Results

CSIS - Center for Strategic and International Studies Inc.

01/15/2026 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 01/15/2026 13:23

New Executive Order Ties U.S. Critical Minerals Security to Global Partnerships

New Executive Order Ties U.S. Critical Minerals Security to Global Partnerships

Photo: BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP/Getty Images

Critical Questions by Gracelin Baskaran

Published January 15, 2026

On January 15, 2026, President Trump signed the first critical minerals executive order (EO) of the year, titled "Adjusting Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Their Derivative Products into the United States." The order emphasizes the use of international cooperation to strengthen U.S. minerals security. With the United States fully import-dependent for 12 critical minerals and reliant on imports for more than half of its consumption of an additional 29, expanded coordination with allied and partner countries will be central to reducing supply chain vulnerabilities and dependence on China.

In a way, the United States will take a page out of China's playbook. Its dominance did not emerge in isolation. Over the past three decades, Beijing has leveraged its allies to secure minerals. Although China produces only about 10 percent of global lithium, cobalt, and copper, it controls an estimated 40 to 90 percent of the world's processing capacity for these materials. This concentration reflects decades of deliberate industrial, trade, and foreign policy decisions rather than natural resource endowment alone.

Q1: How does the EO shape U.S. policy toward critical minerals?

A1: The EO is focused on international trade of processed critical minerals, rather than upstream extraction, given the concentration of processing capabilities in China. It specifically notes that "Mining a mineral domestically does not safeguard the national security of the United States if the United States remains dependent on a foreign country for the processing of that mineral."

To address this vulnerability, the EO directs the secretary of commerce to negotiate agreements with foreign partners to secure adequate U.S. supplies of processed minerals. These agreements are intended to incentivize cooperation on processing, refining, and downstream capacity. If negotiations fail to produce timely or satisfactory outcomes, the order explicitly contemplates the use of trade remedies-such as tariffs or other import restrictions-to protect U.S. national security. The order also leaves open the possibility of additional measures in the future, including minimum import prices for certain critical minerals, depending on the results of negotiations.

Q2: How does the EO position critical minerals as a foundational pillar of national, economic, and energy security?

A2: The EO frames processed critical minerals as foundational inputs across the entire U.S. economy and energy system, not niche industrial commodities. It finds that these materials are essential to all 16 critical infrastructure sectors identified under National Security Memorandum 22, including chemicals, communications, and energy. From enabling chemical synthesis and industrial processes to powering fiber optic networks, satellites, batteries, nuclear fuel, generators, and electric motors, the EO makes clear that economic stability, energy reliability, and military capability all rest on secure access to processed critical minerals.

It also reinforces the importance of the minerals-defense nexus, noting that processed critical minerals are foundational to the U.S. defense industrial base, directly enabling military readiness and technological superiority. They are embedded across nearly all major defense systems-from aircraft and munitions to naval platforms, communications, and surveillance-making secure access to processed minerals a core national security imperative.

Q3: How does this EO further integrate critical minerals into the administration's foreign policy and economic statecraft tool kit?

A3: The new EO makes clear that the United States is not pursuing an America-only approach to mineral security. Instead, it embeds critical minerals into a framework of allied cooperation, trade negotiation, and shared supply chain resilience, recognizing that no single country can secure these supply chains alone. By prioritizing agreements with trusted partners on processed minerals and pairing cooperation with clear trade consequences if vulnerabilities persist, the EO signals a shift toward global supply chain cooperation as a pillar of U.S. economic and national security strategy, rather than unilateral self-sufficiency.

Q4: What role does the EO assign to price support mechanisms in critical minerals policy?

A4: The EO explicitly recognizes price volatility as a structural vulnerability in critical mineral markets that undermines private investment, discourages market-based economies from sustaining capacity, and threatens the long-term viability of U.S. mining, processing, and downstream manufacturing.

The EO directs the secretary of commerce, in coordination with the U.S. trade representative, to consider price support mechanisms-such as price floors-within negotiated trade agreements, alongside other trade-restricting measures where appropriate. By framing price volatility as a national security concern rather than a market anomaly, the EO signals a shift toward using trade policy to stabilize prices and sustain industrial capacity, rather than relying solely on market forces.

Q5: Who is responsible for coordinating these bilateral agreements?

A5: The EO assigns joint responsibility to the secretary and the U.S. trade representative, who are directed to coordinate and lead negotiations on bilateral agreements to address national security risks arising from imports of processed critical minerals and their derivative products. The order also authorizes them to involve other senior executive branch officials as appropriate, ensuring a whole-of-government approach consistent with Section 232 authorities. The most likely agencies include the Department of State (for diplomatic engagement), the Department of Defense (for defense industrial base requirements), the Department of Energy (for materials and processing expertise), and the National Security Council to ensure alignment with broader national security priorities.

Q6: How does this EO build on President Trump's previous efforts?

A6: In 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13817 to improve federal coordination on critical minerals and strengthen U.S. energy security and economic competitiveness. The order directed an interagency review led by the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Interior, and Energy, in coordination with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. One of the six calls to action in the report was to "Enhance International Trade and Cooperation Related to Critical Minerals: [Identify] options for accessing and developing critical minerals through investment and trade with America's allies . . . [and discuss] areas for international collaboration and cooperation."

During President Trump's second term, critical minerals have emerged as a prominent element of U.S. foreign policy. The administration has pursued a series of bilateral agreements aimed at securing access to mineral resources and strengthening supply chains with key partners, including Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Malaysia, Japan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These agreements have focused on expanding upstream investment, processing cooperation, and long-term offtake arrangements, reflecting a broader effort to reduce U.S. dependence on adversarial suppliers while deepening economic and strategic ties with allied and partner countries.

Gracelin Baskaran is director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2026 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Image
Director, Critical Minerals Security Program

Related Content

Image

Trade in Critical Supply Chains

Congressional Testimony by Gracelin Baskaran - May 14, 2025

Image

What's in the New U.S.-Saudi Minerals Agreement?

Critical Questions by Gracelin Baskaran - November 19, 2025

Image

Ahead of APEC, Trump Signs Flurry of Bilateral Minerals Agreements on Asia Tour

Critical Questions by Gracelin Baskaran and Meredith Schwartz - October 31, 2025

CSIS - Center for Strategic and International Studies Inc. published this content on January 15, 2026, and is solely responsible for the information contained herein. Distributed via Public Technologies (PUBT), unedited and unaltered, on January 15, 2026 at 19:23 UTC. If you believe the information included in the content is inaccurate or outdated and requires editing or removal, please contact us at [email protected]