated, has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian naphtha since 2025.
• The Panama-flagged chemical/oil tanker SWIFT FALCON (IMO 9246803), which is owned by Hong Kong-based Arden Angel Shipping Company Limited, has transported millions of barrels of Iranian naphtha since 2025.
• The Hong Kong-flagged LPG tanker MIGHTY NAVIGATOR (IMO 9206396), which is owned by Hong Kong-based Verda Gas Co Ltd, has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian LPG in 2026.
• The Panama-flagged crude oil tanker MIDAS (IMO 9266841), which is owned by Marshall Islands-based Ocean Marvel Shipping Company Limited, has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian oil in 2026.
• The Panama-flagged chemical and oil tanker BRIGHT GOLD (IMO 9171503), which is owned by Hong Kong-based GS Chemical Transportation Limited, has transported millions of barrels of Iranian methanol since 2025.
• The San Marino-flagged LPG tanker DOUBLE IN (IMO 8917807), which is owned by United Kingdom-based Science Obedient International Company Limited, has transported millions of barrels of Iranian LPG since 2025.
• The Cameroon-flagged chemical/oil tanker NARSIS (IMO 9408358), which is owned by Liberia-based Sun Ocean Shipping Incorporated, has transported more than a hundred thousand barrels of Iranian high sulfur fuel oil since 2024.
• The Comoros-flagged LPG tanker G JADES (IMO 9131096), which is owned by Hong Kong-based Gjades Shipping Company Limited, has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian petrochemicals since 2024.
• The Gabon-flagged LPG tanker GAS ENDURANCE (IMO 9240419), which is owned by Panama-based Aquila Worldwide Marine Developments Corp., has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian LPG in 2026.
• The Palau-flagged LPG tanker OCEAN RADIANCE (IMO 9194969), which is owned by Marshall Islands-based Aurora Business Company Limited, has transported millions of barrels of Iranian LPG since 2025.
• The Panama-flagged LPG tanker QUANTUM STAR (IMO 9225342), which is owned by Marshall Islands-based Taurus Gas Company Limited, has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian LPG since 2025.
• The Panama-flagged LPG tanker GAS STRENGTH (IMO 9172636), which is owned by Marshall Islands-based Veinto Global Marine Inc,, has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian LPG since late 2025.
• The Vanuatu-flagged crude oil tanker FEADSHIP (IMO 9322279), which is owned by Marshall Islands-based Mozart Maritime Inc., has transported millions of barrels of Iranian oil since 2026.
• The Cameroon-flagged crude oil tanker VASLATI (IMO 9252333), which is owned by Marshall Islands-based Splendid Lexy Trading Company Ltd, has transported millions of barrels of Iranian oil since late 2025.
• The Cook Islands-flagged crude oil tanker DAKUSH (IMO 9278698), which is owned by Marshall Islands-based Mekong Lines Inc., has transported hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian naphtha since 2025.
• The Panama-flagged crude oil tanker TEJAS (IMO 9326067), which is owned by St. Kitts and Nevis-based Romy Lines Incorporated, has transported millions of barrels of Iranian oil since 2026.
• The Sierra Leone-flagged oil tanker LUNA LUSTER (IMO 9292187), which is owned by United Kingdom-based Global Fortune Shipping Limited, has transported millions of barrels of Iranian oil since mid-2025.
• The Hong Kong-flagged chemical/oil tanker GALA ROSE (IMO 9126015), which is owned by British Virgin Islands-based Sparkling Courage Limited, has transported millions of barrels of Iranian LPG since 2023.

The following persons are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum or petrochemical sectors of the Iranian economy:

• Great Sail Shipping Limited;
• Ow Maritime Incorporated;
• Arden Angel Shipping Company Limited;
• Verda Gas Co Ltd;
• Ocean Marvel Shipping Company Limited;
• GS Chemical Transportation Limited;
• Science Obedient International Company Limited;
• Sun Ocean Shipping Incorporated;
• Gjades Shipping Company Limited;
• Aquila Worldwide Marine Developments Corp.;
• Aurora Business Company Limited;
• Taurus Gas Company Limited;
• Veinto Global Marine Inc.;
• Mozart Maritime Inc.;
• Splendid Lexy Trading Company Ltd;
• Mekong Lines Inc.;
• Romy Lines Incorporated;
• Global Fortune Shipping Limited; and
• Sparkling Courage Limited.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

All property and interests in property of the persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC's regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.

Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC's Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC's enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to FinCEN's whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC's ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC's guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.

Click here for more information on the persons designated and any property identified as blocked property today.