Virtual Press Briefing with Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge A. Colby

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MODERATOR: Good morning from the U.S. Department of State's Asia Pacific Media Hub. I'm Tim Johnson, and it's my pleasure to welcome journalists to today's on-the-record briefing. Today, we're honored to host Elbridge Colby, Under Secretary of War for Policy, who joins us while on travel this week to the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Cambodia.

For today's briefing, we will move directly into Q&A. Our first question goes to Mike Cherney of The Wall Street Journal, if you could please unmute yourself.

QUESTION: Yeah, hi. Can you guys hear me?

MODERATOR: Yes, please go ahead.

QUESTION: Yeah, hi, Mr. Colby. Thanks for talking to us today. Just on the Philippines, has there been any infrastructure upgrades, prepositioning or other progress at any of the EDCA sites recently? And beyond these EDCA sites, how is the U.S. looking to expand its military footprint to bolster deterrence in the region? Thank you.

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: Well, thanks. Thanks for the question. And yeah, I mean, I think overall we're looking to - we already have substantially accelerated the relationship with the Philippines and we are proud to say that there has been progress with the EDCA sites and we anticipate more. Obviously, we're working very closely, hand in glove, with the Filipinos to do that in a way that supports their sovereignty, that supports their sort of national kind of perspective. But we're proud to say that over the kind of last 18 months plus, we've made a lot of progress and we just, based on the conversations with President Marcos and Secretary of National Defense Teodoro, we just see further progress is definitely in the future, and that's the reason that we refer to them as a model ally. They're really leaning forward in a very productive and collaborative way.

MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next question goes to Cindy Frishanti Octavia of ANTARA in Indonesia. Please unmute yourself and go ahead.

QUESTION: Hello. Can you hear my voice?

MODERATOR: Yes, please go ahead. Yes.

QUESTION: Yes, it's nice talking to you, Secretary Colby. My question is: What concrete programs under the MDCP framework will the United States prioritize with Indonesia over the next 12 months? And to what extent will this MDCP involve defense technology transfer rather than simply a purchase from United States? Thank you.

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: Well, thank you. I mean, I was very - we were really thrilled by the visit to Jakarta where I had the honor of meeting with President Prabowo and the minister of defense as well - very productive conversations that I think are opening up new vistas in terms of a mutually respectful, pragmatic, realistic relationship and partnership between the United States and Indonesia.

So we're going to work out a lot of the specifics together in a way that's very consistent with Indonesian sovereignty, Indonesian nationalism, and so forth, but is designed to enable and empower Indonesia to defend its own sovereignty, to defend its own nationhood, and its security. So we're going to - I think we feel based on this visit that there's a lot of opportunity that, again, is pragmatic; it's not asking countries like Indonesia to choose one or the other, but is really designed to enable Indonesia to protect its own security and sovereignty.

MODERATOR: Thank you. Staying with Indonesia, our next question goes to Andreas Febrian of Kumparan, if you could please unmute yourself and go ahead.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Colby, for having us. Hello, can you hear me?

MODERATOR: Yes, please go ahead.

QUESTION: Okay. How do you - my question is: How do you guarantee our sovereignty? Because we have some formal agreement such as a blanket overflight that agreed a few months earlier. Thank you, Mr. Colby.

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: I'm sorry, could you say the last part again, just so I understand you correctly, sir?

QUESTION: So in the past few months, we have some mutual flight - blanket overflight, that it sparked some protests in our country because that can - that can - we're afraid that the agreement could violate our sovereignty. But how you can explain this?

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: Well, first of all, let me -

QUESTION: That you can guarantee our sovereignty.

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: Thank you. First of all, let me stress that it's for the Indonesian government and, of course, the Indonesian nation to determine what is in - the best way to defend Indonesian sovereignty. And we are very respectful of that, and we want to work with countries like Indonesia on the basis of their own perspective on how to secure their sovereignty. Obviously, Indonesia is a huge country with a very large archipelago, has a lot of challenges in terms of the span of control, and we want to work with Indonesia to help it to secure its territorial integrity.

Obviously, the United States has no territorial claims. We are not seeking to expand our territory here. As I stressed in Manila, we're a huge country. We have an enormous country already. We're not looking to expand our territory. We're looking to sustain a balance of power in the region based on a combination of strength and peace, if you will, military strength which we're - our contention is that our military posture in the region is becoming stronger, but at the same time, we are also engaging in very active diplomacy - I, myself, Secretary of War, Secretary of State, and the President himself, obviously.

So those are - that's kind of a natural combination of peace through strength. And I think from the perspective of regional countries, our hypothesis, if you will, is that regional countries benefit from a strong relationship with the United States that's designed to promote their ability to secure their sovereignty. So we're working with countries on the basis of clear-eyed realism and pragmatism to secure their interests. And of course, we have things that we're looking to try to achieve to secure that balance of power. We're not looking to try to undermine or compromise Indonesia's sovereignty; we're looking to strengthen it. And I think that's a basis for a pragmatic relationship that we feel very optimistic about.

It's a similar mindset we're bringing here in Thailand, where we also feel that there's a lot of progress to be made, and of course in the Philippines, and also countries that I didn't have the opportunity to visit during this trip, or won't, like Vietnam or Malaysia or Singapore. Those are all - that's our perspective that we're carrying throughout the region.

So, I mean, we're realists, so we understand that countries have to have a basis for mutual exchange. There has to be a reason that we have an interest in doing something, that Indonesia has a reason. We're not coming and telling and wagging our finger. We're saying, look, here's the kinds of things that we need to work on that make sense for that balance of power perspective, that peace through strength perspective. That's not designed to control Indonesia or undermine Indonesia or Thailand or Philippines or whoever. Rather, our interest - and let me stress that - is in strong countries that are capable of defending their own sovereignty, their own territorial integrity, and we - territorial integrity, and we are not the threat to that territorial integrity.

So I think - and this is what we hear from regional countries, is that a very strong American presence is in their interest because without a strong United States that's active and engaged, you won't have a balance of power. And if you don't have a balance of power, you won't have a continuation of the decades of economic growth that have happened in this region. That's what we're looking for. We're looking for a continuation of that peaceful balance of power that will lead to further economic growth throughout this region.

MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next question goes to Priscilla Ganesan of BFM in Malaysia. Please unmute yourself and go ahead.

QUESTION: Morning. My question to you is: As the U.S. deepens defense cooperation with Indonesia and also expand its regional posture, what role does Washington see for Malaysia in safeguarding the Strait of Malacca and also other critical maritime chokepoints? Thank you.

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: Thank you. Well, no, we welcome more engagement with Malaysia. We've already had a number of very good conversations with our Malaysian counterparts, and we'd welcome further. Obviously, the scheduling of this trip, you can only go to so many places. So there's no disrespect at all meant to Malaysia or anybody else. We'd welcome deeper collaboration. And again, on the same logic, whether it's the Strait of Malacca or Malaysia's territorial integrity and security, sovereignty in the South China Sea - these are areas where we want to deepen relations and deepen partnership with Malaysia, and also enable Malaysia to be able to defend its own sovereignty and territorial integrity as much as it can. And we believe that's very consistent with the ASEAN Way, a pragmatic approach that's designed to strengthen the national defense capability of the ASEAN countries.

MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next question goes to Patpicha Tanakasempipat of Bloomberg, if you could please unmute yourself and go ahead.

QUESTION: Thank you very much. Under Secretary, I would just like to ask about our Bloomberg News report earlier this week that Thailand was preparing to warn the U.S. that steep tariffs could force it to scale back military cooperation, including joint exercises like Cobra Gold. My question is: What's your view on this potential move by Thailand to leverage security cooperation in the trade talks?

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: Yeah, I won't - I won't comment on the - what the Thai government's position is. I have not - we have not received anything like that. Obviously, there are - we hear regularly from countries throughout the world their economic interests, and we respect those, but we have certainly not heard from Thai counterparts that they are linking or kind of preparing to pull down things like Cobra Gold, which are of shared interest, because of the tariff issues.

One thing I would say is I think - that distinguishes our administration, and this is a message that I stressed in my remarks in Manila, is I think this is an administration that is America First and that is common-sense. And I think I mentioned that there's an analogy to the ASEAN Way. This is not an ideologically rigid administration. It's designed to advance the interests of regular Americans in the same way that the Thai government or the Malaysian government or the Indonesian government or the Philippine government looks to advance the interests of their citizens and does so in a pragmatic way.

And President Trump, to his great credit, ran on both - all the times he's run on rectifying the inequitable and kind of foolhardy arrangement on excessive visions of an ideological vision of kind of free trade and unfettered trade that was not realistic, and that is accepted now. It's a consensus in the United States across the partisan spectrum that that was a mistake. And so President Trump and people like Ambassador Greer, Ambassador Lighthizer in the first term, who's the - we were honored to have as the chairman of our Defense Policy Board, they're trying to restore and put things back on a much more sensible, common-sense basis where we use - the Administration is using the instruments it has available to try to recalibrate these relationships in a more common-sense way.

So this is obviously a priority for the Administration as a whole from the President on down, and we recognize and of course support that. And I think one of the things that makes it different is there's a perception, certainly in the Trump Administration, that in the past the United States would often bargain away reasonable leverage on the economic side for regular Americans for sort of putative gains on the security side, often kind of trading away the interests of regular Americans economically for sort of notional gains often on the security side. And that's not the approach that we're taking.

That doesn't mean it goes in the other direction. But I think the way we're looking at things in general terms is the economic side is going to be looked at on its own merits, and the United States is going to drive a hard bargain. You can't take the United States for granted anymore, as I said in Manila and as the President has made very clear. But at the same time, we're going to look at the security case on its own merits.

And I think the point I stressed in Manila that I'd like to stress again here is that this is an unprecedented historic opportunity, especially in a place like Southeast Asia, where in the last generation, often American policy, for instance, on the strategic side would often be subordinated to kind of liberal or progressive political ideas, and important strategic relationships would be subordinated to those ideological priorities. And that sort of - I think that was an implicit - if you will, almost a denigration of the importance of the relationships here.

What we're doing is recalibrating and say, look, we're going to look at this. Obviously, we're going to stand for our values and our principles, of course, but we're going to - we believe that Southeast Asia is incredibly important, and not just as a kind of throwaway line, but it's going to be one of the most important economic areas in the world. ASEAN is growing. You're going to have countries like Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam are going to be some of the most important economies in the world. We need to take it seriously on its own terms. Sure, we're going to have issues on the political side or what have you that we can make those points, but we're not going to hold hostage everything that's important here in this very important region on the economic side, but also on the security side.

So this is an opportunity for - because we're coming in a pragmatic, results-oriented, sort of deal-making spirit to say, look, let's unlock things that make sense for both of us. We're not coming and saying, you need to pick us and hate the X country or Y country or Z country. We're saying, we understand everybody's going to be dealing on multiple factors. We're going to be - and multiple vectors. We're going to be pragmatic about that. But you and we both have interests in working together and deepening and revamping our strategic security relationship, whether it's in helping you have capacity to uphold your claims in the maritime environment, whether it's in ISR, whether it's in foreign military sales, whether it's in training. Those are things that we have to offer, and of course the countries of the region have things to offer us. We're going to look at it in a common-sense basis. What is it that we need? We're not asking for fealty; we're asking for practical things: access, collaboration, these kinds of things.

And so I think this is a really historic opportunity, and I feel I've already seen the evidence as I've gone through the meetings now in three countries - in the Philippines, in Indonesia, in Thailand - we feel that hypothesis is being borne out. We already see pretty dramatic evidence that countries in the region also see things in this pragmatic, results-oriented way. And so we're very optimistic about the future of the relationship with the ASEAN countries.

MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next question goes to Torn Chanritheara from ThmeyThmey in Cambodia. Please unmute yourself and go ahead. Torn, please go ahead.

QUESTION: Okay. Do you hear me?

MODERATOR: Yes.

QUESTION: Okay. So my question to Mr. Colby: So Cambodia and U.S., I mean, the joint military exercise will resume next year. So what is, I mean, U.S. objective on this resumption? And this could represent the U.S., I mean, signal of preparedness to expand a broader defense cooperation with Cambodia, like including armed sales? So thank you.

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: Yes, thank you. Well, I'm pleased that I'm going to be traveling to Phnom Penh tonight and I will be having meetings tomorrow. So yes, we are looking forward to working to expand the defense partnership with Cambodia in exactly the same spirit that I've been laying out, which is a kind of pragmatic one designed to help Cambodia secure its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and in a kind of pragmatic basis. So that's the same spirit that we're carrying to Cambodia. I think we've already made progress in the last year or so with Phnom Penh, so we're looking forward to continuing that.

MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next question goes to Jesse Johnson of The Japan Times, if you could unmute yourself and go ahead.

QUESTION: Hello, can you hear me?

MODERATOR: Yes.

QUESTION: Thank you for doing this, Mr. Secretary. So in a recent speech, you touted flexible realism and frowned on middle-power alliances that you say are designed to exclude America. But most of these middle powers are seeking to offset what they believe is a faltering U.S. presence in the region, which is in itself kind of a pragmatic and realistic strategy. I'm curious how the Trump Administration squares this.

And also, it's been pointed out that neither China nor the South China Sea were mentioned in your recent speech. Can you tell us why these were not mentioned? Thank you.

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: Yeah, sure. Let me go - maybe I'll start with the second. I mean, look, I think as I said in Manila, first of all, the point was really to underline the theme, the kind of strategic theme that we're bringing here, which is a change in strategic approach. And so there are any number of issues that we could talk about. And also, kind of the key theme of this approach is strengthening countries and delivering results, real kind of military and capability results, and not, as we call it, peacocking. I think there's been a lot of talk along those lines for many years, but much less delivery.

And I think our approach in the Trump Administration is strong and clear, but quiet, which is true for ourselves, but also with our collaboration with allies and partners, which is all about quietly, relentlessly increasing deterrent strength and capability, but coupling that with well-advised rhetorical language. Everybody knows our position on those issues. They've been repeated many times in private and public, so we don't feel the need to tub thump every day. We think that what is unique and different about our approach is that focus on results in the military domain, not only for ourselves where we think the proof is in the pudding, but also with our allies and partners.

On the middle-powers thing, actually, a key point of our approach - and thanks for the question, Jesse - is actually that's not an accurate assessment, that actually countries in the region do know, especially in the Indo-Pacific do know but also actually in Europe - I mean, that's one of the things we were trying to kind of highlight a bit more, is that in our dealings with governments, not only here but actually also in Europe and the Middle East, you don't see interested middle powers, with a couple of minor exceptions - you do not see a middle-power collaborative strategy.

Now, let's distinguish something. There's a category of countries that are middle powers. That's an analytical component. That's fine. That's just an analytical discussion about how they should operate. Then there's a middle-power strategy, which is like, oh, middle powers should work together often because - on the putative basis for what you just laid out, which is that they don't trust America or they don't have enough capacity for America or don't believe America has enough capacity or whatever it might be, and then they should collaborate together.

What we're going against - and actually largely often in the interests of the stated middle powers - is actually that that's not a smart or wise strategy. Part of the point is we're not nervous about it from our self-interested point of view because we know that the size of the American economy, our investments at the cutting edge of technology, the quality and scale of our defense industrial base, the quality of the American Armed Forces, they're unbeatable. So we know that we will be okay. What we're actually trying to communicate is that middle-power countries, especially ones that are threatened or feel a higher degree of threat, risk wasting a lot of time, effort, resources, et cetera, if they embark on a futile and kind of foolhardy quest along those lines.

And I mean, I gave some specific examples like on defense industrial capacity, where we are actually encouraging - this is an important point to stress - we're actually encouraging countries - and this is distinct from past administrations - we actually want middle powers as an empirical category to build up their strength. And we're also encouraging them to indigenize a lot of their defense industry.

What we're moving against is saying - what we're arguing against is excluding or attempting to exclude, and ultimately that will not work, the United States from those kinds of collaborations in order to supplant them. So if you look at the - depending on what your definition of middle power is. Look at Poland. Look at Germany. Look at Finland. Look at - obviously Japan, Germany, those are very large powers. South Korea, maybe count the Philippines, et cetera. They are increasing their engagement with the United States. They are spending more on defense, and a lot of that is going to go into their own arms sales. But you see - take the F-35. You see tremendous interest in the F-35 in the Middle East as well.

So that's really what we're doing. I mean, we actually view this kind of critique of the middle-power strategy as, if anything, being really in the interests of those countries themselves not to embark on a course that's ultimately going to be a waste of time.

We are - we - especially we in the Pentagon have been very clear over the last 18 months. And I mean, ask around. We are not saying you shouldn't indigenize some of your defense industrial dollars. We're just saying, hey, look, let's focus on results. That's the key point. Don't use - and there are some countries that are doing this - don't use your defense industrial dollar as a kind of political or industrial economic strategy for your domestic context. Make sure that when you're thinking about, hey, where - what kind of aircraft are we going to buy? What kind of interceptor are we going to buy? What kind of ships are we going to buy? That should have military deterrent utility that's focused on strategic reality.

And if you do that, the American option will not always be the optimal solution. Oh, no sweat - that's great. We totally get it, and we encourage - we understand that you can't expect countries to spend more on defense, as we are advocating for, if they don't indigenize some of those yen or euros or whatever they may be. We get that. But let's make sure it's designed to strengthen deterrence and defense capabilities as rapidly, as efficiently as possible.

MODERATOR: Thanks. Our next question goes to James Griffiths of The Globe and Mail, if you could please unmute yourself and go ahead.

QUESTION: Hi, yeah. Thanks for this, Under Secretary. I wondered if you could talk specifically about how the U.S. is working with the Philippines to increase deterrence when we talk about China's actions in the South China Sea, and including territorial claims and increased harassment of Filipino vessels. We're a decade on from the international tribunal ruling, but deterrence in that last decade doesn't seem to have done much, and I wonder what you think the current administration is doing differently to the ones that came before it. Thanks.

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: Yeah. I mean, I think we are focused on that strengthening of deterrence capabilities and military capabilities. We're not interested in unnecessarily pressurizing the rhetorical environment as administrations of the past have often focused on on a variety of issues, not just in the South China Sea but other sensitive issues. We are focused on increasing strength and having those results be measured by the results in a kind of peace-through-strength approach.

So we - I mean, we have unprecedented collaboration with the government in Manila. We feel that we're going to really, hopefully dramatically, improve the partnership, the strategic and defense partnership with Jakarta, Bangkok. We hope the same thing in Phnom Penh, in Hanoi, in Kuala Lumpur, with Singapore obviously already a strong relationship. We think that combination is not only sensible but is also - on its own terms, but is also the one that resonates in this region. And that's - that was our hypothesis and we feel that that's resonating.

MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next question goes to Ben Packham of The Australian, if you could please unmute yourself and go ahead.

QUESTION: Thank you, Under Secretary. If I could just ask for an AUKUS update from you, and what's your assessment of Virginia-class submarine production and whether that will permit the sale of three of those boats to Australia in the 2030s? And if I may, what is the strategic value of the Submarine Rotational Force-West to the United States, and how do you think that's going to operate after 2032 when Virginia-class submarines are due to become nuclear-armed? Thank you.

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: On the first, we're very pleased to say that AUKUS is, as the President said, full steam ahead. And we have a very tight discussion and a very clear understanding between the Pentagon and the broader Administration and the Australian government, and we've been very pleased with the progress that has been made since the conclusion of the AUKUS review, which has basically, I think, provided a roadmap for the success of the AUKUS program.

We all know this is a historic endeavor on the part of both countries, but particularly for Australia, and that requires a real sort of level of effort that we see the evidence for. And so we remain optimistic but also clear-eyed about what we all need to do to achieve that. We in the Pentagon are very focused on submarine production, submarine maintenance, and making sure that that's in as strong a place it can be.

Obviously, there's a lot of things that the Australian side needs to do. We have been pleased with progress on SRF-West, which is tremendously important and is one of the key values that benefit not just the United States but Australia itself, because I think one of the things that we've been impressed with our close ally, no better ally, Australia, is that Australia really sees things through the lens of collective defense and a strategy of deterrence by denial designed to sustain a balance of power in this key region.

So we see a deep alignment of thinking, and we see an energy and a focus more and more on the Australian side that we're optimistic. And we'll just keep knocking down the targets on our side, and we have every expectation the Australian side will do the same. They know what is required. We've been very clear in private with them, designed to give everybody a reasonable, stable, and realistic set of expectations to achieve this historic ambition that will put us all in a stronger place, and we're hopeful that that will continue.

MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next question goes to Allegra Mendelson of The Telegraph, if you could please unmute yourself and go ahead.

QUESTION: Thank you very much, Under Secretary. Taiwan will wrap up its annual military drills tomorrow, and I am curious to hear your thoughts on what the Trump Administration made of the drills as well as the defense capabilities that were on display the last week and a half. Thank you.

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: Thanks. I mean, I think as the President and Secretary Rubio have made clear, our position is the status quo, and we're looking to promote a strategic stability and a stable balance of power in the region. I think we are conscious - consciously distinguishing from particularly the last administration where an intense rhetorical pressurization around that sensitive issue without a commensurate focus on delivering military capability in the region, whether U.S. or ally and partner.

And so we believe that the recipe that, under the President and the Secretary's leadership, we're pursuing is the right one. It's designed to keep the rhetorical atmosphere at a stable level - again, that concept of strategic stability designed where nobody in this interest - in this region has an interest in a major war and we shouldn't - we see a part of our responsibility as not contributing to rhetoric that might make that more likely; but at the same time, that relentless strengthening of deterrence throughout the region designed for that peace-through-strength model, which is both parts of that are vital, and sometimes you only hear one or the other.

It's a common-sense - I mean, people go back and say, oh, President Trump is this radical break. I mean, this is the foreign policy of Dwight Eisenhower in a lot of ways. He met with the Soviet leadership, for instance. This is the foreign policy of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, who began the military rebuild after Vietnam, but at the same time we're engaging with the Soviet and the Chinese leadership. And it's the foreign policy in many ways of President Reagan, who people often talk about the "evil empire" speech, but they forget - and of course the military buildup, but they forget that President Reagan was the one who met General-Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik and visited Moscow while he was president and brought the Cold War to a conclusion through diplomacy.

So that's that tradition of peace through strength that we are resuscitating in this region, and we believe not only is that, again, the right approach, the strategically sound approach; we believe it's an approach that resonates throughout Asia and the Indo-Pacific but particularly in the countries of ASEAN and Southeast Asia where countries understand the importance of strength. They don't take for granted the importance of defending their territorial integrity and integrity, so they understand that. But they're also pragmatic and results-oriented. They don't want a big war. Nobody wants a big war. But you understand that you have to be strong to ensure that you can prevent that outcome.

MODERATOR: Thank you. We have time for one more question, and it will go to Kenta Kamimura of Yomiuri Shimbun in Japan. Please unmute yourself and go ahead. Kenta, are you on the line? Are you able to ask your question?

All right, it looks like Kenta is not able to ask a question, so let's go to Hyun-soo Kim of Yonhap, if you could please unmute yourself and go ahead.

QUESTION: Hi.

MODERATOR: Hyun-soo, if you could - yes, we can hear you.

QUESTION: Oh, thank you. So there have been reports that the Department of War is developing a new nuclear strategy that would put greater emphasis on short-range, low-yield tactical nuclear weapons to deter China and Russia. So given your role in shaping the strategy, are you considering the expansion of low-yield, theater-level nuclear options in the U.S. arsenal to be a central element of the new strategy? And also, what implications, in your view, could this option have on the security environment in Northeast Asia, especially for U.S. allies in the region like South Korea? Thank you.

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: Great, thank you. Well, this is pre-decisional. I spoke a bit about this at the U.S. Strategic Command conference, so I had quite a bit for about an hour and those - that question-and-answer period is available on the Department of War website as a transcript. So I'd recommend that to your attention.

One thing, we're still undertaking the review, which is a relatively narrow review. It's not a full nuclear posture review. It's more related to kind of the particular potential employment, God forbid, of nuclear weapons. Obviously, the goal here, I stress, is to maintain deterrence and stability rather than to exacerbate it.

One thing I would like to specifically clarify is that we are not seeking to accentuate or increase the focus on theater-range nuclear weapons. There is a little bit of, I think, an error in the reporting that we're focused on that. It's not an exclusion of theater-range systems, but I would just kind of like to clarify that because that has more to do with the range and the launch - potential launch location of a nuclear weapon. Our view is that the more important elements about nuclear weapons, God forbid they were ever used, again, would be crossing of the nuclear threshold itself as well as the effect it might have.

The main thing, as I stressed, is really to make sure that - and again, this is the whole - and if you're interested, I also gave some remarks at the National War College in May laying this out. And this is very - obviously very consistent with our National Defense Strategy and what Secretary Hegseth said in multiple different venues, is to make sure that our military strategy, including our nuclear strategy, backing up our overall strategy, which is designed for favorable balances of power and stability, is a rational one in which the potential employment of military force at great scale, including nuclear weapons, would be rational and correlated with the interests at stake for the United States of America.

And this, of course - this has multiple ramifications, obviously our focus on denial. Denial, let me stress, at the conventional or nuclear level, is status quo-oriented. It's designed to defend the territorial integrity of our allies and partners. It's not designed to go regime change. The U.S. military used to be sized and shaped to conduct regime change operations. That's not what we're sizing and shaping. We're shaping for a defensive function of denial. It's also one of the key reasons why we're pushing so much on burden sharing, is that we recognize that our allies and partners, including places like South Korea, Germany, Japan, Australia, Poland, these are very wealthy countries that can and are prepared to do more. And that will also make the military problem, particularly in the context of potential multiple concurrent scenarios, much more - we'll have an alliance-wide military and defense strategy that's more viable and sustainable, and that will make the whole thing more sustainable and ultimately be better postured to deter conflict.

So that's really the logic. I have no kind of statements to make about a change in our nuclear strategy at this time. We don't anticipate radical changes. Really what we're looking at is making sure that the nuclear strategy, just as the conventional strategy that we have, is fit for purpose for the time and the strategic context in which we find ourselves.

Let me just conclude. I see a couple of questions in the - I won't have the ability, unfortunately, to get to all of them. But let me go through and just try to answer a few that I think are a little bit distinctive and that I'd like to comment on.

One question is about the change of the name from INDOPACOM to PACOM, and does this signify a strategic shift away? I'd just like to stress that this is not in any way a sort of denigration of the importance of the Indian Ocean area or of India itself, as I visited India in March and gave some remarks there. We've had a number of senior administration officials visit India. We really see India as a critical power, and the Indian Ocean, of course, is very important. There are multiple important relationships we have there.

The change back to PACOM has multiple reasons, but I think what I would stress here is that the strategic focus of the United States military is really - and consistent with the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy - is on the first island chain. And so the Pacific element to that is really the focus, the Western Pacific area, obviously stretching into Southeast Asia here. Again, that's the strategic logic.

So if anything, we really see India as a vital relationship where there's a natural partnership. Again, similar spirit - in fact, essentially the same spirit that I'm bringing here - I brought to India in the spring, is to say this is a respectful basis. Let's look where our interests align. We're going to have areas where we don't always agree. But we're looking for a stronger India, and the change in name - of course, there's also different geographical lexicon. Indo-Pacific has one meaning, the Pacific has another, the Asia Pacific has a third. So I think that's something that I would stress there.

Let me just see if there's - and I don't know if we got that question from the Japanese, the Yomiuri reporter or not, since we haven't had a Japanese question.

Yeah, other than that, I think I've probably covered most of what I'm here to discuss. I don't know if we have the Japanese reporter. Otherwise, I'll probably conclude there.

MODERATOR: Kenta Kamimura, are you still on the line and able to ask your question? Okay, I think it looks like we're not able to get that question, so maybe we will wrap there.

UNDER SECRETARY COLBY: Okay, thank you, everyone.

MODERATOR: Thank you all so much for joining us. Yes, thank you so much. We'll provide the audio recording of today's briefing shortly via email to all participating journalists, and the transcript will be available in the coming hours. If you have any feedback or further questions, please feel free to contact us at [email protected]. Thanks again for your participation, and we hope you can join us for another briefing soon. Take care.

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