Full text, enrichment details emerge on Saudi 123 Agreement

On July 22, the Department of Energy announced that Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Minister of Energy Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman had signed a 123 Agreement to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation between the two countries. The agreement now awaits congressional approval.

At the time of the signing, Wright said, "Rest assured, these agreements uphold the highest standards of nuclear safety and nonproliferation while relying on the world's best nuclear technology and scientists, designed right here in the United States."

Nonetheless, in the weeks following the announcement, extensive speculation and discourse circulated regarding the nature of the agreement and its broader geopolitical implications. Now, the text of that agreement is available in full, shedding significant light on what the future of nuclear could look like in Saudi Arabia.

123 context: A 123 Agreement, named after and required by section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, establishes a legal framework for any significant nondefense nuclear cooperation between the United States and another country.

The United States maintains valid 123 Agreements with more than 50 countries across the world. Most of these agreements are with countries in South America, Europe, and Asia; Africa and the Middle East have fewer agreements than any other regions. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia's eastern neighbor, is one of the most recent entrants into a 123 Agreement, having made a nuclear deal with the United States in December 2009.

While all 123 Agreements require congressional review and approval, a veto-proof majority would be needed to override the president.

Enrichment details: Most discussion surrounding the U.S.-Saudi deal has been related to enrichment concerns. In a July 23 Truth Social post, President Trump said "There will be no enrichment of material!" as part of the deal, adding, with some unclear terminology, "The United States is not opposed to Civil (Non-Enriched) Nuclear Facilities." Despite this statement, the final 123 Agreement explicitly details a pathway for the potential enrichment of uranium in Saudi Arabia.

Article 7 of the agreement, "Uranium Enrichment," opens by saying both parties "may explore options to support the long-term commercial feasibility of civil uranium enrichment capacity in the United States of America and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia."

The section further calls for a joint enrichment and conversion study in which both parties will identify "appropriate options for the enrichment of uranium" and for "further development or demonstration in the United States of America that could be deployed in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." The section adds that this study will take into account the specific characteristics of the involved technologies, the global commercial market, "the economic viability of an enrichment facility in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia," potential modalities for that facility, and "in particular those considerations needed to ensure that the deployment of such technologies will not result in a significant increase of the risk of proliferation and can be effectively safeguarded by the [International Atomic Energy Agency]."

In terms of enrichment percentage, the section states that any enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia that uses equipment or technology transferred from the United States "shall not be modified or operated to enrich uranium to greater than five-percent" uranium-235. However, it also leaves the door open for a follow-on study on high-assay low-enriched uranium that could increase that threshold to less than 20 percent U-235.

The enrichment details of the U.S.-Saudi deal stand in sharp contrast to the deal previously made between the United States and the UAE. In 2009, when the UAE entered into its 123 Agreement, it agreed to forego any domestic enrichment or reprocessing within its territory. Such a commitment is sometimes referred to as the "gold standard" for international nuclear cooperation agreements.

IAEA chimes in: Yesterday, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi held a press conference in which he highlighted another concern regarding the details of agreement: It does not require Saudi Arabia to accept the Additional Protocol-an IAEA agreement that significantly increases the agency's ability to carry out its safeguards work. It's another point of contrast with the UAE 123 Agreement, which explicitly required the acceptance of the Additional Protocol.

During the press conference, Grossi said that the Additional Protocol "is the ideal setup for safeguards because it gives us more access. But, there are a number of countries which don't have Additional Protocols." He added that the parties are currently developing other agreements that will ultimately give the IAEA "authorizations and capacities which are very similar to those that you may find in an Additional Protocol."

Saudi Arabia background: Nuclear News chronicled Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions and history in July, when the DOE first announced the agreement. Another key element in this story is the November 2025 deal the United States and Saudi Arabia signed to lay out their cooperative plans for the country's civilian nuclear power sector.