George Mason University professor probes ‘Labubu economics’

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The billion-dollar Labubu phenomenon broke a cardinal rule of retail: Consumers need to know what they're buying before they open their wallet. Most new Labubu sales took the form of "blind boxes," where purchasers found out which type of doll they'd purchased only after the fact.

Zhechao Yang, assistant professor of information systems and operations management at Costello College of Business at George Mason University. Photo by Jeffrey Porovich/Costello College of Business.

Zhechao Yang, assistant professor of information systems and operations management at the Costello College of Business at George Mason University, says that the "blind box" strategy, or "probabilistic selling" in academic terminology, is a rapidly growing global phenomenon that goes way beyond Labubu. Her recently published paper in Manufacturing & Service Operations Managementexamines how, and why, this emerging strategy has worked for toymakers, car rental companies andbooksellers alike-while delighting customers willing to pay for a surprise.

The paper was co-authored by Hongseok Jang of Tulane University and Xiajun Amy Pan of University of Florida.

The researchers used game-theoretic modeling to analyze the interactions of suppliers, retailers and customers in a market where a manufacturer sells through a retailer. In this realistic setup, a supplier offers an assortment of products ranging from high- to low-quality at wholesale prices, which retailers seek to sell to consumers at the highest possible profit. Either the retailer or the supplier can choose to initiate probabilistic selling (PS), selecting some mixture of high- and low-quality products to go in the "blind boxes."

Yang and her co-authors noted that PS can improve profits for retailers and suppliers in a number of ways. "One is the market expansion effect," Yang explains. "If there is an excess of high-quality products that consumers are not buying, they can be combined with low-quality products to form a new product, via PS…Another way is through strategic differentiation, essentially preventing the excess high-quality products from experiencing price convergence with lower-quality products."

But PS' profitability potential is far from uniform. As the paper clarifies, it can vary greatly with the context, based particularly on two elements: whether PS is retailer- or supplier-led, and whether high-value products are abundant or scarce.

The researchers found that transaction costs-the extra costs of creating and selling blind boxes-were one of the main determining factors. Whichever party initiates PS will have to bear certain costs, which may include the labor required to assemble "blind boxes," and additional fulfillment, inventory and logistics costs. Additionally, Yang says, "There could be financial and accounting costs associated with adding new products."

When retailers take it upon themselves to introduce PS, the associated transaction costs can reshape upstream pricing. Anticipating those costs, the supplier may lower the wholesale price of high-quality products to make the blind-box strategy viable for the retailer. This can help the retailer, but it also reduces the supplier's margin and may make retailer-led PS unattractive to the supplier under some conditions.

When retailers take the lead, they will adjust the product mix for PS based on balancing transaction costs against the likelihood of product cannibalization-a trade-off that may give rise to more shortsighted choices.

On the other hand, supplier-led PS gives the supplier more control over both the blind-box mix and the wholesale terms. Also, by adjusting the number of high-quality products that will go in the "blind boxes," the supplier can maximize price differentiation, thus increasing profits.

"When the supplier leads the strategy, it can reduce the channel inefficiency," Yang says. "In the model, the supplier can control both the product mix inside the blind box and the wholesale terms offered to the retailer. That can make it easier to manage cannibalization and preserve the value of high-quality products."

The importance of supplier-led PS becomes especially clear when high-value products are scarce. In that setting, the paper shows that firms should use the limited high-value capacity on "blind boxes" rather than sell those products separately.

Thus, the paper concludes that supplier-led PS, unlike the retailer-led variety, can create a "win-win-win" scenario where the supplier and retailer both earn higher profits, market coverage expands, and consumers benefit from access to a broader set of purchasing options.

However, power plays a significant role in real-world decisions around PS. "In reality, major retailers like Amazon may have more bargaining power, more pricing power. The high-level assumption we give this model is that when the retailer is more powerful, the retailer gets the first opportunity to decide whether to introduce PS., but that doesn't mean it's the best option for the whole supply chain," Yang says.

"It's better for the two parties to have some conversation before deciding who will take the power at the very beginning. Large retailers may have some advantages, but sometimes it's better to give this power to the supplier."

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