Burnham in Berlin: The Test Is Delivery

By Wes Ball and Daniel Wixforth

Andy Burnham lands in Berlin today for his first face-to-face meeting with Chancellor Friedrich Merz.

It would be easy to dismiss it as another European diplomatic visit. It shouldn't be.

Britain and Germany are Europe's two largest economies. They are also two of its most important defence and industrial powers. At a moment when Europe is trying to rebuild its security, competitiveness and industrial base, the question is not whether London and Berlin should work more closely. It is whether they can turn good intentions into factories, investment, capability and jobs.

The foundations are already in place.

The Kensington Treaty, signed by Keir Starmer and Merz last year, created a framework for deeper cooperation on defence, security, science, technology and growth. Today, the two governments are formally ratifying it and launching a new partnership to counter cyberattacks, sabotage and other hybrid threats.

That is welcome. But treaties do not defend continents. Industrial capacity does.

Two Leaders, Similar Pressures

Burnham arrives in Berlin with a clear domestic imperative.

He wants a closer relationship with Europe. But he also needs to show voters that closer ties deliver tangible benefits: investment, jobs, lower costs and stronger public services. With the UK economy still underperforming, vague talk of "partnership" will not be enough.

Merz faces pressures of his own.

His coalition is under strain, his approval ratings are weak, and there is growing frustration over the pace of economic reform. Foreign policy gives him an opportunity to demonstrate leadership - particularly on Ukraine, defence and European competitiveness.

Both men need results. That creates an opening.

Berlin increasingly recognises that European leadership cannot depend on the Franco-German relationship alone. On defence and security, Britain brings military capability, industrial depth, intelligence relationships and political weight that Germany cannot ignore.

For Burnham, Berlin is a gateway to Brussels. For Merz, London is a partner that can help Germany deliver on its European ambitions.

Their politics differ. Their strategic interests increasingly overlap.

Defence: The Real Test

The Trinity House Agreement and the Kensington Treaty have already established important frameworks on defence procurement, North Sea infrastructure and business-government cooperation.

Now comes the harder part.

Europe faces a security environment not seen for decades. Cyberattacks, sabotage, disinformation and the threat of major-power conflict are no longer theoretical risks. They are operational realities.

The new UK-Germany partnership on hybrid threats is a sensible response. It will focus on information-sharing, coordinated monitoring, deterrence and disruption, as well as protecting critical national infrastructure.

But the bigger prize lies in defence-industrial cooperation.

Britain and Germany are already working together on a long-range precision-strike capability with a range exceeding 2,000km, Boxer and RCH 155 artillery systems, and maritime capabilities. These are not symbolic projects. They are the building blocks of a more credible European defence base.

The next question is fighter jets.

With the Franco-German-Spanish FCAS programme in difficulty, Germany is exploring alternatives. Burnham has expressed openness to Germany joining the UK-Italy-Japan Global Combat Air Programme. That would be a major strategic shift, reshaping Europe's defence-industrial map, complicating Berlin's relationship with Paris, and giving London a new kind of relevance.

Europe wants to rebuild its defences. But political commitments must become joint manufacturing, cross-border supply chains and shared industrial capacity.

The €150 billion SAFE programme shows the problem. Negotiations on enhanced British participation failed in 2025. If Europe excludes trusted partners while trying to build strategic autonomy, it risks undermining the very capability it says it needs.

For primes and tier-one suppliers in both countries, the question is simple: can governments create the conditions for companies to invest, build capacity and deliver what politicians have promised?

Made in Europe: Friend or Foe?

The growing push for "Made in Europe" industrial policy is a double-edged sword for Britain.

Local-content rules, low-carbon standards and domestic supply-chain requirements can help build strategic resilience. But unchecked, they can also sever the cross-Channel supply chains on which European manufacturing depends.

Think car plants, Airbus, agri-food and advanced manufacturing.

Germany understands this better than most. Its export-led economy depends on open markets and deeply integrated industrial networks. Berlin supports a stronger European industrial base, but it is wary of protectionism that disrupts the supply chains its companies rely on.

The proposed Industrial Accelerator Act introduces European-content requirements for certain public procurement and support schemes. Berlin wants room for trusted partners such as the UK. Paris favours stricter European preferences.

That is the battleground.

Burnham's mission in Berlin is to champion a broader "trade partner" approach: ensuring UK-manufactured components count towards European local-content mandates.

But Britain cannot simply ask for access. It must offer value in return - shared green-technology investment, joint energy infrastructure and deeper cooperation on AI standards.

For UK manufacturers, this is a question of investment certainty for the next decade.

Berlin as the EU Benchmark

Brexit has failed, Andy Burham told his party conference. He wants a national conversation about a closer relationship with the EU - one that could ultimately include rejoining.

That is a major political ambition. Berlin will help determine how realistic it is.

Merz is an economic pragmatist, but also a firm defender of Single Market integrity. That does not make him hostile to a closer UK-EU relationship. Germany has a strong interest in bringing Britain closer to the EU on security, trade and industrial policy.

Germany could become one of Britain's most important allies in Brussels.

For Burnham, the immediate challenge is to identify where practical progress is possible - on standards, mobility, energy and industrial cooperation - without reopening every fundamental question of EU membership.

For Merz, a closer UK-EU relationship would also strengthen Europe's capacity to act and give Germany another important partner in shaping Europe's strategic direction.

The UK-EU summit in November will show whether political goodwill can become practical progress.

From Friction to Delivery

Europe faces an uncomfortable contradiction.

It wants greater strategic autonomy. But it cannot achieve it without closer cooperation with trusted partners outside the EU.

Britain and Germany are a test case.

Their relationship could show how Europe combines security cooperation, industrial integration and economic interest without requiring full EU membership.

The measure of success today is more than the communiqué. Can two governments move from post-Brexit friction to a mature, growth-driven strategic partnership: One that delivers projects and unlocks financing. One that gives companies the confidence to invest on both sides of the Channel.

Europe's future will not be shaped by EU institutions alone. It will depend on how effectively Europe works with its closest partners outside the Union. The German-British relationship is a good place to start.