Russian film and TV replace Ukrainian media: how the enemy rewrites identity under occupation

When cinemas close down in occupied territories, it is often viewed as another consequence of war - ruined buildings, power outages, or lack of cinemagoers. However, operational venues have transformed: they no longer show Ukrainian or international releases, serving instead as platforms for propaganda and brainwashing.

'Legislative' framework

Control of the cinematic landscape in captured regions was established through pseudo-institutions overseeing cinemas, television, and film distribution. In Donetsk Oblast, the so-called 'Ministry of Culture' emerged shortly after the 2014 occupation, while in Luhansk Oblast, a similar body underwent reorganisation before being integrated into the Russian system.

These pseudo-agencies were granted power to regulate cinema operations, issue distribution licences, and dictate film selection policy.

Meanwhile, a regulatory framework was built. In 2015, pseudo-laws 'On Culture' were passed in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, establishing operational rules for cultural institutions - including cinemas - and enforcing language norms in public spaces.

In 2022-2023, Russian law mandated inclusion of local cultural heritage sites into the Russian registry, which also applied to local cinemas.

Because the film landscape in the temporarily occupied territories (TOT) came under Russian management, it enabled the systematic displacement of Ukrainian content and replacement with Russian media.

Weaponising screens for propaganda

After 2014, Russia stepped up film production about the war in Ukraine and the seizure of Ukrainian regions. Between 2014 and 2024, 43 such films appeared, surging after the full-scale invasion due to Russian Ministry of Culture orders.

Most are documentaries created for television.

A prominent example is Renat Davletyarov's military drama Donbas. Okraina. Shot in occupied Crimea and released in 2019.

Critics highlighted overt politicisation from the opening frames: the 2014 Maidan is portrayed as a 'coup', the Ukrainian army is demonised, and Ukrainian dialogue is distorted.

While some acknowledged technical production value, others called the film 'hideous', criticising its script and bias.

Feature film The Witness (or The Musician) was released in August 2023, subsidised by the Russian Ministry of Culture as a 'socially significant' project depicting 'global geopolitical and social changes'.

Box office performance was a failure. Against a budget of 70-200 million roubles, it grossed 15 million, with attendance under 50,000. Industry analysts attributed the flop to poor quality, weak acting, flawed screenwriting, and lack of marketing. Film critic Ivan Filippov noted that Russian society 'has no appetite for propaganda', whereas 'politically neutral' products succeed.

On IMDb, the movie received 1 out of 10. Critics pointed out that its propaganda narratives - accusing Ukrainians of aggression and crimes - parroted official discourse. The Insider described the plot as 'inept', comparing films funded by the Russian Ministry of Culture to those commissioned by Nazi Germany's Ministry of Propaganda.

Feature film Opolchenochka (The Militia Girl) was the first project of Lugafilm, a studio set up in occupied territory. Its focus is the war in Donbas.

Actors from Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts, as well as Russia, participated. Filming took place in Luhansk, Kadiivka, Alchevsk, and on firing ranges.

Premiering in Donetsk in May 2019, it screened in Luhansk, Sevastopol, Moscow, and St Petersburg. Granted a Russian distribution licence in July 2019, it was never widely released and was re-edited by 2020.

The Razumkov Centre, StopFake, and producer Illia Gladshtein all characterise the film as propaganda.

These titles represent a fraction of the propaganda output manufactured and disseminated by Russia across occupied territories.

Another targeted area is television broadcasting in the TOT. In 2023, Russia launched the 'Russian World' satellite project to block access to Ukrainian and European channels, replacing them with Russian content. During occupation, Russian forces capture TV towers first, reconfigure equipment, and cut off Ukrainian signals.

Broadcast media in captured regions falls into categories. Military propaganda: films depicting combat in Donbas where Russian soldiers and collaborators are framed as 'defenders', while the Ukrainian military is cast as the aggressor. So-called 'heroisation': films glorifying supposed 'achievements' of occupiers to cultivate an image of an 'invincible army' and justify war.

A young man from Horlivka, who survived the 2014 occupation, shared how the city's information landscape changed after the arrival of the Russian occupiers:

'By the summer of 2014, there were no Ukrainian media on television. There were local and Russian channels showing adverts calling people to join the "militia". Russian soldiers appeared on the news, talking about the situation. Personally, I got my information from social media and YouTube, where you could find Ukrainian sources and learn the truth.'

Indoctrinating children

Cultural and educational influence targets youth and children. One example is introducing viewings and discussions of Soviet films into the school curricula. A presidential decree requires the Russian Minister of Education and 'heads' of occupied regions to report annually on the initiative's implementation.

Soviet films have been embedded into mandatory curricula. Pupils discuss what they watch, linking themes directly to subjects covered in lessons.

Under the 'Historical Memory' project, run by United Russia, culture palaces in Donetsk screen documentaries about the 'Great Victory' for schoolchildren. After watching, children share impressions as part of a system designed to reshape youth worldview in the TOT.

According to a teenager who attended school in occupied Horlivka and later moved abroad, pro-Russian narratives were actively promoted at school following the occupation:

'When I had already moved abroad but still continued studying remotely at my hometown school, they talked about everything Russian constantly during lessons: Russia is great, Ukraine is bad. But then I was expelled from the school because I only had a Ukrainian passport.'

Mobile cinemas

The Russian government is discussing tighter grip over cultural and information spheres, proposing to reinstate pre-production censorship in filmmaking with mandatory script reviews before shooting begins.

In Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, a system of mobile cinema screenings operates. Mobile cultural centres - trucks fitted with screens - travel to remote settlements lacking permanent cinema venues.

Screenings are held outdoors or in local community halls, usually free of charge. This format serves as a cost-effective tool for spreading propaganda: it requires minimal advertising costs, providing free content to audiences.

Cinemas, television, and mobile projection units in occupied territories have turned into instruments for the systematic erasure of Ukrainian cultural product.

Under occupation, screens are no longer a medium for leisure; they have become tools for influencing minds, rewriting identity, and forcibly instilling Russian historical and political narratives.